fkie_cve-2022-2053
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2022-08-05 16:15
Modified
2024-11-21 07:00
Severity ?
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
When a POST request comes through AJP and the request exceeds the max-post-size limit (maxEntitySize), Undertow's AjpServerRequestConduit implementation closes a connection without sending any response to the client/proxy. This behavior results in that a front-end proxy marking the backend worker (application server) as an error state and not forward requests to the worker for a while. In mod_cluster, this continues until the next STATUS request (10 seconds intervals) from the application server updates the server state. So, in the worst case, it can result in "All workers are in error state" and mod_cluster responds "503 Service Unavailable" for a while (up to 10 seconds). In mod_proxy_balancer, it does not forward requests to the worker until the "retry" timeout passes. However, luckily, mod_proxy_balancer has "forcerecovery" setting (On by default; this parameter can force the immediate recovery of all workers without considering the retry parameter of the workers if all workers of a balancer are in error state.). So, unlike mod_cluster, mod_proxy_balancer does not result in responding "503 Service Unavailable". An attacker could use this behavior to send a malicious request and trigger server errors, resulting in DoS (denial of service). This flaw was fixed in Undertow 2.2.19.Final, Undertow 2.3.0.Alpha2.
References
secalert@redhat.comhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2095862&comment#0Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
secalert@redhat.comhttps://issues.redhat.com/browse/UNDERTOW-2133Vendor Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2095862&comment#0Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://issues.redhat.com/browse/UNDERTOW-2133Vendor Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
redhat integration_camel_k -
redhat jboss_fuse 7.0.0
redhat undertow *
redhat undertow 2.3.0


To clipboard 

{
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      {
         nodes: [
            {
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   cveTags: [],
   descriptions: [
      {
         lang: "en",
         value: "When a POST request comes through AJP and the request exceeds the max-post-size limit (maxEntitySize), Undertow's AjpServerRequestConduit implementation closes a connection without sending any response to the client/proxy. This behavior results in that a front-end proxy marking the backend worker (application server) as an error state and not forward requests to the worker for a while. In mod_cluster, this continues until the next STATUS request (10 seconds intervals) from the application server updates the server state. So, in the worst case, it can result in \"All workers are in error state\" and mod_cluster responds \"503 Service Unavailable\" for a while (up to 10 seconds). In mod_proxy_balancer, it does not forward requests to the worker until the \"retry\" timeout passes. However, luckily, mod_proxy_balancer has \"forcerecovery\" setting (On by default; this parameter can force the immediate recovery of all workers without considering the retry parameter of the workers if all workers of a balancer are in error state.). So, unlike mod_cluster, mod_proxy_balancer does not result in responding \"503 Service Unavailable\". An attacker could use this behavior to send a malicious request and trigger server errors, resulting in DoS (denial of service). This flaw was fixed in Undertow 2.2.19.Final, Undertow 2.3.0.Alpha2.",
      },
      {
         lang: "es",
         value: "Cuando una petición POST llega a través de AJP y la petición excede el límite de tamaño máximo de post (maxEntitySize), la implementación AjpServerRequestConduit de Undertow cierra una conexión sin enviar ninguna respuesta al cliente/proxy. Este comportamiento resulta en que un proxy del front-end marque al trabajador del backend (servidor de aplicaciones) como un estado de error y no reenvíe peticiones al trabajador durante un tiempo. En mod_cluster, esto continúa hasta que la siguiente petición de STATUS (en intervalos de 10 segundos) del servidor de aplicaciones actualiza el estado del servidor. Así que, en el peor de los casos, puede resultar en \"Todos los trabajadores están en estado de error\" y mod_cluster responde \"503 Service Unavailable\" durante un tiempo (hasta 10 segundos). En mod_proxy_balancer, no reenvía las peticiones al trabajador hasta que pasa el tiempo de espera de \"reintento\". Sin embargo, por suerte, mod_proxy_balancer presenta el parámetro \"forcerecovery\" (habilitado por defecto; este parámetro puede forzar la recuperación inmediata de todos los trabajadores sin tener en cuenta el parámetro retry de los trabajadores si todos los trabajadores de un balanceador están en estado de error). Así, a diferencia de mod_cluster, mod_proxy_balancer no resulta en la respuesta \"503 Service Unavailable\". Un atacante podría usar este comportamiento para enviar una petición maliciosa y desencadenar errores en el servidor, resultando en DoS (denegación de servicio). Este fallo fue corregido en Undertow versión 2.2.19.Final, Undertow versión 2.3.0.Alpha2",
      },
   ],
   id: "CVE-2022-2053",
   lastModified: "2024-11-21T07:00:14.433",
   metrics: {
      cvssMetricV31: [
         {
            cvssData: {
               attackComplexity: "LOW",
               attackVector: "NETWORK",
               availabilityImpact: "HIGH",
               baseScore: 7.5,
               baseSeverity: "HIGH",
               confidentialityImpact: "NONE",
               integrityImpact: "NONE",
               privilegesRequired: "NONE",
               scope: "UNCHANGED",
               userInteraction: "NONE",
               vectorString: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
               version: "3.1",
            },
            exploitabilityScore: 3.9,
            impactScore: 3.6,
            source: "nvd@nist.gov",
            type: "Primary",
         },
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   },
   published: "2022-08-05T16:15:11.560",
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}


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