{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "netty",
          "vendor": "netty",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 4.1.136.Final"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.2.0.Final, \u003c 4.2.16.Final"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "3A15093F-C6A7-4FCF-81BA-939CD522D1DD",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.1.136",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "4DE4BC35-4405-49B5-A2A8-A700C7F63C8B",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.2.16",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.2.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the OcspServerCertificateValidator flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as VALID, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate. Exploitation can lead to certificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using OcspServerCertificateValidator is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-56821",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-07T15:05:53.920",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-56821",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-30T03:55:19.093244Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-29T00:16:38.573",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-299"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.16.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.136.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56821"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-299"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T21:46:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`OcspServerCertificateValidator` flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as `VALID`, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate.\n\n### Details\nIn `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered` the freshness check has no `return`, so execution falls through and a `VALID` `OcspValidationEvent` is still fired:\n\n```java\n                        if (!(current.after(response.getThisUpdate()) \u0026\u0026\n                                current.before(response.getNextUpdate()))) {\n                            ctx.fireExceptionCaught(new IllegalStateException(\"OCSP Response is out-of-date\"));\n                        }\n```\n\nNonce validation is optional and off by default, so freshness is the only replay defense \u2014 and it is not enforced. Additionally `getNextUpdate()` may be `null`, making `current.before(null)` throw `NullPointerException`.\n\nhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960#section-3.2\n\n```\n   5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be\n      correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent;\n\n   6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will\n      be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is\n      greater than the current time.\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nAdd the test below to `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidatorTest`\n\n```java\n    @Test\n    void staleOcspResponseIsRejected() throws Exception {\n        X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()\n                .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)\n                .subject(\"CN=TrustedRootCA\")\n                .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)\n                .buildSelfSigned();\n\n        GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, \"http://localhost/\");\n        AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(\n                new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));\n        X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()\n                .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)\n                .subject(\"CN=TargetServer\")\n                .addExtensionOctetString(\"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1\", false, aia.getEncoded())\n                .buildIssuedBy(caRoot);\n\n        Date past = new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() - TimeUnit.DAYS.toMillis(7));\n        CertificateID certId = new CertificateID(\n                new JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder().build().get(CertificateID.HASH_SHA1),\n                new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()),\n                targetCert.getCertificate().getSerialNumber());\n        BasicOCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new BasicOCSPRespBuilder(\n                new RespID(new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()).getSubject()));\n        respBuilder.addResponse(certId, CertificateStatus.GOOD, past, past);\n        BasicOCSPResp expiredBasicResp = respBuilder.build(\n                new JcaContentSignerBuilder(\"SHA256withRSA\").build(caRoot.getKeyPair().getPrivate()),\n                new X509CertificateHolder[0],\n                past);\n        final byte[] responseEncoded = new OCSPRespBuilder()\n                .build(OCSPRespBuilder.SUCCESSFUL, expiredBasicResp).getEncoded();\n\n        IoTransport defaultTransport = createDefaultTransport();\n        IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(defaultTransport.eventLoop(), () -\u003e {\n                NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();\n                channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                    @Override\n                    public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress,\n                                        SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {\n                        promise.setSuccess();\n                        ctx.executor().execute(() -\u003e {\n                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();\n                            DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(\n                                    HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK,\n                                    Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));\n                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, \"application/ocsp-response\");\n                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH,\n                                    httpResponse.content().readableBytes());\n                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);\n                        });\n                    }\n                });\n                return channel;\n            }, defaultTransport.datagramChannel());\n\n            SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder\n                    .forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(),\n                            targetCert.getCertificate(), caRoot.getCertificate())\n                    .build();\n            Channel serverChannel = new ServerBootstrap()\n                    .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())\n                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n                        @Override\n                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));\n                        }\n                    })\n                    .bind(0).sync().channel();\n\n            int serverPort = ((InetSocketAddress) serverChannel.localAddress()).getPort();\n\n            AtomicBoolean validEventFired = new AtomicBoolean();\n            AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e caughtException = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n            DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);\n            SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()\n                    .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)\n                    .build();\n            new Bootstrap()\n                    .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())\n                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n                    .handler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n                        @Override\n                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), \"127.0.0.1\", serverPort));\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(\n                                    new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                                @Override\n                                public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {\n                                    if (evt instanceof OcspValidationEvent \u0026\u0026\n                                            ((OcspValidationEvent) evt).response().status() ==\n                                                    OcspResponse.Status.VALID) {\n                                        validEventFired.set(true);\n                                    }\n                                    ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);\n                                }\n\n                                @Override\n                                public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n                                    caughtException.compareAndSet(null, cause);\n                                    ctx.channel().close();\n                                    latch.countDown();\n                                }\n                            });\n                        }\n                    })\n                    .connect(\"127.0.0.1\", serverPort).sync();\n\n            assertTrue(latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n            assertFalse(validEventFired.get(),\n                    \"OcspValidationEvent(VALID) must not be emitted for a stale OCSP response\");\n            assertNotNull(caughtException.get());\n            assertInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class, caughtException.get());\n\n            serverChannel.close().sync();\n            resolver.close();\n    }\n```\n### Impact\nCertificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using `OcspServerCertificateValidator` is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted.",
  "id": "GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T21:46:39Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T21:46:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty: Out-of-date OCSP Responses Accepted by OcspServerCertificateValidator"
}