GHSA-HCWQ-8WJF-3GCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 22:12 – Updated: 2026-09-16 22:12Summary
The audio decode-duration guard (max_duration_s, env VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S, default 600s) that protects against audio decompression-bomb DoS is wired into only the speech-to-text path (/v1/audio/transcriptions). The chat audio path (/v1/chat/completions, input_audio content parts) calls the same decoder with no limit, so an unauthenticated client can submit a few-KB compressed audio file that expands to multiple GB of float32 PCM at decode time, OOM-killing the worker. This is a distinct sibling of CVE-2026-5497 (video frame-count bomb, VideoMediaIO.load_base64) and GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p (image) in the same media subsystem.
Verified against main at HEAD d78650c (2026-06-16); applicable to the latest release v0.23.0.
Details
The guard rejects long audio during decode (before allocation), implemented in vllm/multimodal/media/audio.py:
- load_audio_pyav — metadata reject (~82-98) and live sample-count reject (~129-136)
- load_audio_soundfile — frames reject (~165-174)
All are gated on if max_duration_s is not None.
It is passed in exactly one place — the transcription serving layer:
# .../speech_to_text/base/serving.py:~170-174
load_audio(buf, sr=..., max_duration_s=self.max_audio_decode_duration_s)
# self.max_audio_decode_duration_s = envs.VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S (default 600)
The chat path never threads it:
# vllm/multimodal/media/audio.py:237-238
def load_bytes(self, data: bytes) -> tuple[npt.NDArray, float]:
return load_audio(BytesIO(data), sr=None) # no max_duration_s -> every guard above is skipped
Unauthenticated reachability chain (chat):
parse_input_audio (chat_utils.py) -> parse_audio -> connector.fetch_audio -> AudioMediaIO._load_data_url -> load_base64 -> load_bytes -> load_audio(..., sr=None). The connector never passes max_duration_s, and inline data: URLs need no HTTP fetch (so VLLM_AUDIO_FETCH_TIMEOUT does not bound them). The OpenAI-compatible server has no auth by default (auth only when --api-key / VLLM_API_KEY is set).
Impact
Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability) via memory amplification on a default-no-auth endpoint, on any deployment serving an audio-capable model. Same class and impact as the sibling CVE-2026-5497 (video). CWE-770 / CWE-409.
Fix
A fix was introduced in this MR: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45908
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57173"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:12:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T17:17:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe audio decode-duration guard (`max_duration_s`, env `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S`, default 600s) that protects against audio decompression-bomb DoS is wired into **only** the speech-to-text path (`/v1/audio/transcriptions`). The **chat** audio path (`/v1/chat/completions`, `input_audio` content parts) calls the same decoder with **no** limit, so an **unauthenticated** client can submit a few-KB compressed audio file that expands to multiple GB of float32 PCM at decode time, OOM-killing the worker. This is a distinct sibling of **CVE-2026-5497** (video frame-count bomb, `VideoMediaIO.load_base64`) and **GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p** (image) in the same media subsystem.\n\nVerified against `main` at HEAD `d78650c` (2026-06-16); applicable to the latest release v0.23.0.\n\n### Details\nThe guard rejects long audio *during* decode (before allocation), implemented in `vllm/multimodal/media/audio.py`:\n- `load_audio_pyav` \u2014 metadata reject (~82-98) and live sample-count reject (~129-136)\n- `load_audio_soundfile` \u2014 frames reject (~165-174)\n\nAll are gated on `if max_duration_s is not None`.\n\nIt is passed in exactly **one** place \u2014 the transcription serving layer:\n```python\n# .../speech_to_text/base/serving.py:~170-174\nload_audio(buf, sr=..., max_duration_s=self.max_audio_decode_duration_s)\n# self.max_audio_decode_duration_s = envs.VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S (default 600)\n```\n\nThe chat path never threads it:\n```python\n# vllm/multimodal/media/audio.py:237-238\ndef load_bytes(self, data: bytes) -\u003e tuple[npt.NDArray, float]:\n return load_audio(BytesIO(data), sr=None) # no max_duration_s -\u003e every guard above is skipped\n```\n\nUnauthenticated reachability chain (chat):\n`parse_input_audio` (`chat_utils.py`) -\u003e `parse_audio` -\u003e `connector.fetch_audio` -\u003e `AudioMediaIO._load_data_url` -\u003e `load_base64` -\u003e `load_bytes` -\u003e `load_audio(..., sr=None)`. The connector never passes `max_duration_s`, and inline `data:` URLs need no HTTP fetch (so `VLLM_AUDIO_FETCH_TIMEOUT` does not bound them). The OpenAI-compatible server has no auth by default (auth only when `--api-key` / `VLLM_API_KEY` is set).\n\n### Impact\nUnauthenticated remote denial of service (availability) via memory amplification on a default-no-auth endpoint, on any deployment serving an audio-capable model. Same class and impact as the sibling CVE-2026-5497 (video). CWE-770 / CWE-409.\n\n### Fix\nA fix was introduced in this MR: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45908",
"id": "GHSA-hcwq-8wjf-3gcr",
"modified": "2026-09-16T22:12:18Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T22:12:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-hcwq-8wjf-3gcr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57173"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/3d20275bb4d434f53055c3c0b645fd8bb072965e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.24.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM: Unauthenticated audio decompression-bomb DoS in /v1/chat/completions"
}
Sightings
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|---|
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