GHSA-58F6-6RJ2-3V8R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:29 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:29
VLAI
Summary
Steeltoe vulnerable to management-port isolation bypass via spoofed Host header
Details

Summary

When Steeltoe management endpoints are configured to listen on an alternate port (Management:Endpoints:Port is configured), the middleware responsible for restricting access to the endpoints uses the Host HTTP header rather than the actual network socket port.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can reach every actuator endpoint using a specially crafted HTTP request.

Affected configuration

  • The application's public port is accessible over from the network.
  • Management:Endpoints:Port is configured to a value different from the application's main listener port.
  • The request scheme matches Management:Endpoints:SslEnabled. For example, http when SslEnabled is false (the default), or https when SslEnabled is true.

Mitigations

If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:

  • Add explicit ASP.NET Core authorization (RequireAuthorization) to all sensitive actuator endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure independent of port isolation.
  • Configure the reverse proxy or load balancer to enforce the Host header value and prevent clients from setting an arbitrary port.
Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:29:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T22:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen Steeltoe management endpoints are configured to listen on an alternate port (`Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured), the middleware responsible for restricting access to the endpoints uses the `Host` HTTP header rather than the actual network socket port. \n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can reach every actuator endpoint using a specially crafted HTTP request.\n\n### Affected configuration\n\n- The application\u0027s public port is accessible over from the network.\n- `Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured to a value different from the application\u0027s main listener port.\n- The request scheme matches `Management:Endpoints:SslEnabled`. For example, `http` when `SslEnabled` is `false` (the default), or `https` when `SslEnabled` is `true`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nIf an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:\n\n- Add explicit ASP.NET Core authorization (`RequireAuthorization`) to all sensitive actuator endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure independent of port isolation.\n- Configure the reverse proxy or load balancer to enforce the `Host` header value and prevent clients from setting an arbitrary port.",
  "id": "GHSA-58f6-6rj2-3v8r",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T20:29:13Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T20:29:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-58f6-6rj2-3v8r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/commit/4cbc352fe89ac2e6c609554e435ab28996fec5e9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/commit/b7ca93c510aaa08d7e4ebec40ce20c5811c2c4b6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/steeltoe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Steeltoe vulnerable to management-port isolation bypass via spoofed Host header"
}



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