Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-J9FC-W3MR-X6MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:12 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:57

Summary

Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization

Details

Summary

Budibase 3.39.19 (commit 03fbabae4) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An app-scoped builder (a user who builds only specific apps — user.builder.apps = [appA], not a global builder or admin) can grant themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. ADMIN) in any app, by calling POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign. The endpoint only authorizes the two global flags (admin, builder); the per-app appBuilder and role:{appId,roleId} grant vectors are passed to the backend without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.

This is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit d63d1d9054 ("Inline public user global role validation"), which only ever validated the global flags.

Details

The issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a flag-level allowlist (admin/builder) instead of validating the scope the caller is granting.

Relevant code paths:

packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts — validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, roleUpdate) only checks roleUpdate.admin (requires isAdmin) and roleUpdate.builder (requires isGlobalBuilder). The GlobalRoleUpdate interface declares only { builder?, admin? }; appBuilder and role are not referenced.
packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts — assign() does const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body; validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, assignmentProps); await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps). The appBuilder/role props pass through unvalidated.
packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts — assign(): for opts.appBuilder it sets user.builder = { apps: existing.concat([getProdWorkspaceID(opts.appBuilder.appId)]) }; for opts.role it sets user.roles[getProdWorkspaceID(opts.role.appId)] = opts.role.roleId. No check that the caller builds the target app, and userIds is an arbitrary list (bulkGet). The only gate is the isExpandedPublicApiEnabled() license check.
packages/server/src/api/routes/public/index.ts — applyAdminRoutes(roleEndpoints) attaches only middleware.builderOrAdmin (no publicApi, no authorized(PermissionType.USER, …)).
packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOrAdmin.ts — with a workspaceId present, it only requires isBuilder(ctx.user, workspaceId). The attacker sets x-budibase-app-id to their own app (appA), so the gate passes.
packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOnly.ts — on the worker, POST /api/global/self/api_key only requires hasBuilderPermissions(ctx.user), which is true for app-scoped builders, so the attacker can self-issue a public API key.
packages/shared-core/src/sdk/documents/users.ts — isGlobalBuilder is false for app-scoped builders (so the global builder flag is correctly blocked), while isBuilder(user, appA) and hasBuilderPermissions(user) are true.

Attack flow:

Attacker is an app-scoped builder of appA only (no global builder/admin).
POST /api/global/self/api_key (worker) — passes builderOnly via hasBuilderPermissions → attacker obtains a public API key.
POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign with header x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id> and body {"userIds":["<self>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}} — builderOrAdmin passes (isBuilder(user, appA)), validateGlobalRoleUpdate ignores appBuilder, the SDK pushes appB into user.builder.apps.
Attacker is now a builder of appB (and, via the role vector, can set any data-role such as ADMIN in any app).

Security boundary crossed:

Before: builder of appA only.
After: builder of appB (and any other app) → read/modify all rows, read datasource configs and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials, edit automations (including the bash/executeScript/executeQuery steps); plus arbitrary data-role assignment in any app.
Why disallowed: the per-app builder model is meant to isolate builders to their assigned apps; a builder of one app must not gain authority over apps they were never granted.

PoC

Environment:

Budibase version: 3.39.19, commit 03fbabae4
Deployment: Business/Enterprise license required (isExpandedPublicApiEnabled)
Attacker role: app-scoped builder (user.builder.apps=[appA]), not global builder/admin
Mock services: none needed for the unit-level proof; HTTP PoC script provided for a licensed lab

Steps (unit-level proof, no license needed — verbatim auth-gate + SDK logic):

Run the verification harness:

cd D:/CVE-Hunting/budibase-audit-output/lab
node harness/verify-privesc-authz.cjs

Observed result (evidence: evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log):

[PASS-VALIDATION] appBuilder:{appId:APP_B}          -> NOT rejected
[PASS-VALIDATION] role:{appId:APP_B, roleId:'ADMIN'}-> NOT rejected
[BLOCKED 403]      builder:true (global)            -> Only global builders or admins ...
[BLOCKED 403]      admin:true (global)              -> Only global admins ...
after : builder={"apps":["app_A...","app_B..."]} roles={"app_B...":"ADMIN"}
isBuilder(attacker, APP_B) now = true   <-- escalated to builder of APP_B

Steps (HTTP PoC for a licensed lab — poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh):

# 1) self-issue API key
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/self/api_key -H "Cookie: <attacker session>" -d '{}'
# 2) escalate: grant self builder of appB
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/public/v1/roles/assign \
  -H "x-budibase-api-key: <KEY>" -H "x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id>" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"userIds":["<self global id>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}}'

Expected result:

The request should be rejected (403) — an app-scoped builder must not be able to grant
itself builder/role access to an app it does not control. Instead it returns 200 and the
grant is applied.

Evidence files:

evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log
poc/verify-privesc-authz.cjs, poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh

Runtime limitation: full HTTP end-to-end requires a Business/Enterprise license (isExpandedPublicApiEnabled); no license was cracked. The authorization defect is proven at unit level with the verbatim validation + SDK logic, and the route→validation→SDK call chain was independently verified by source review.

Source PoC

Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip

Impact

An attacker holding an app-scoped builder role on a single app in a licensed (Business/Enterprise) tenant can:

escalate to builder of every other app in the tenant (cross-app/workspace isolation bypass);
read and modify all rows in those apps;
read those apps' datasource configurations and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials;
edit automations in those apps, including server-side execution steps;
assign arbitrary data-plane roles (e.g. ADMIN) in any app to any user, including themselves.

It does not grant the global admin/builder flags (those are validated), so it is not a direct global-admin takeover; but cross-app builder is effectively a tenant-wide app/data-plane compromise. No real secrets were accessed during testing; the lab used canary-only data.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73305"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:12:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nBudibase `3.39.19` (commit `03fbabae4`) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An **app-scoped builder** (a user who builds only specific apps \u2014 `user.builder.apps = [appA]`, not a global builder or admin) can grant **themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant**, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app, by calling `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign`. The endpoint only authorizes the two *global* flags (`admin`, `builder`); the per-app `appBuilder` and `role:{appId,roleId}` grant vectors are passed to the backend **without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app**. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit `d63d1d9054` (\"Inline public user global role validation\"), which only ever validated the global flags.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a **flag-level allowlist** (`admin`/`builder`) instead of validating the *scope* the caller is granting.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts` \u2014 `validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, roleUpdate)` only checks `roleUpdate.admin` (requires `isAdmin`) and `roleUpdate.builder` (requires `isGlobalBuilder`). The `GlobalRoleUpdate` interface declares only `{ builder?, admin? }`; `appBuilder` and `role` are not referenced.\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts` \u2014 `assign()` does `const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body; validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, assignmentProps); await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps)`. The `appBuilder`/`role` props pass through unvalidated.\n- `packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts` \u2014 `assign()`: for `opts.appBuilder` it sets `user.builder = { apps: existing.concat([getProdWorkspaceID(opts.appBuilder.appId)]) }`; for `opts.role` it sets `user.roles[getProdWorkspaceID(opts.role.appId)] = opts.role.roleId`. No check that the caller builds the target app, and `userIds` is an arbitrary list (`bulkGet`). The only gate is the `isExpandedPublicApiEnabled()` license check.\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/public/index.ts` \u2014 `applyAdminRoutes(roleEndpoints)` attaches **only** `middleware.builderOrAdmin` (no `publicApi`, no `authorized(PermissionType.USER, \u2026)`).\n- `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOrAdmin.ts` \u2014 with a `workspaceId` present, it only requires `isBuilder(ctx.user, workspaceId)`. The attacker sets `x-budibase-app-id` to **their own** app (appA), so the gate passes.\n- `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOnly.ts` \u2014 on the worker, `POST /api/global/self/api_key` only requires `hasBuilderPermissions(ctx.user)`, which is true for app-scoped builders, so the attacker can self-issue a public API key.\n- `packages/shared-core/src/sdk/documents/users.ts` \u2014 `isGlobalBuilder` is false for app-scoped builders (so the global `builder` flag is correctly blocked), while `isBuilder(user, appA)` and `hasBuilderPermissions(user)` are true.\n\nAttack flow:\n\n1. Attacker is an app-scoped builder of `appA` only (no global builder/admin).\n2. `POST /api/global/self/api_key` (worker) \u2014 passes `builderOnly` via `hasBuilderPermissions` \u2192 attacker obtains a public API key.\n3. `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign` with header `x-budibase-app-id: \u003cappA prod id\u003e` and body `{\"userIds\":[\"\u003cself\u003e\"],\"appBuilder\":{\"appId\":\"\u003cappB\u003e\"}}` \u2014 `builderOrAdmin` passes (`isBuilder(user, appA)`), `validateGlobalRoleUpdate` ignores `appBuilder`, the SDK pushes `appB` into `user.builder.apps`.\n4. Attacker is now a builder of `appB` (and, via the `role` vector, can set any data-role such as `ADMIN` in any app).\n\nSecurity boundary crossed:\n\n- **Before:** builder of `appA` only.\n- **After:** builder of `appB` (and any other app) \u2192 read/modify all rows, read datasource configs and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials, edit automations (including the `bash`/`executeScript`/`executeQuery` steps); plus arbitrary data-role assignment in any app.\n- **Why disallowed:** the per-app builder model is meant to isolate builders to their assigned apps; a builder of one app must not gain authority over apps they were never granted.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment:\n\n- Budibase version: `3.39.19`, commit `03fbabae4`\n- Deployment: Business/Enterprise license required (`isExpandedPublicApiEnabled`)\n- Attacker role: app-scoped builder (`user.builder.apps=[appA]`), not global builder/admin\n- Mock services: none needed for the unit-level proof; HTTP PoC script provided for a licensed lab\n\nSteps (unit-level proof, no license needed \u2014 verbatim auth-gate + SDK logic):\n\n1. Run the verification harness:\n\n```bash\ncd D:/CVE-Hunting/budibase-audit-output/lab\nnode harness/verify-privesc-authz.cjs\n```\n\n2. Observed result (evidence: `evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log`):\n\n```text\n[PASS-VALIDATION] appBuilder:{appId:APP_B}          -\u003e NOT rejected\n[PASS-VALIDATION] role:{appId:APP_B, roleId:\u0027ADMIN\u0027}-\u003e NOT rejected\n[BLOCKED 403]      builder:true (global)            -\u003e Only global builders or admins ...\n[BLOCKED 403]      admin:true (global)              -\u003e Only global admins ...\nafter : builder={\"apps\":[\"app_A...\",\"app_B...\"]} roles={\"app_B...\":\"ADMIN\"}\nisBuilder(attacker, APP_B) now = true   \u003c-- escalated to builder of APP_B\n```\n\nSteps (HTTP PoC for a licensed lab \u2014 `poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh`):\n\n```bash\n# 1) self-issue API key\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/self/api_key -H \"Cookie: \u003cattacker session\u003e\" -d \u0027{}\u0027\n# 2) escalate: grant self builder of appB\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/public/v1/roles/assign \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-api-key: \u003cKEY\u003e\" -H \"x-budibase-app-id: \u003cappA prod id\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"userIds\":[\"\u003cself global id\u003e\"],\"appBuilder\":{\"appId\":\"\u003cappB\u003e\"}}\u0027\n```\n\n3. Expected result:\n\n```text\nThe request should be rejected (403) \u2014 an app-scoped builder must not be able to grant\nitself builder/role access to an app it does not control. Instead it returns 200 and the\ngrant is applied.\n```\n\nEvidence files:\n\n- `evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log`\n- `poc/verify-privesc-authz.cjs`, `poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh`\n\n**Runtime limitation:** full HTTP end-to-end requires a Business/Enterprise license (`isExpandedPublicApiEnabled`); no license was cracked. The authorization defect is proven at unit level with the verbatim validation + SDK logic, and the route\u2192validation\u2192SDK call chain was independently verified by source review.\n\n### Source PoC\n\n[Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29161435/Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip)\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker holding an **app-scoped builder** role on a single app in a licensed (Business/Enterprise) tenant can:\n\n* escalate to builder of **every other app** in the tenant (cross-app/workspace isolation bypass);\n* read and modify all rows in those apps;\n* read those apps\u0027 datasource configurations and **exfiltrate stored datasource credentials**;\n* edit automations in those apps, including server-side execution steps;\n* assign arbitrary data-plane roles (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app to any user, including themselves.\n\nIt does **not** grant the global `admin`/`builder` flags (those are validated), so it is not a direct global-admin takeover; but cross-app builder is effectively a tenant-wide app/data-plane compromise. No real secrets were accessed during testing; the lab used canary-only data.",
  "id": "GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T18:57:18Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:12:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.40.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization"
}

CVE-2026-73305 (GCVE-0-2026-73305)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 22:05 – Updated: 2026-08-18 01:46

Title

Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization

Summary

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.24, POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign called validateGlobalRoleUpdate without checking appBuilder.appId or role.appId in packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts. An app-scoped builder could scope the request to an app they control and then grant themselves builder access or an arbitrary role in another app, exposing that app data, datasource configuration, and automations. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.24.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-18 01:46 UTC

CWE

CWE-269 - Improper Privilege Management
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19098	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/45339…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Budibase	budibase	Affected: < 3.39.24

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-73305",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-18T01:46:11.821753Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T01:46:32.727Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "budibase",
          "vendor": "Budibase",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.39.24"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.24, POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign called validateGlobalRoleUpdate without checking appBuilder.appId or role.appId in packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts. An app-scoped builder could scope the request to an app they control and then grant themselves builder access or an arbitrary role in another app, exposing that app data, datasource configuration, and automations. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.24."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-269",
              "description": "CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T22:05:02.972Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19098",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19098"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/453391d3245dd04cc386ccd6959d38ccf30db9a8",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/453391d3245dd04cc386ccd6959d38ccf30db9a8"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.24",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.24"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-73305",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-13T22:05:02.972Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-11T19:42:11.451Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T01:46:32.727Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

GHSA-J9FC-W3MR-X6MV

Summary

Details

PoC

Source PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-73305 (GCVE-0-2026-73305)

Tags

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