Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-FJJQ-85MX-VG3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-07 18:32

Details

Preconditions:

The target MISP instance has email OTP login enabled.
The attacker possesses a valid, unexpired OTP (e.g., via email interception or social engineering).
The attacker can issue two HTTP POST requests in close temporal proximity.

Impact:

The one-time-use guarantee of the OTP is violated; a single code can yield two authenticated sessions.
This weakens the authentication control and may facilitate unauthorized access if the OTP is shared or intercepted.

Affected versions: <2.5.48

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107276"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T16:17:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "MISP contains a race condition in the email-based one-time password (OTP) login flow. When two HTTP requests carrying the same valid OTP are submitted concurrently, both can successfully authenticate and establish a session. The root cause is that the OTP value is read from the shared store, validated, and then deleted in separate non-atomic steps, allowing a second in-flight request to read the same value before the first request\u0027s deletion takes effect.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- The target MISP instance has email OTP login enabled.\n\n- The attacker possesses a valid, unexpired OTP (e.g., via email interception or social engineering).\n\n- The attacker can issue two HTTP POST requests in close temporal proximity.\n\nImpact:\n\n- The one-time-use guarantee of the OTP is violated; a single code can yield two authenticated sessions.\n\n- This weakens the authentication control and may facilitate unauthorized access if the OTP is shared or intercepted.\n\nAffected versions: \u003c2.5.48",
  "id": "GHSA-fjjq-85mx-vg3v",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T18:32:09Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T18:32:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-107276 (GCVE-0-2026-107276)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-07 15:36 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:28

Title

MISP Email OTP Race Condition Allows One-Time Password to Be Consumed by Multiple Concurrent Requests

Summary

MISP contains a race condition in the email-based one-time password (OTP) login flow. When two HTTP requests carrying the same valid OTP are submitted concurrently, both can successfully authenticate and establish a session. The root cause is that the OTP value is read from the shared store, validated, and then deleted in separate non-atomic steps, allowing a second in-flight request to read the same value before the first request's deletion takes effect. Preconditions: - The target MISP instance has email OTP login enabled. - The attacker possesses a valid, unexpired OTP (e.g., via email interception or social engineering). - The attacker can issue two HTTP POST requests in close temporal proximity. Impact: - The one-time-use guarantee of the OTP is violated; a single code can yield two authenticated sessions. - This weakens the authentication control and may facilitate unauthorized access if the OTP is shared or intercepted. Affected versions: <2.5.48

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-07 15:34 UTC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-07 20:28 UTC

CWE

CWE-362 - Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (Race Condition)
CWE-367 - Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Assigner

CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root

CNA scorecard B 90/100 over 235 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
MISP	MISP	Affected: 0 , < 2.5.48 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp::::::::

Credits

iglocska Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context)

GCVE extensions

AI-generated Human-reviewed Confidence: medium Model qwen3.8:27b 1 event advisory bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03

bcp-05-x-01

AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation

GCVE-BCP-05-X-01

Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification

Model	Source	Identifier
qwen3.8:27b	ollama	`qwen3.8:27b`

bcp-05-x-02

Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance

GCVE-BCP-05-X-02

Generator: patch2vuln.py on 2026-10-07 15:34
Model: qwen3.8:27b
Input: https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5.patch 810e97a648a3…
Confidence: medium

Commit	Subject	Patch SHA-256
`ba95e67d545e`	fix: [login] Let only one request spend an e-mailed OTP	`810e97a648a3…`

Fix summary

The fix makes OTP consumption atomic by moving the deletion of the OTP from the shared store into the validation condition itself. The return value of the delete operation (1 if the key was actually removed, 0 otherwise) is now part of the success check, so only the request that successfully removes the OTP from the store is permitted to proceed with login. A session-state cleanup call was also added to remove the OTP user reference from the session.

Patch summary

In UsersController::email_otp(), the $redis->del() call was moved from after the hash_equals comparison into the if-condition as an additional conjunct. The condition now requires $redis->del('misp:otp:' . $user_id) === 1, meaning only the request whose delete actually removed the key (returning 1) can proceed to Auth->login(). A $this->Session->delete('email_otp_user') call was added before the login step to clean up session state. Net change: 6 insertions, 3 deletions in one file.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: Exploitation occurs over the network via HTTP POST. AC:H: Exploiting the race condition requires precise timing of two concurrent requests so both read the OTP before either deletes it; this is non-trivial to achieve reliably. AT:N: No data corruption or manipulation is required. PR:N: The attacker does not need prior authentication to MISP; they only need possession of a valid OTP (e.g., intercepted email). UI:N: No victim interaction beyond the initial login flow is needed. VC:N: No direct confidentiality loss of system data. VI:L: The one-time-use property of the OTP is violated, allowing a second authenticated session. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI:L: Limited integrity impact on the authentication process; no cross-system impact. SA:N: No impact on security authority.

Weakness rationale

CWE-362 The OTP stored in Redis is a shared resource accessed by concurrent HTTP requests. The original code performed read, compare, and delete as separate non-atomic operations, allowing two concurrent requests to both read and validate the same OTP before either deletes it. This is a textbook race condition on a shared resource.
CWE-367 The check (reading and comparing the OTP) and the use (logging in) are separated in time, and the state (OTP presence in the store) can change between the two steps due to a concurrent request. This is a TOCTOU variant of the race condition.

Attack pattern rationale

CAPEC-111 The attack pattern involves an adversary issuing two or more concurrent requests to exploit a non-atomic check-and-use sequence on a shared resource (the OTP in Redis). CAPEC-111 directly describes exploiting timing dependencies between sub-processes. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed vulnerability; no more specific CAPEC for OTP replay via race condition exists in the CAPEC catalog.

Assumptions to verify

The exact affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch; the tag boundary v2.5.48 with 39 commits after the fix suggests the fix landed shortly after that tag, but the precise first-fixed version is unconfirmed.
The CAPEC-111 mapping is the closest available; no CAPEC specifically covers OTP replay via race condition, so this is the best-fit pattern.
CVSS AC:H assumes the race window is narrow and requires precise timing; if the Redis round-trip latency is large, exploitation may be easier, but no evidence supports lowering AC.
The commit message states the issue was 'found during the internal review, not externally reported,' but no specific individual is named as finder, so no finder credit is assigned.
PR:N assumes the attacker obtains the OTP through out-of-band means (email interception); if MISP requires prior authentication to request an OTP, PR could be L.

Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model	Score	Agreement	Confidence	Assumptions
`qwen3.8:27b`	7	11	medium	5

bcp-05-x-03

Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline

GCVE-BCP-05-X-03

2026-09-23 14:26 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (ba95e67d545efa313435ae39dd481879d72e72e6): fix: [login] Let only one request spend an e-mailed OTP https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5.patch

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JSON

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    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
    "assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-107276",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-07T15:36:49.564Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-07T15:36:46.122Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-07T20:28:21.466Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-FJJQ-85MX-VG3V

CVE-2026-107276 (GCVE-0-2026-107276)

AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation

Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance

Fix summary

Patch summary

CVSS rationale

Weakness rationale

Attack pattern rationale

Assumptions to verify

Model comparison

Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour