AZL-83192 (CVE-2026-31486)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-22 14:16 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-31486 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.143.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hwmon: (pmbus/core) Protect regulator operations with mutex

The regulator operations pmbus_regulator_get_voltage(), pmbus_regulator_set_voltage(), and pmbus_regulator_list_voltage() access PMBus registers and shared data but were not protected by the update_lock mutex. This could lead to race conditions.

However, adding mutex protection directly to these functions causes a deadlock because pmbus_regulator_notify() (which calls regulator_notifier_call_chain()) is often called with the mutex already held (e.g., from pmbus_fault_handler()). If a regulator callback then calls one of the now-protected voltage functions, it will attempt to acquire the same mutex.

Rework pmbus_regulator_notify() to utilize a worker function to send notifications outside of the mutex protection. Events are stored as atomics in a per-page bitmask and processed by the worker.

Initialize the worker and its associated data during regulator registration, and ensure it is cancelled on device removal using devm_add_action_or_reset().

While at it, remove the unnecessary include of linux/of.h.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.143.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.143.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (pmbus/core) Protect regulator operations with mutex\n\nThe regulator operations pmbus_regulator_get_voltage(),\npmbus_regulator_set_voltage(), and pmbus_regulator_list_voltage()\naccess PMBus registers and shared data but were not protected by\nthe update_lock mutex. This could lead to race conditions.\n\nHowever, adding mutex protection directly to these functions causes\na deadlock because pmbus_regulator_notify() (which calls\nregulator_notifier_call_chain()) is often called with the mutex\nalready held (e.g., from pmbus_fault_handler()). If a regulator\ncallback then calls one of the now-protected voltage functions,\nit will attempt to acquire the same mutex.\n\nRework pmbus_regulator_notify() to utilize a worker function to\nsend notifications outside of the mutex protection. Events are\nstored as atomics in a per-page bitmask and processed by the worker.\n\nInitialize the worker and its associated data during regulator\nregistration, and ensure it is cancelled on device removal using\ndevm_add_action_or_reset().\n\nWhile at it, remove the unnecessary include of linux/of.h.",
  "id": "AZL-83192",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T14:16:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31486"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-31486 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.143.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-31486"
  ]
}



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