GHSA-HH89-3R9W-QJ3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 15:11 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:11Impact
The OAuth Dynamic Client Registration endpoints validated field sizes only for redirect_uris, leaving client_name and grant_types bounded by presence checks alone. An unauthenticated remote caller could submit arbitrarily large values in either field and have them persisted to the database. Repeated registration therefore grew persistent storage without limit and without any account on the instance. The patch caps client_name at its column length and limits grant_types to the grant types the server actually implements, with the array capped at that count.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Restrict network access to the n8n instance so that only trusted clients can reach it.
- Place the instance behind a reverse proxy configured to enforce strict request body size limits below the default 16 MiB.
- Monitor database size for unexpected growth and audit the oauth_clients table for anomalous entries.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.38.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.38.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.37.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86075"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T15:11:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T22:19:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThe OAuth Dynamic Client Registration endpoints validated field sizes only for `redirect_uris`, leaving `client_name` and `grant_types` bounded by presence checks alone. An unauthenticated remote caller could submit arbitrarily large values in either field and have them persisted to the database. Repeated registration therefore grew persistent storage without limit and without any account on the instance. The patch caps `client_name` at its column length and limits `grant_types` to the grant types the server actually implements, with the array capped at that count.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Restrict network access to the n8n instance so that only trusted clients can reach it.\n- Place the instance behind a reverse proxy configured to enforce strict request body size limits below the default 16 MiB.\n- Monitor database size for unexpected growth and audit the `oauth_clients` table for anomalous entries.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
"id": "GHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j",
"modified": "2026-09-10T15:11:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T15:11:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86075"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.37.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.38.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "n8n: Unauthenticated Persistent Storage Exhaustion via OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.