CVE-2026-52839 (GCVE-0-2026-52839)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-14 15:21 – Updated: 2026-07-15 14:51
VLAI
Title
Easy!Appointments appointments/store and appointments/update allow cross-provider appointment injection — Authorization Bypass
Summary
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 correctly filter provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session. A normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Show details on NVD website

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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