AZL-83909 (CVE-2026-31656)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-24 15:16 – Updated: 2026-05-06 06:22 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat
A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same engine->heartbeat.systole request.
The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering __engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow:
<4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915]
<4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0
...
<4> [487.222707] Call Trace:
<4> [487.222711] <TASK>
<4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915]
<4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
<4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915]
<4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915]
<4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915]
<4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915]
<4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760
<4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
<4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150
<4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480
<4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
<4> [487.227141] </TASK>
Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it.
(cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42)
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31656 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.137.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.137.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat\n\nA use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat\nworker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same\nengine-\u003eheartbeat.systole request.\n\nThe heartbeat worker reads engine-\u003eheartbeat.systole and calls\ni915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears\nthe pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request\nretirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering\n__engine_park() -\u003e intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat\ntimer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and\nintel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer\nand calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow:\n\n```\n\u003c4\u003e [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0\n...\n\u003c4\u003e [487.222707] Call Trace:\n\u003c4\u003e [487.222711] \u003cTASK\u003e\n\u003c4\u003e [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915]\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\u003c4\u003e [487.227141] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n```\n\nFix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with\nxchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware\ninstruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This\nguarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL\npointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42)",
"id": "AZL-83909",
"modified": "2026-05-06T06:22:03Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T15:16:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31656"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-31656 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.137.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-31656"
]
}
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