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BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-R5FQ-947M-XM57)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:24 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has a path traversal in apply_patch could write/delete files outside the workspace
Details

Summary

In affected versions, when apply_patch was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.13
  • Fixed: >= 2026.2.14

Details

The non-sandbox path resolution in apply_patch did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like ../../... or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.

Impact

Practical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.

Workarounds

  • Keep tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled disabled if you do not need apply_patch.
  • Keep tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly at its secure default of true.
  • Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).

Configuration Note

tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.

Fix

  • PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405
  • Merge commit: 5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1

Credits

Thanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn affected versions, when `apply_patch` was enabled and the agent ran without filesystem sandbox containment, crafted paths could cause file writes/deletes outside the configured workspace directory.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.13`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= 2026.2.14`\n\n## Details\n\nThe non-sandbox path resolution in `apply_patch` did not enforce workspace containment. Inputs like `../../...` or absolute paths could escape the working directory in non-sandboxed mode.\n\n## Impact\n\nPractical impact depends on deployment and who can trigger tool execution. This is most relevant when tool invocation is exposed to less-trusted callers or when operators expected workspace-only containment.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.enabled` disabled if you do not need `apply_patch`.\n- Keep `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` at its secure default of `true`.\n- Restrict who can trigger tool execution (and which tools are allowlisted).\n\n## Configuration Note\n\n`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` intentionally opts out of workspace containment and can re-enable outside-workspace writes/deletes.\n\n## Fix\n\n- PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405\n- Merge commit: `5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1`\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks to @p80n-sec for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32060",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r5fq-947m-xm57"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32060"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16405"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5544646a09c0121fca7d7093812dc2de8437c7f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-path-traversal-in-apply-patch-via-crafted-paths"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has a path traversal in apply_patch could write/delete files outside the workspace",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-r5fq-947m-xm57",
    "CVE-2026-32060"
  ]
}



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