Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-75083 (GCVE-0-2026-75083)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-14 16:45 – Updated: 2026-10-16 15:31

Title

Integer underflow of the radio-reported frame length causes an out-of-bounds write in the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver

Summary

The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255. Because the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array. The length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact. The fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-16 15:25 UTC

CWE

CWE-191 - integer-overflow

Assigner

zephyr CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 77/100 over 175 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/comm…	patch
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/secu…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
zephyrproject	zephyr	Affected: 1.8.0 , < 4.5.0 (semver)	guessed

Show details on NVD website

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FKIE_CVE-2026-75083

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-14 17:19 - Updated: 2026-10-15 14:46

Severity

5.9 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org	https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/51d71864578c08eb1a1201f87b46ec81c8609d62
	vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org	https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2pwx-gg6f-535f

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "kw41z_isr"
            },
            {
              "name": "kw41z_rx"
            }
          ],
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    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-75083",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-15T14:46:15.327",
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          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
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  "published": "2026-10-14T17:19:10.307",
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    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/51d71864578c08eb1a1201f87b46ec81c8609d62"
    },
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    {
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        {
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          "value": "CWE-191"
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      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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