CVE-2026-34182 (GCVE-0-2026-34182)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-09 16:03 – Updated: 2026-06-10 15:58
VLAI
Title
CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages
Summary
Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails to perform
sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields of
AuthEnvelopedData containers, leading to various potential compromises.
Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve
key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass integrity
validation for a given message.
In one use case, an attacker may send a CMS message containing
AuthEnvelopedData with the cipher specified as a non-AEAD cipher. OpenSSL
erroneously allows this selection, and attempts to decrypt and validate the
message.
An on-path attacker who captures one legitimate AES-GCM AuthEnvelopedData
addressed to the victim can re-emit it with the recipientInfos set left
byte-for-byte intact, so the victim's private key still unwraps the genuine CEK
(the content-encryption key), but with the inner OID rewritten to AES-256-OFB
(Output Feedback Mode, an unauthenticated keystream mode) and with an
attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. The victim initializes AES-256-OFB under the
real CEK, never consults the MAC field, and CMS_decrypt() returns success.
If the application under attack responds to the attacker with any indicator
showing success or failure of the decryption effort, it is possible for the
attacker to use this as an oracle to obtain key equivalent functionality for the
CEK used for the chosen recipient of the message.
In another use case, an attacker can reduce the tag length of the chosen AEAD
cipher for a given AuthEnvelopedData container to be a single byte long,
allowing an attacker to brute force CMS decryption, producing an integrity
bypass for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject modified content.
The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-354 - Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-06-09 14:00
Credits
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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