{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Server Technology PRO3X",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Server\nTechnology (Legrand group) PRO3X series intelligent rack PDUs, firmware\nspdu-pro3x-030600 build 46640 (ARM 32-bit uClibc Linux).\n\nType: authenticated listener program override leading to root command execution\n(CWE-78, CWE-269; a separate hard-coded factory credential is reported as\nCWE-798). PRO3X PDUs run port_mux, an inetd-style launcher that starts every\nprotocol listener with fork + execv and never drops privileges, so listeners run\nas root. The executable path is proto_listener_entry.program in cfg_pmux.cdl,\ntyped nctl_nspc_nempty_str_512, a free-form string with no whitelist, and an\nauthenticated administrator rewrites it through setConfiguration (POST /J/cfg).\nPointing the port 80 http listener at /bin/sh with arguments -c \"\u003ccmd\u003e\" applies at\nruntime: the next TCP connection to port 80 executes the attacker\u0027s command as\nuid 0.\n\nScoring. This finding is dual-scored, with the conditional figure published\nalongside the primary:\n- PRIMARY, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. An\n  authenticated administrator is required, and that gate was verified unbypassed.\n- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Where\n  the factory default administrator credential is left unchanged, unrotated units\n  are open with no privileged secret.\n\nImpact: root (uid 0) on the rack power distribution controller, a\ncritical-infrastructure power monitoring and control appliance. Full configuration\ncontrol follows; the disabled modbus (502) and mbusd (503) listeners can be armed\nwith attacker-chosen programs. Outlet switching and power cycling were not\nseparately exercised by this proof-of-concept.\n\nAuthentication: post-authentication administrator (with a shipped default\nadministrator credential reported separately as CWE-798).\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. No physical PRO3X hardware was used, and\nthe three-step HTTP chain (POST /J/auth, POST /J/cfg, then the TCP trigger) was\nNOT exercised end to end against a device. What was dynamically proven is the\nroot execution primitive: port_mux fork + execv of an injected /bin/sh -c as uid\n0, run twice inside a network namespace under qemu-arm-static against the\nrootfs unpacked from the firmware Squashfs, each producing a root-owned marker\ncontaining uid=0(root). Each link of the HTTP delivery path was confirmed\ncomponent by component (httpd.conf routing, the BusyBox SCM_RIGHTS descriptor\npassing, the administrator credential accepted by auth_cli, and the configuration\nwrite accepted and read back through cfgc). SCM_RIGHTS descriptor passing between\nthe separate httpd and jsonrpcd processes does not complete under qemu user-mode\nemulation, which is an emulation-environment limitation rather than a property of\nthe vulnerability. Only this build was tested; no other build or model is claimed.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/servertech-pro3x-port-mux-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to\nthis finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-269",
              "description": "CWE-269",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-78",
              "description": "CWE-78",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-798",
              "description": "CWE-798",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
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      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/79"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/79"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/servertech-pro3x-port-mux-command-injection"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/79"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Server Technology PRO3X PDU 030600 port_mux listener program override to root command execution (7.2)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0431",
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            "evidenceScore": 11,
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            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-09-23T04:55:27Z"
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    "datePublished": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
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