CVE-2026-102713 (GCVE-0-2026-102713)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:40 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than
four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not
against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one
missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.
The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:
```c
/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */
status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,
server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);
...
fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);
```
`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the
end of the first packet:
```
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5
#0 __interceptor_memcpy
#1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78
0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region
```
Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them
back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.
The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs
ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the
attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never
returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and
the server thread suspended, and no later client is served.
Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,
and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:44 UTC
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-102713",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-29T18:44:12.259965Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T18:44:38.207Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "NetX Duo",
"product": "NetX Duo",
"vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1.202602",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "L0stHeart"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003efour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003emissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```c\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003estatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026amp;temp_ptr,\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e server_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e...\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003efx_file_write(\u0026amp;(client_request_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_tftp_client_request_file),\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e packet_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e packet_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_packet_length - 4);\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eend of the first packet:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e #0 __interceptor_memcpy\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ereturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ethe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eReject `nx_packet_length \u0026gt; 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026temp_ptr,\n\n server_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(\u0026(client_request_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length \u003e 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-125",
"description": "CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z",
"orgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
"shortName": "eclipse"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
"assignerShortName": "eclipse",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-102713",
"datePublished": "2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-29T16:15:09.632Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T18:44:38.207Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-102713",
"date": "2026-09-30",
"epss": "0.00308",
"percentile": "0.2126"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "NetX Duo",
"product": "NetX Duo",
"vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1.202602",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "emo@eclipse.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026temp_ptr,\n\n server_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(\u0026(client_request_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length \u003e 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-102713",
"lastModified": "2026-09-29T19:17:20.290",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-102713",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-29T18:44:12.259965Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-29T18:17:10.457",
"references": [
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "emo@eclipse.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-102713",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-29T18:44:12.259965Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T18:44:34.697Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "NetX Duo",
"product": "NetX Duo",
"vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1.202602",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "L0stHeart"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003efour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003emissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```c\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003estatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026amp;temp_ptr,\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e server_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e...\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003efx_file_write(\u0026amp;(client_request_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_tftp_client_request_file),\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e packet_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e packet_ptr -\u0026gt; nx_packet_length - 4);\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eend of the first packet:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\u003c/p\u003e\u003ccode\u003e #0 __interceptor_memcpy\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ccode\u003e #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\u003c/code\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e```\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ereturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ethe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eReject `nx_packet_length \u0026gt; 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026temp_ptr,\n\n server_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(\u0026(client_request_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length \u003e 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-125",
"description": "CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z",
"orgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
"shortName": "eclipse"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
"assignerShortName": "eclipse",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-102713",
"datePublished": "2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-29T16:15:09.632Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T18:44:38.207Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…