CVE-2026-95679 (GCVE-0-2026-95679)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-22 13:50 – Updated: 2026-09-22 15:37
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
MISP Unauthenticated Blind SSRF via XML Body Processing
Summary
MISP's RequestHandlerComponent automatically decodes XML request bodies on all write requests. The underlying Xml::build() library contains a logic error in its readFile guard condition (readFile && http || https), where PHP operator precedence causes the https branch to bypass the readFile check entirely. As a result, a request body containing a bare HTTPS URL is treated as a locator and fetched by the server. Because the cspReport endpoint accepts XML content type and is unauthenticated by design, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a POST request with a crafted XML body to cause the MISP server to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an arbitrary target reachable from the server.
The attacker does not receive the response body, but can use the vulnerability to probe internal services, trigger actions on internal HTTPS endpoints, or perform timing-based reconnaissance of the server's network environment.
The vulnerability affects any MISP deployment where the cspReport endpoint is reachable and the server has network access to internal or external HTTPS services.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-22 15:36 UTC
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/716fc49d3 | patch |
Impacted products
GCVE extensions
AI-generated
Human-reviewed
Confidence: medium
Model
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
AI involvement
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
Patch provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-22 13:46 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/716fc49d3.patch
99e7ef2fbd5a… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
716fc49d3816
|
fix: [security] Decode only an XML body that is actually a | 99e7ef2fbd5a… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a custom XML input type handler in AppController::beforeFilter() that validates the request body contains an XML document marker (the < character) before passing it to the XML decoder. If the body does not contain <, it returns an empty array, preventing the Xml::build() locator/fetch code path from being reached regardless of the vendored library's internal guard logic. This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, eliminating the SSRF vector.
Patch summary
Adds 15 lines to app/Controller/AppController.php in the beforeFilter() method. Registers a custom XML input type via RequestHandler->addInputType('xml', ...) with a closure that checks whether the body is a string containing the < character. If not, it returns an empty array (no decoding). If yes, it delegates to RequestHandler->convertXml(). This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, preventing bare URLs from being interpreted as fetch locators by the vendored Xml::build() library.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The cspReport endpoint is network-accessible. AC:L: The attack requires only a POST request with a specific Content-Type and a URL as the body; no race conditions or complex setup. AT:N: No attack target manipulation is required. PR:N: The cspReport endpoint is unauthenticated by design. UI:N: No user interaction is needed. VC/VI/VA:N: The SSRF is blind; the response is not returned to the attacker, and there is no direct impact on MISP's confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC/SI/SA:N: The blind nature means no data from secondary systems is exfiltrated to the attacker, and no confirmed integrity or availability impact on secondary systems is evidenced. Note: if the server processes the fetched response in a way that leaks data or triggers side effects on internal services, the secondary impact metrics could be higher; this is not confirmed by the available evidence.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-918 The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the MISP server to issue outbound HTTPS requests to arbitrary attacker-specified URLs by sending a crafted XML body to the cspReport endpoint. The server fetches the URL as if it were an XML document locator, constituting a blind SSRF.
- CWE-20 The root cause is that the XML request body is not validated to confirm it is an actual XML document before being passed to Xml::build(). The framework's default behavior treats any XML content-type body as a document without checking for document structure, allowing a bare URL to be interpreted as a fetch locator.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-12 The framework's default behavior is to automatically decode any XML-typed request body through Xml::build() without validating that the body is actually an XML document. This unsafe default, combined with a logic error in the vendored library's guard condition, allows an attacker to exploit the default processing path to trigger an outbound request. CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping; the attack is more specifically about exploiting a logic error in input validation within the default processing pipeline rather than a purely misconfigured default. No CAPEC entry more precisely describes SSRF via unvalidated input in an automatic content-type handler.
Assumptions to verify
- The cspReport endpoint is unauthenticated by design, as stated in the commit message.
- The SSRF is limited to HTTPS targets because the operator precedence bug only ungates the https branch of the readFile guard.
- The SSRF is blind: the fetched response is not returned to the attacker, limiting direct data exfiltration.
- The exact affected version range before 2.5.47 is not precisely determined; the tag boundary indicates the fix is included in v2.5.47.
- CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping; the attack is more specifically about exploiting a logic error in input validation within an automatic content-type handler rather than a purely misconfigured default.
- CVSS impact metrics are set to None based on the blind nature of the SSRF; if the server processes the fetched response in a way that leaks data or triggers actions on internal services, the impact could be higher.
- The vendored Xml::build() library's behavior with a locator (fetching the URL) is taken from the commit message description; the actual library code was not included in the patch.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
3 | 9 | medium | 7 |
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"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T15:36:18.794Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"modules": [
"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "MISP",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.5.47",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Niels Teusink of Eye Security"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5 (1M context)"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP\u0027s RequestHandlerComponent automatically decodes XML request bodies on all write requests. The underlying Xml::build() library contains a logic error in its readFile guard condition (readFile \u0026amp;\u0026amp; http || https), where PHP operator precedence causes the https branch to bypass the readFile check entirely. As a result, a request body containing a bare HTTPS URL is treated as a locator and fetched by the server. Because the cspReport endpoint accepts XML content type and is unauthenticated by design, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a POST request with a crafted XML body to cause the MISP server to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an arbitrary target reachable from the server.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe attacker does not receive the response body, but can use the vulnerability to probe internal services, trigger actions on internal HTTPS endpoints, or perform timing-based reconnaissance of the server\u0027s network environment.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability affects any MISP deployment where the cspReport endpoint is reachable and the server has network access to internal or external HTTPS services.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "MISP\u0027s RequestHandlerComponent automatically decodes XML request bodies on all write requests. The underlying Xml::build() library contains a logic error in its readFile guard condition (readFile \u0026\u0026 http || https), where PHP operator precedence causes the https branch to bypass the readFile check entirely. As a result, a request body containing a bare HTTPS URL is treated as a locator and fetched by the server. Because the cspReport endpoint accepts XML content type and is unauthenticated by design, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a POST request with a crafted XML body to cause the MISP server to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an arbitrary target reachable from the server.\n\nThe attacker does not receive the response body, but can use the vulnerability to probe internal services, trigger actions on internal HTTPS endpoints, or perform timing-based reconnaissance of the server\u0027s network environment.\u00a0\n\nThe vulnerability affects any MISP deployment where the cspReport endpoint is reachable and the server has network access to internal or external HTTPS services."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-12",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-12 Exploiting Unsafe Default Behavior"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-918",
"description": "CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"description": "CWE-20 Improper Input Validation",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T13:50:48.696Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/716fc49d3"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix introduces a custom XML input type handler in AppController::beforeFilter() that validates the request body contains an XML document marker (the \u0026lt; character) before passing it to the XML decoder. If the body does not contain \u0026lt;, it returns an empty array, preventing the Xml::build() locator/fetch code path from being reached regardless of the vendored library\u0027s internal guard logic. This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, eliminating the SSRF vector.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The fix introduces a custom XML input type handler in AppController::beforeFilter() that validates the request body contains an XML document marker (the \u003c character) before passing it to the XML decoder. If the body does not contain \u003c, it returns an empty array, preventing the Xml::build() locator/fetch code path from being reached regardless of the vendored library\u0027s internal guard logic. This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, eliminating the SSRF vector."
}
],
"title": "MISP Unauthenticated Blind SSRF via XML Body Processing",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The cspReport endpoint is unauthenticated by design, as stated in the commit message.",
"The SSRF is limited to HTTPS targets because the operator precedence bug only ungates the https branch of the readFile guard.",
"The SSRF is blind: the fetched response is not returned to the attacker, limiting direct data exfiltration.",
"The exact affected version range before 2.5.47 is not precisely determined; the tag boundary indicates the fix is included in v2.5.47.",
"CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping; the attack is more specifically about exploiting a logic error in input validation within an automatic content-type handler rather than a purely misconfigured default.",
"CVSS impact metrics are set to None based on the blind nature of the SSRF; if the server processes the fetched response in a way that leaks data or triggers actions on internal services, the impact could be higher.",
"The vendored Xml::build() library\u0027s behavior with a locator (fetching the URL) is taken from the commit message description; the actual library code was not included in the patch."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-12",
"rationale": "The framework\u0027s default behavior is to automatically decode any XML-typed request body through Xml::build() without validating that the body is actually an XML document. This unsafe default, combined with a logic error in the vendored library\u0027s guard condition, allows an attacker to exploit the default processing path to trigger an outbound request. CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping; the attack is more specifically about exploiting a logic error in input validation within the default processing pipeline rather than a purely misconfigured default. No CAPEC entry more precisely describes SSRF via unvalidated input in an automatic content-type handler."
}
],
"commit": "716fc49d3816dd17d8aeeee074a12f430edc2a55",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Niels Teusink of Eye Security"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5 (1M context)"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: The cspReport endpoint is network-accessible. AC:L: The attack requires only a POST request with a specific Content-Type and a URL as the body; no race conditions or complex setup. AT:N: No attack target manipulation is required. PR:N: The cspReport endpoint is unauthenticated by design. UI:N: No user interaction is needed. VC/VI/VA:N: The SSRF is blind; the response is not returned to the attacker, and there is no direct impact on MISP\u0027s confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC/SI/SA:N: The blind nature means no data from secondary systems is exfiltrated to the attacker, and no confirmed integrity or availability impact on secondary systems is evidenced. Note: if the server processes the fetched response in a way that leaks data or triggers side effects on internal services, the secondary impact metrics could be higher; this is not confirmed by the available evidence.",
"fixSummary": "The fix introduces a custom XML input type handler in AppController::beforeFilter() that validates the request body contains an XML document marker (the \u003c character) before passing it to the XML decoder. If the body does not contain \u003c, it returns an empty array, preventing the Xml::build() locator/fetch code path from being reached regardless of the vendored library\u0027s internal guard logic. This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, eliminating the SSRF vector.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-22T13:46:08.714767Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 9,
"assumptionCount": 7,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 3
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "99e7ef2fbd5abebda159b377fe3bb3f75026c9966eb556d2d713642448af9d60",
"patchSummary": "Adds 15 lines to app/Controller/AppController.php in the beforeFilter() method. Registers a custom XML input type via RequestHandler-\u003eaddInputType(\u0027xml\u0027, ...) with a closure that checks whether the body is a string containing the \u003c character. If not, it returns an empty array (no decoding). If yes, it delegates to RequestHandler-\u003econvertXml(). This ensures only actual XML documents are processed, preventing bare URLs from being interpreted as fetch locators by the vendored Xml::build() library.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "716fc49d3816dd17d8aeeee074a12f430edc2a55",
"patchSha256": "99e7ef2fbd5abebda159b377fe3bb3f75026c9966eb556d2d713642448af9d60",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/716fc49d3.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/716fc49d3.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Decode only an XML body that is actually a"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/716fc49d3.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Decode only an XML body that is actually a",
"tagVersionBoundary": {
"commits_after_fix": 41,
"repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"tag": "v2.5.47",
"version": "2.5.47",
"version_type": "semver"
},
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-918",
"rationale": "The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the MISP server to issue outbound HTTPS requests to arbitrary attacker-specified URLs by sending a crafted XML body to the cspReport endpoint. The server fetches the URL as if it were an XML document locator, constituting a blind SSRF."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"rationale": "The root cause is that the XML request body is not validated to confirm it is an actual XML document before being passed to Xml::build(). The framework\u0027s default behavior treats any XML content-type body as a document without checking for document structure, allowing a bare URL to be interpreted as a fetch locator."
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20205"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-95679",
"datePublished": "2026-09-22T13:50:48.696Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-22T13:50:46.243Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T15:37:46.734Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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