{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42863"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T14:54:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI.\n\nThe endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object.\n\nDue to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint responsible for updating chatflows:\n\n**PUT /api/v1/chatflows/{chatflowId}**\n\naccepts a JSON request body containing the chatflow configuration (flowData) along with other metadata fields.\n\nHowever, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.\n\nExamples of server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:\n\n1. deployed\n2. isPublic\n3. workspaceId\n4. createdDate\n5. updatedDate\n6. category\n7. type\n\nThese fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity when processing the update request, suggesting that the server performs a direct merge of the request body into the chatflow model without applying a strict DTO whitelist or authorization checks.\n\nFor example, modifying the request body with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"createdDate\": \"1999-03-06T10:59:32.000Z\",\n  \"updatedDate\": \"1999-03-06T13:21:34.000Z\",\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nresults in the server accepting and persisting these values.\n\nIn testing, a second workspace was created in the database and the workspaceId field was successfully modified through the API request. The chatflow was reassigned to the attacker-controlled workspace, confirming that the application does not enforce workspace ownership validation.\n\n\n### PoC\nAuthenticate to the Flowise interface.\n\nCapture the request used to update a chatflow:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/chatflows/\u003cCHATFLOW_ID\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\nModify the request body by injecting additional fields:\n\n{\n  \"name\": \"test-flow\",\n  \"flowData\": \"{...}\",\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nSend the request.\n\nObserve that the response returns the manipulated values:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nVerify in the database that the chatflow has been reassigned:\n\n```sql\nSELECT id, workspaceId FROM chat_flow WHERE id=\u0027\u003cCHATFLOW_ID\u003e\u0027;\n```\n\nThe workspaceId value reflects the attacker-supplied workspace.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate server-controlled attributes of chatflows.\n\nConfirmed impacts include:\n\n- Unauthorized modification of chatflow visibility (isPublic)\n- Unauthorized deployment state changes (deployed)\n- Cross-workspace reassignment of chatflows (workspaceId)\n- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)\n\nIn multi-tenant environments, this allows an attacker to move chatflows between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.\n\nThis may enable:\n\n- Cross-workspace workflow takeover\n- Unauthorized exposure of private workflows\n- Manipulation of deployed agent workflows\n\nThe issue stems from missing authorization checks and improper handling of client-controlled input in the chatflow update endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T14:54:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T14:54:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment"
}