GHSA-MCQQ-FQGF-RXWM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 20:53 – Updated: 2026-07-06 20:53
VLAI
Summary
Coder vulnerable to SSH config injection via unsanitized server-supplied values in `coder config-ssh`
Details

Summary

coder config-ssh wrote server-supplied SSH settings (HostnameSuffix, SSHConfigOptions) into the user's ~/.ssh/config without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration.

Note: Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromised deployment, a man-in-the-middle position or admin access to the HostnameSuffix and SSHConfigOptions settings.

Impact

A server administrator or an attacker who controlled the server, could inject a directive such as ProxyCommand and achieve arbitrary code execution on any developer workstation that ran coder config-ssh. Injected commands ran with the local user's privileges and applied to all SSH connections, not just Coder workspaces.

Patches

The fix validates HostnameSuffix and SSHConfigOptions against a strict character set that rejects newlines and other control characters.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line Patched version
2.34 v2.34.2
2.33 v2.33.8
2.32 v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR) v2.29.17

Workarounds

Inspect coder config-ssh --dry-run output before applying changes.

Resources

  • Fix: #26154

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22437) for independently disclosing this issue!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.29.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55427"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T20:53:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`coder config-ssh` wrote server-supplied SSH settings (`HostnameSuffix`, `SSHConfigOptions`) into the user\u0027s `~/.ssh/config` without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromised deployment, a man-in-the-middle position or admin access to the `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` settings.\n\n### Impact\n\nA server administrator or an attacker who controlled the server, could inject a directive such as `ProxyCommand` and achieve arbitrary code execution on any developer workstation that ran `coder config-ssh`. Injected commands ran with the local user\u0027s privileges and applied to all SSH connections, not just Coder workspaces.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix validates `HostnameSuffix` and `SSHConfigOptions` against a strict character set that rejects newlines and other control characters.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |\n| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nInspect `coder config-ssh --dry-run` output before applying changes.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Fix: #26154\n\n### Credits\n\nCoder would like to thank Anthropic\u0027s Security Team (ANT-2026-22437) for independently disclosing this issue!",
  "id": "GHSA-mcqq-fqgf-rxwm",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T20:53:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T20:53:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-mcqq-fqgf-rxwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26154"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Coder vulnerable to SSH config injection via unsanitized server-supplied values in `coder config-ssh`"
}



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