CVE-2025-21834 (GCVE-0-2025-21834)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-03-06 16:22 – Updated: 2026-05-11 21:07
VLAI
Title
seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c , < 5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c (git)
Affected: ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c , < fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed (git)
Affected: ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c , < cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6 (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 6.11
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.11 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.14 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.13.3 , ≤ 6.13.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.14 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/seccomp.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/seccomp.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.11"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.11",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.14",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.13.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.13.3",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.14",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.14",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.13.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.14",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nseccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering\n\nWhen attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached\nprocess is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.\n\nThe reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp\nfilters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known\nsyscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp\nto control their syscall surface.\n\nSince uretprobe is a \"kernel implementation detail\" system call which is\nnot used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and\nthere\u0027s very little point in forcing all userspace applications to\nexplicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.\n\nPass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.\n\nNote: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn\u0027t expected to ever be\nsupported in i386.\n\n[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-11T21:07:25.633Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6"
        }
      ],
      "title": "seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-21834",
    "datePublished": "2025-03-06T16:22:35.490Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-12-29T08:45:45.777Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-11T21:07:25.633Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-21834",
      "date": "2026-07-16",
      "epss": "0.00168",
      "percentile": "0.06366"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2025-21834\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2025-03-06T17:15:23.397\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-06-17T08:44:24.340\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Analyzed\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nseccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering\\n\\nWhen attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached\\nprocess is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.\\n\\nThe reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp\\nfilters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known\\nsyscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp\\nto control their syscall surface.\\n\\nSince uretprobe is a \\\"kernel implementation detail\\\" system call which is\\nnot used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and\\nthere\u0027s very little point in forcing all userspace applications to\\nexplicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.\\n\\nPass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.\\n\\nNote: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn\u0027t expected to ever be\\nsupported in i386.\\n\\n[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: seccomp: pasar a trav\u00e9s de la llamada al sistema uretprobe sin filtrar Al adjuntar uretprobes a procesos que se ejecutan dentro de docker, el proceso adjunto sufre un error de segmentaci\u00f3n al encontrar retprobe. La raz\u00f3n es que ahora que uretprobe es una llamada al sistema, los filtros seccomp predeterminados en docker lo bloquean ya que solo permiten un conjunto espec\u00edfico de llamadas al sistema conocidas. Esto es cierto para otras aplicaciones de espacio de usuario que usan seccomp para controlar su superficie de llamada al sistema. Dado que uretprobe es una llamada al sistema de \\\"detalle de implementaci\u00f3n del kernel\\\" que no es utilizada directamente por el c\u00f3digo de la aplicaci\u00f3n de espacio de usuario, no es pr\u00e1ctica y no tiene mucho sentido forzar a todas las aplicaciones de espacio de usuario a permitirla expl\u00edcitamente para evitar que se bloqueen los procesos rastreados. Pase esta llamada al sistema a trav\u00e9s de seccomp sin depender de la configuraci\u00f3n. Nota: uretprobe actualmente solo es x86_64 y no se espera que sea compatible con i386. [kees: se minimizaron los cambios para facilitar la adaptaci\u00f3n, se modific\u00f3 el registro de confirmaciones]\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"kernel/seccomp.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c\",\"lessThan\":\"5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c\",\"lessThan\":\"fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c\",\"lessThan\":\"cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"kernel/seccomp.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"6.11\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"6.11\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.14\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.13.3\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.13.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.14\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\",\"baseScore\":5.5,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":3.6}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"NVD-CWE-noinfo\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.11\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.12.14\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"632A78F2-3542-460F-A6CF-B0B56B62CABE\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.13\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.13.3\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"0E92CEE3-1FC3-4AFC-A513-DEDBA7414F00\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"186716B6-2B66-4BD0-852E-D48E71C0C85F\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]}]}}",
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Low",
      "current_release_date": "2026-07-15T12:50:10+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-21834",
      "id": "CVE-2025-21834",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-03-06T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "104",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "170",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-21834.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.