CVE-2026-87689 (GCVE-0-2026-87689)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-13 00:53 – Updated: 2026-10-13 00:53
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Metasploit Framework Web Service REST API Missing Authentication on Credential Endpoints
Summary
The Metasploit Framework Web Service REST API (msf-ws) exposes the credential store through Msf::WebServices::CredentialServlet. Every mutating and read route in this servlet calls warden.authenticate! before processing a request, except the update_credential (PUT) and delete_credentials (DELETE) handlers for /api/v1/credentials, which omit the authentication call entirely. Because these handlers call directly into lib/msf/core/db_manager/cred.rb, which performs no authorization check of its own, any client able to reach the web service on its default 0.0.0.0:8080 listener can read, modify, or permanently delete every stored credential record — including passwords, hashes, and private keys stored for a shared team engagement — without presenting any authentication. All published versions of Metasploit Framework through 6.5.4 are affected. The issue is fixed in 6.5.5 by adding warden.authenticate! as the first statement in both handlers, matching the pattern used by every other route in the API.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CWE
- CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/re… | release-notespatch |
| https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework | product |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rapid7 | Metasploit Framework |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.4
(semver)
Unaffected: 6.5.5 (semver) |
guessed |
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