GHSA-C7C5-5J6R-Q957

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 22:06 – Updated: 2026-09-16 22:06
VLAI
Summary
djust has broken object-level access control (IDOR)
Details

Impact

djust's per-object authorization (get_object + has_object_permission, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket mount and event paths but not on three other render entry points: (a) the initial HTTP GET render, (b) SPA url_change navigation, and (c) {% live_render %} embedded child views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child — a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views.

Patches

Fixed in djust 1.0.7. All render entry points now route through a shared enforce_object_permission chokepoint: HTTP GET returns 403, url_change emits a permission_denied frame and skips the render, and {% live_render %} (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom get_object are unaffected (no-op).

Workarounds

No reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "djust"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61596"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:06:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\ndjust\u0027s per-object authorization (`get_object` + `has_object_permission`, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket **mount** and **event** paths but **not** on three other render entry points: (a) the initial **HTTP GET** render, (b) **SPA `url_change`** navigation, and (c) `{% live_render %}` **embedded child** views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child \u2014 a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. All render entry points now route through a shared `enforce_object_permission` chokepoint: HTTP GET returns **403**, `url_change` emits a `permission_denied` frame and skips the render, and `{% live_render %}` (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom `get_object` are unaffected (no-op).\n\n### Workarounds\nNo reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched.",
  "id": "GHSA-c7c5-5j6r-q957",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T22:06:02Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T22:06:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-c7c5-5j6r-q957"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "djust has broken object-level access control (IDOR)"
}



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