GHSA-G2FM-8HR4-J82H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:39 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:39Summary
EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.
That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.
Impact
Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.
Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.
Patches
Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.
Workarounds
Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.
Credits
Reported by @TungNGo02.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.29.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81892"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:39:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T21:17:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony\u0027s security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route\u0027s **name** can execute that route\u0027s controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **4.29.16** and **5.5.1**. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route\u0027s `access_control` rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAdd controller-level authorization (`#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()`) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @TungNGo02.",
"id": "GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:39:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:39:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/security/advisories/GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/commit/03be45c6b7213c4c984a1d0542b7ec60359329f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/commit/6228dfef598d81eeb0baa35625e50812f3c77699"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/releases/tag/v4.29.16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/releases/tag/v5.5.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/easycorp/easyadmin-bundle/CVE-2026-81892.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EasyAdmin custom-action dispatcher bypasses access_control on other routes"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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