GHSA-9998-894R-FWVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 19:54 – Updated: 2026-09-15 19:54Summary
Ember's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the Transfer-Encoding header value
with a case-sensitive substring test (hValue.contains("chunked")). RFC
9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A
request carrying Transfer-Encoding: Chunked (capital C) is therefore not
recognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by Content-Length
(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by
chunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body
ends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).
The same line of code admits two further variants:
- The substring test misfires on
Transfer-Encoding: notchunked(an inverse desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary rejects the unknown coding). - Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under
UTF-8 the wire bytes
E2 84 AAdecode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, whichString.equalsIgnoreCaseUnicode-case-folds tok, soTransfer-Encoding: chun<U+212A>edmatcheschunkedonce the comparison is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.
Impact
Server
Request smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that
honours Transfer-Encoding case-insensitively per RFC, forwards the header
value verbatim, and reuses keep-alive connections to the backend:
- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.
- Cross-user request hijack: a partial smuggled prefix left in Ember's
connection buffer is concatenated with the next victim's request on the
same pooled backend connection, exposing its headers (e.g.
Cookie,Authorization) to the attacker. - Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.
Client
ember-client shares the same HeaderP.parse on the response path, enabling
response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway. This is less severe: it
requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote
client.
Preconditions
- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)
- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary
- Intermediary treats
Transfer-Encodingcase-insensitively (per RFC) and forwards the header value without lowercasing it - Malicious or compromised upstream (client)
Workarounds
- Intermediary fully buffers and re-encodes request bodies (e.g. nginx with
default
proxy_request_buffering on) - Intermediary normalises the
Transfer-Encodingvalue (lowercases the token) before forwarding - Disable backend keep-alive between the intermediary and Ember
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-M46"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-M46"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-15T19:54:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nEmber\u0027s HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 \u00a77 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n desync \u2014 Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n `Transfer-Encoding: chun\u003cU+212A\u003eed` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that\nhonours `Transfer-Encoding` case-insensitively per RFC, forwards the header\nvalue verbatim, and reuses keep-alive connections to the backend:\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the\n intermediary\u0027s ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen\n method and headers.\n- Cross-user request hijack: a partial smuggled prefix left in Ember\u0027s\n connection buffer is concatenated with the next victim\u0027s request on the\n same pooled backend connection, exposing its headers (e.g. `Cookie`,\n `Authorization`) to the attacker.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request\n key in a caching proxy.\n\n### Client\n\nember-client shares the same `HeaderP.parse` on the response path, enabling\nresponse smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway. This is less severe: it\nrequires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote\nclient.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Intermediary treats `Transfer-Encoding` case-insensitively (per RFC) and\n forwards the header value without lowercasing it\n- Malicious or compromised upstream (client)\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Intermediary fully buffers and re-encodes request bodies (e.g. nginx with\n default `proxy_request_buffering on`)\n- Intermediary normalises the `Transfer-Encoding` value (lowercases the\n token) before forwarding\n- Disable backend keep-alive between the intermediary and Ember",
"id": "GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr",
"modified": "2026-09-15T19:54:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T19:54:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/security/advisories/GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/commit/5e88b2e7b4e6ea2f0c61040a4bc9de0d73e51217"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v0.23.35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Http4s Ember Transfer-Encoding value parsing (TE.CL / TE.0 request smuggling)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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