Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-WPP4-VQFQ-V4HP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-27 23:33 – Updated: 2025-10-27 23:33

Summary

ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)

Details

Summary

A single root cause in the CLAHE implementation — tile width/height becoming zero — produces two distinct but related unsafe behaviors. Vulnerabilities exists in the CLAHEImage() function of ImageMagick’s MagickCore/enhance.c.

Unsigned integer underflow → out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic (OOB): when tile_info.height == 0, the expression tile_info.height - 1 (unsigned) wraps to a very large value; using that value in pointer arithmetic yields a huge offset and OOB memory access (leading to memory corruption, SIGSEGV, or resource exhaustion).
Division/modulus by zero: where code performs ... / tile_info.width or ... % tile_info.height without re-checking for zero, causing immediate division-by-zero crashes under sanitizers or abort at runtime.

Both behaviors are triggered by the same invalid tile condition (e.g., CLI exact -clahe 0x0! or automatic tile derivation dim >> 3 == 0 for very small images).

Details

Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)

Location: MagickCore/enhance.c, around line 609
Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
Vulnerable code

enhance.c: 609

c p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * (tile.height - 1);
Root Cause
- If tile.height == 0, then (tile.height - 1) underflows to UINT_MAX.
- Multiplication with clahe_info->width yields a huge value close to SIZE_MAX.
- Adding this to p causes pointer arithmetic underflow.

Division-by-zero

File / Location: MagickCore/enhance.c, around line 669
Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
vulnerable code

enhance.c: 669-673

c if ((image->columns % tile_info.width) != 0) tile_info.x=(ssize_t) (tile_info.width-(image->columns % tile_info.width)); tile_info.y=0; if ((image->rows % tile_info.height) != 0) tile_info.y=(ssize_t) (tile_info.height-(image->rows % tile_info.height));
Root cause

Missing input validation / bounds checks after computing default tile dimensions:

If either tile_info.width or tile_info.height is 0, this triggers a division by zero. Zeros can reach this point through:
1. Exact tiles: CLI clahe 0x0! (the ! forces zero to be used verbatim).
2. Auto tiles on tiny images: When a requested tile is 0 (no !), the code derives a default from the image size (e.g., dim >> 3). For images with dim < 8, this result is 0 unless clamped.

Reproduction

Unsigned underflow

Environment

Built with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer enabled.

export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0

Command

./magick xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

Output

MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset overflowed
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6 in CLAHEImage

./magick -size 10x10 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

memory region corruption.

./magick -size 2000x2000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

→ Significant memory consumption and evidence of memory region corruption.

./magick -size 4000x4000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

→ Much larger memory usage; process appears to be aggressively consuming cache and address space.

./magick -size 8000x8000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

→ Memory usage escalates further and begins exhausting available cache. If left running, the process is likely to crash (DoS) after sustained allocation attempts.

Division-by-zero

Environment: ASan/UBSan-enabled build.

export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0

Command

./magick -size 16x2 gradient: -type TrueColor -depth 8 -clahe 0x0! null:

Output

Notes: Without sanitizers, the process may terminate with just Aborted (still DoS).

Impact

Primary: Denial-of-Service — crash or sustained resource exhaustion (memory/cache thrash) when processing crafted parameters or small images via CLI or API. Attackers can trivially trigger via clahe 0x0! or by uploading very small images to services using ImageMagick.
Secondary (theoretical): OOB memory accesses and memory corruption could potentially be combined with other vulnerabilities to achieve more severe outcomes; however, no reliable code execution was demonstrated from these PoCs alone.

Suggested concrete patch snippets

Apply in CLAHEImage() after tile_info is computed but before any division/modulus/pointer arithmetic:

if (exact_tiles_requested && (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0)) {
  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,
                       "CLAHEInvalidTile", "%lux%lu",
                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,
                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);
  return (Image *) NULL;
}

if (!exact_tiles_requested) {
  tile_info.width  = (tile_info.width  == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image->columns >> 3) : tile_info.width;
  tile_info.height = (tile_info.height == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image->rows    >> 3) : tile_info.height;
}

if (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0) {
  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,
                       "CLAHEInvalidTile", "%lux%lu",
                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,
                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);
  return (Image *) NULL;
}

ssize_t tile_h_minus1 = (ssize_t)tile_info.height - 1;
if (tile_h_minus1 < 0) {
  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,
                       "CLAHEInvalidTile", "%lux%lu",
                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,
                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);
  return (Image *) NULL;
}
p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * tile_h_minus1;

Notes about exact_tiles_requested: if the CLI/Wand parser already exposes whether ! was present, use it. If not, add a parse-time flag so CLAHEImage can know whether 0 is literal or auto.

Credit

Team Whys

Bug Hunting Master Program, HSpace/Findthegap

Youngmin Kim kunshim@naver.com

Woojin Park

@jin-156 1203kids@gmail.com

Youngin Won

@amethyst0225 youngin04@korea.ac.kr

Siyeon Han

@hanbunny kokosyeon@gmail.com

Shinyoung Won

@yosiimich yosimich123@gmail.com

Severity

4.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "14.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-119",
      "CWE-191",
      "CWE-369"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-27T23:33:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-27T20:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA single root cause in the CLAHE implementation \u2014 tile width/height becoming zero \u2014 produces two distinct but related unsafe behaviors.\nVulnerabilities exists in the `CLAHEImage()` function of ImageMagick\u2019s `MagickCore/enhance.c`.\n\n1. Unsigned integer underflow \u2192 out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic (OOB): when `tile_info.height == 0`, the expression `tile_info.height - 1` (unsigned) wraps to a very large value; using that value in pointer arithmetic yields a huge offset and OOB memory access (leading to memory corruption, SIGSEGV, or resource exhaustion).\n2. **Division/modulus by zero**: where code performs `... / tile_info.width` or `... % tile_info.height` without re-checking for zero, causing immediate division-by-zero crashes under sanitizers or `abort` at runtime.\n\nBoth behaviors are triggered by the same invalid tile condition (e.g., CLI exact `-clahe 0x0!` or automatic tile derivation `dim \u003e\u003e 3 == 0` for very small images). \n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### **Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)**\n\n- Location: `MagickCore/enhance.c`, around line 609\n- Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)\n- Vulnerable code\n    \n    enhance.c: 609\n    \n    ```c\n    p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info-\u003ewidth * (tile.height - 1);\n    ```\n    \n- Root Cause\n    - If `tile.height == 0`, then `(tile.height - 1)` underflows to `UINT_MAX`.\n    - Multiplication with `clahe_info-\u003ewidth` yields a huge value close to `SIZE_MAX`.\n    - Adding this to `p` causes pointer arithmetic underflow.\n\n### **Division-by-zero**\n\n- File / Location: `MagickCore/enhance.c`, around line 669\n- Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)\n- vulnerable code\n    \n    enhance.c: 669-673\n    \n    ```c\n     if ((image-\u003ecolumns % tile_info.width) != 0)\n        tile_info.x=(ssize_t) (tile_info.width-(image-\u003ecolumns % tile_info.width));\n      tile_info.y=0;\n      if ((image-\u003erows % tile_info.height) != 0)\n        tile_info.y=(ssize_t) (tile_info.height-(image-\u003erows % tile_info.height));\n    ```\n    \n- Root cause\n    \n    Missing input validation / bounds checks after computing default tile dimensions:\n    \n    If either `tile_info.width` or `tile_info.height` is 0, this triggers a division by zero. Zeros can reach this point through:\n    \n    1. Exact tiles: CLI `clahe 0x0!` (the `!` forces zero to be used verbatim).\n    2. Auto tiles on tiny images: When a requested tile is `0` (no `!`), the code derives a default from the image size (e.g., `dim \u003e\u003e 3`). For images with `dim \u003c 8`, this result is 0 unless clamped.\n\n---\n\n## Reproduction\n\n### **Unsigned underflow**\n\n**Environment**\n\nBuilt with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer enabled.\n\n```c\nexport UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0\n```\n\n**Command**\n\n```bash\n./magick xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:\n```\n\n**Output**\n\n```\nMagickCore/enhance.c:609:6: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset overflowed\nSUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6 in CLAHEImage\n```\n\n`./magick -size 10x10 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1068\" height=\"64\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd9637ee-1d03-4066-834d-fda22410dd8b\" /\u003e\n\nmemory region corruption.\n\n`./magick -size 2000x2000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1069\" height=\"70\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecbab79c-a3c2-4e8c-96c9-8e2aa8f0d2b2\" /\u003e\n\n\u2192 Significant memory consumption and evidence of memory region corruption.\n\n`./magick -size 4000x4000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"776\" height=\"49\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/63a7cec5-616b-4aa5-87f3-a546a87e6625\" /\u003e\n\n\u2192 Much larger memory usage; process appears to be aggressively consuming cache and address space.\n\n`./magick -size 8000x8000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"748\" height=\"46\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48b3aac8-98b3-4fbb-a5ca-4e7936bca44b\" /\u003e\n\n\u2192 Memory usage escalates further and begins exhausting available cache. If left running, the process is likely to crash (DoS) after sustained allocation attempts.\n\n### **Division-by-zero**\n\n**Environment:** ASan/UBSan-enabled build.\n\n```c\nexport UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0\n```\n\n**Command**\n\n```bash\n./magick -size 16x2 gradient: -type TrueColor -depth 8 -clahe 0x0! null:\n```\n\n**Output**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1915\" height=\"818\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cfe44432-b429-49e4-8673-2ed55ba9a961\" /\u003e\n\n**Notes:** Without sanitizers, the process may terminate with just `Aborted` (still DoS).\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- Primary: Denial-of-Service \u2014 crash or sustained resource exhaustion (memory/cache thrash) when processing crafted parameters or small images via CLI or API. Attackers can trivially trigger via `clahe 0x0!` or by uploading very small images to services using ImageMagick.\n- Secondary (theoretical): OOB memory accesses and memory corruption could potentially be combined with other vulnerabilities to achieve more severe outcomes; however, no reliable code execution was demonstrated from these PoCs alone.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested concrete patch snippets\n\nApply in `CLAHEImage()` after `tile_info` is computed but **before** any division/modulus/pointer arithmetic:\n\n```c\nif (exact_tiles_requested \u0026\u0026 (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0)) {\n  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,\n                       \"CLAHEInvalidTile\", \"%lux%lu\",\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);\n  return (Image *) NULL;\n}\n\nif (!exact_tiles_requested) {\n  tile_info.width  = (tile_info.width  == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image-\u003ecolumns \u003e\u003e 3) : tile_info.width;\n  tile_info.height = (tile_info.height == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image-\u003erows    \u003e\u003e 3) : tile_info.height;\n}\n\nif (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0) {\n  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,\n                       \"CLAHEInvalidTile\", \"%lux%lu\",\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);\n  return (Image *) NULL;\n}\n\nssize_t tile_h_minus1 = (ssize_t)tile_info.height - 1;\nif (tile_h_minus1 \u003c 0) {\n  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,\n                       \"CLAHEInvalidTile\", \"%lux%lu\",\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);\n  return (Image *) NULL;\n}\np += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info-\u003ewidth * tile_h_minus1;\n```\n\nNotes about `exact_tiles_requested`: if the CLI/Wand parser already exposes whether `!` was present, use it. If not, add a parse-time flag so CLAHEImage can know whether `0` is literal or auto.\n\n---\n\n## Credit\n\n### Team Whys \n\n**Bug Hunting Master Program, HSpace/Findthegap**\n\n**Youngmin Kim** \nkunshim@naver.com\n\n**Woojin Park**\n\n[@jin-156](https://github.com/jin-156)\n[1203kids@gmail.com](mailto:1203kids@gmail.com)\n\n**Youngin Won**\n\n[@amethyst0225](https://github.com/amethyst0225)\n[youngin04@korea.ac.kr](mailto:youngin04@korea.ac.kr)\n\n**Siyeon Han**\n\n[@hanbunny](https://github.com/hanbunny)\n[kokosyeon@gmail.com](mailto:kokosyeon@gmail.com)\n\n**Shinyoung Won**\n\n[@yosiimich](yosimich123@gmail.com)\n[yosimich123@gmail.com](mailto:yosimich123@gmail.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp",
  "modified": "2025-10-27T23:33:10Z",
  "published": "2025-10-27T23:33:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/7b47fe369eda90483402fcd3d78fa4167d3bb129"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)"
}

CVE-2025-62594 (GCVE-0-2025-62594)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-10-27 20:00 – Updated: 2025-10-27 20:23

Title

ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)

Summary

ImageMagick is a software suite to create, edit, compose, or convert bitmap images. ImageMagick versions prior to 7.1.2-8 are vulnerable to denial-of-service due to unsigned integer underflow and division-by-zero in the CLAHEImage function. When tile width or height is zero, unsigned underflow occurs in pointer arithmetic, leading to out-of-bounds memory access, and division-by-zero causes immediate crashes. This issue has been patched in version 7.1.2-8.

Severity

4.7 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2025-10-27 20:23 UTC

CWE

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CWE-369 - Divide By Zero
CWE-191 - Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/securi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
ImageMagick	ImageMagick	Affected: < 7.1.2-8

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2025-62594",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-10-27T20:23:10.571151Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2025-10-27T20:23:20.526Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "ImageMagick",
          "vendor": "ImageMagick",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 7.1.2-8"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "ImageMagick is a software suite to create, edit, compose, or convert bitmap images. ImageMagick versions prior to 7.1.2-8 are vulnerable to denial-of-service due to unsigned integer underflow and division-by-zero in the CLAHEImage function. When tile width or height is zero, unsigned underflow occurs in pointer arithmetic, leading to out-of-bounds memory access, and division-by-zero causes immediate crashes. This issue has been patched in version 7.1.2-8."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 4.7,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-119",
              "description": "CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-369",
              "description": "CWE-369: Divide By Zero",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-191",
              "description": "CWE-191: Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2025-10-27T20:00:33.205Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/7b47fe369eda90483402fcd3d78fa4167d3bb129",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/7b47fe369eda90483402fcd3d78fa4167d3bb129"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-62594",
    "datePublished": "2025-10-27T20:00:33.205Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-10-16T19:24:37.266Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2025-10-27T20:23:20.526Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-WPP4-VQFQ-V4HP

Summary

Details

Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)

Division-by-zero

Reproduction

Unsigned underflow

Division-by-zero

Impact

Suggested concrete patch snippets

Credit

Team Whys

CVE-2025-62594 (GCVE-0-2025-62594)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour