{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "praisonai-platform",
          "vendor": "MervinPraison",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.1.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no \"cannot remove last owner\" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "PraisonAI Platform es la capa de plataforma para el sistema de equipos multiagente de PraisonAI. Las versiones anteriores a la 0.1.4 tienen una omisi\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n que permite el bloqueo del propietario. El endpoint \u201cDELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\u201d est\u00e1 protegido solo por \u201crequire_workspace_member(workspace_id)\u201d (por defecto \u201cmin_role=\u201cmember\u201d\u201d). Cualquier miembro puede eliminar a cualquier otro miembro, incluyendo al propietario del espacio de trabajo, usando una \u00fanica solicitud DELETE. No hay verificaci\u00f3n de rol del invocador, ni verificaci\u00f3n de rol del objetivo, ni protecci\u00f3n \u2019no se puede eliminar al \u00faltimo propietario\u2019. La versi\u00f3n 0.1.4 de PraisonAI Platform corrige el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-47409",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T19:10:00.127",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-47409",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-21T18:27:48.906663Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-21T17:17:09.640",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/24385d64876577620f749957bd4814f162f4ca47"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/pull/1686"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-w388-2392-px73"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-w388-2392-px73"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47409"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:57:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no \"cannot remove last owner\" guard.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140; `services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78.\n**Root cause:** `MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id)` performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied `user_id` and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue `DELETE .../members/\u003cowner_user_id\u003e` and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140.\n\n```python\n@router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\nasync def remove_member(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # \u003c-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    member_svc = MemberService(session)\n    removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)        # \u003c-- removes any member, including owner\n    if not removed:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Member not found\")\n```\n\n**File 2:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78.\n\n```python\nasync def remove(self, workspace_id: str, user_id: str) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Remove a member from a workspace.\"\"\"\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    if member is None:\n        return False\n    await self._session.delete(member)                               # \u003c-- BUG: no caller-role check, no last-owner protection\n    await self._session.flush()\n    return True\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** member-removal is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. Removing the workspace owner is a permanent denial-of-service against the legitimate owner unless another owner exists. There must be (a) a caller min-role gate of \"owner\" or \"admin\", (b) a check that prevents removing a member whose role is higher than the caller\u0027s, and (c) a check that the workspace is left with at least one owner. None of these exist.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W` with role \"member\". State: attacker holds JWT.\n2. Attacker enumerates the workspace owner\u0027s `user_id` via `GET /workspaces/W/members` (list_members has the same default-member gate, separate finding). Owner UUID `O_id` is now known. State: attacker holds `O_id`.\n3. Attacker sends `DELETE /workspaces/W/members/O_id` with `Authorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_jwt\u003e`. State: control flow enters `remove_member`.\n4. `require_workspace_member(W, attacker)` passes (attacker is a member). `MemberService.remove(W, O_id)` deletes the owner\u0027s member row. State: `Member(workspace_id=W, user_id=O_id, role=\"owner\")` is gone.\n5. Owner attempts `GET /workspaces/W/...` and `require_workspace_member(W, O_id)` returns 403. State: legitimate owner is now locked out of their own workspace.\n6. Combined with the `update_member_role` companion advisory, the attacker first promotes themselves to owner, then removes the legitimate owner, then has uncontested control. Combined with `delete_workspace`, the attacker wipes the workspace after kicking the owner.\n7. Final state: with one member-level token, the attacker locks the legitimate owner out of their own workspace permanently. The owner has no recourse other than database-level admin intervention.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-high. CVSS 8.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, no confidentiality, high integrity (membership table corrupted), high availability (legitimate owner cannot access their own workspace).\n**Attacker capability:** with one workspace-member token plus one DELETE request, the attacker permanently locks any other member (including the workspace owner) out of the workspace.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any membership token; owner\u0027s user_id is reachable via the (unauthenticated-for-member) `list_members` endpoint.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between `require_workspace_member`\u0027s tunable `min_role` parameter and this endpoint\u0027s use of the default value confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, member-tier tokens fail the gate, and removing the workspace\u0027s last owner triggers the additional guard.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -130,11 +130,21 @@\n @router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\n async def remove_member(\n     workspace_id: str,\n     user_id: str,\n-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),\n     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n     member_svc = MemberService(session)\n+    target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n+    if target is not None and target.role == \"owner\":\n+        # Refuse to remove the last owner.\n+        owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == \"owner\"]\n+        if len(owners) \u003c= 1:\n+            raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=\"Cannot remove the last workspace owner\")\n     removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)\n     if not removed:\n         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Member not found\")\n```\n\nThe four companion workspace-mutation endpoints exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.",
  "id": "GHSA-w388-2392-px73",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:57:05Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:57:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-w388-2392-px73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai-platform: Missing authorization on member removal enables full workspace takeover by any user regardless of role"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.1.2",
        "0.1.3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47409",
    "GHSA-w388-2392-px73"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no \"cannot remove last owner\" guard.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140; `services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78.\n**Root cause:** `MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id)` performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied `user_id` and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue `DELETE .../members/\u003cowner_user_id\u003e` and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140.\n\n```python\n@router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\nasync def remove_member(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # \u003c-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    member_svc = MemberService(session)\n    removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)        # \u003c-- removes any member, including owner\n    if not removed:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Member not found\")\n```\n\n**File 2:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78.\n\n```python\nasync def remove(self, workspace_id: str, user_id: str) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Remove a member from a workspace.\"\"\"\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    if member is None:\n        return False\n    await self._session.delete(member)                               # \u003c-- BUG: no caller-role check, no last-owner protection\n    await self._session.flush()\n    return True\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** member-removal is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. Removing the workspace owner is a permanent denial-of-service against the legitimate owner unless another owner exists. There must be (a) a caller min-role gate of \"owner\" or \"admin\", (b) a check that prevents removing a member whose role is higher than the caller\u0027s, and (c) a check that the workspace is left with at least one owner. None of these exist.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W` with role \"member\". State: attacker holds JWT.\n2. Attacker enumerates the workspace owner\u0027s `user_id` via `GET /workspaces/W/members` (list_members has the same default-member gate, separate finding). Owner UUID `O_id` is now known. State: attacker holds `O_id`.\n3. Attacker sends `DELETE /workspaces/W/members/O_id` with `Authorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_jwt\u003e`. State: control flow enters `remove_member`.\n4. `require_workspace_member(W, attacker)` passes (attacker is a member). `MemberService.remove(W, O_id)` deletes the owner\u0027s member row. State: `Member(workspace_id=W, user_id=O_id, role=\"owner\")` is gone.\n5. Owner attempts `GET /workspaces/W/...` and `require_workspace_member(W, O_id)` returns 403. State: legitimate owner is now locked out of their own workspace.\n6. Combined with the `update_member_role` companion advisory, the attacker first promotes themselves to owner, then removes the legitimate owner, then has uncontested control. Combined with `delete_workspace`, the attacker wipes the workspace after kicking the owner.\n7. Final state: with one member-level token, the attacker locks the legitimate owner out of their own workspace permanently. The owner has no recourse other than database-level admin intervention.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-high. CVSS 8.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, no confidentiality, high integrity (membership table corrupted), high availability (legitimate owner cannot access their own workspace).\n**Attacker capability:** with one workspace-member token plus one DELETE request, the attacker permanently locks any other member (including the workspace owner) out of the workspace.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any membership token; owner\u0027s user_id is reachable via the (unauthenticated-for-member) `list_members` endpoint.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between `require_workspace_member`\u0027s tunable `min_role` parameter and this endpoint\u0027s use of the default value confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, member-tier tokens fail the gate, and removing the workspace\u0027s last owner triggers the additional guard.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -130,11 +130,21 @@\n @router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\n async def remove_member(\n     workspace_id: str,\n     user_id: str,\n-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),\n     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n     member_svc = MemberService(session)\n+    target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n+    if target is not None and target.role == \"owner\":\n+        # Refuse to remove the last owner.\n+        owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == \"owner\"]\n+        if len(owners) \u003c= 1:\n+            raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=\"Cannot remove the last workspace owner\")\n     removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)\n     if not removed:\n         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Member not found\")\n```\n\nThe four companion workspace-mutation endpoints exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2938",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:38.376175Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:35:22.488691Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-w388-2392-px73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonai-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w388-2392-px73"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47409"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai-platform: Missing authorization on member removal enables full workspace takeover by any user regardless of role"
}