GHSA-72H8-WP98-7HCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:36 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:36Summary
Multiple authorization vulnerabilities in Unleash admin API, including a critical missing await that completely bypasses a permission check.
Vulnerability 1: Missing await on Permission Check (HIGH)
File: src/lib/features/segment/segment-controller.ts (line 345)
POST /api/admin/segments/strategies has permission: NONE at the route level. The handler performs its own check via this.accessService.hasPermission(), but omits the await keyword. Since hasPermission() is async (returns Promise<boolean>), the variable always receives a truthy Promise object. The if (!hasFeatureStrategyPermission) check never triggers.
// BUG: missing await - hasPermission() returns Promise<boolean>
const hasFeatureStrategyPermission = this.accessService.hasPermission(
req.user, UPDATE_FEATURE_STRATEGY, projectId, environmentId,
);
if (!hasFeatureStrategyPermission) { // Always false - Promise is truthy!
res.status(403).send();
return;
}
Impact: Any authenticated user can modify segment assignments on ANY strategy across ALL projects.
Fix: Add await: const hasFeatureStrategyPermission = await this.accessService.hasPermission(...)
Vulnerability 2: Cross-Project Variant Read (MEDIUM)
File: src/lib/routes/admin-api/project/variants.ts (line 213-223)
GET /api/admin/projects/:projectId/features/:featureName/environments/:environment/variants completely ignores projectId. getVariantsOnEnv() only uses featureName and environment.
Impact: Any authenticated user can read variant configs (names, weights, payloads) from any project.
Vulnerability 3: Cross-Project Strategy Read (MEDIUM)
File: src/lib/features/feature-toggle/feature-toggle-controller.ts (line 1107-1116)
GET .../strategies/:strategyId ignores all params except strategyId. Any authenticated user can read any strategy's full configuration.
Vulnerability 4: Cross-Project Environment Info Leak (MEDIUM)
File: src/lib/features/feature-toggle/feature-toggle-service.ts (line 1611)
getEnvironmentInfo() doesn't validate feature belongs to project. Compare with getFeature() which calls validateFeatureBelongsToProject().
Vulnerability 5: Cross-Project Tag Modification (LOW)
File: src/lib/features/feature-toggle/feature-toggle-controller.ts (line 576-596)
PUT /:projectId/tags accepts features array in body without validating they belong to projectId.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "unleash-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:36:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMultiple authorization vulnerabilities in Unleash admin API, including a critical missing `await` that completely bypasses a permission check.\n\n## Vulnerability 1: Missing `await` on Permission Check (HIGH)\n\n**File:** `src/lib/features/segment/segment-controller.ts` (line 345)\n\n`POST /api/admin/segments/strategies` has `permission: NONE` at the route level. The handler performs its own check via `this.accessService.hasPermission()`, but **omits the `await` keyword**. Since `hasPermission()` is async (returns `Promise\u003cboolean\u003e`), the variable always receives a truthy Promise object. The `if (!hasFeatureStrategyPermission)` check never triggers.\n\n```typescript\n// BUG: missing await - hasPermission() returns Promise\u003cboolean\u003e\nconst hasFeatureStrategyPermission = this.accessService.hasPermission(\n req.user, UPDATE_FEATURE_STRATEGY, projectId, environmentId,\n);\nif (!hasFeatureStrategyPermission) { // Always false - Promise is truthy!\n res.status(403).send();\n return;\n}\n```\n\n**Impact:** Any authenticated user can modify segment assignments on ANY strategy across ALL projects.\n\n**Fix:** Add `await`: `const hasFeatureStrategyPermission = await this.accessService.hasPermission(...)`\n\n## Vulnerability 2: Cross-Project Variant Read (MEDIUM)\n\n**File:** `src/lib/routes/admin-api/project/variants.ts` (line 213-223)\n\n`GET /api/admin/projects/:projectId/features/:featureName/environments/:environment/variants` completely ignores `projectId`. `getVariantsOnEnv()` only uses `featureName` and `environment`.\n\n**Impact:** Any authenticated user can read variant configs (names, weights, payloads) from any project.\n\n## Vulnerability 3: Cross-Project Strategy Read (MEDIUM)\n\n**File:** `src/lib/features/feature-toggle/feature-toggle-controller.ts` (line 1107-1116)\n\n`GET .../strategies/:strategyId` ignores all params except `strategyId`. Any authenticated user can read any strategy\u0027s full configuration.\n\n## Vulnerability 4: Cross-Project Environment Info Leak (MEDIUM)\n\n**File:** `src/lib/features/feature-toggle/feature-toggle-service.ts` (line 1611)\n\n`getEnvironmentInfo()` doesn\u0027t validate feature belongs to project. Compare with `getFeature()` which calls `validateFeatureBelongsToProject()`.\n\n## Vulnerability 5: Cross-Project Tag Modification (LOW)\n\n**File:** `src/lib/features/feature-toggle/feature-toggle-controller.ts` (line 576-596)\n\n`PUT /:projectId/tags` accepts features array in body without validating they belong to projectId.",
"id": "GHSA-72h8-wp98-7hch",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:36:42Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:36:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/security/advisories/GHSA-72h8-wp98-7hch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/7bb2829fc40791aa478e8ffca149c11b0f9cb05a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/ace121c922d2e3eb6f68d95b0b6ab2fc8d824ea1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/bea7effd3687425630423f662136d548e100154d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/c93a963e95e1b7bf1bca2a7729282a48d0eb2f6a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/dd61d0e10f5977a2e5de78df467c3a17c09fbcef"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v8.0.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Unleash: Missing await on permission check + cross-project IDOR in admin API"
}
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