GHSA-X5V6-PJ28-CWWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 14:52 – Updated: 2026-05-14 14:52Summary
A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the tool update endpoint of FlowiseAI.
The endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a tool resource.
Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign tools to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.
Details
The endpoint responsible for updating tools:
PUT /api/v1/tools/{toolId}
accepts a JSON request body containing tool metadata.
However, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.
Server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:
- workspaceId
- createdDate
- updatedDate
The request body is directly merged into the underlying database entity without proper DTO validation or authorization checks.
PoC
Authenticate to the Flowise interface.
Capture the request used to update a tool:
PUT /api/v1/tools/<TOOL_ID>
Content-Type: application/json
Modify the request body by injecting additional fields:
{
"name": "aaa",
"description": "bbb",
"color": "linear-gradient(rgb(109,215,45), rgb(136,170,134))",
"schema": "[]",
"func": "",
"iconSrc": "test",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
"createdDate": "1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z",
"updatedDate": "1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z"
}
Send the request.
Observe that the response includes the manipulated fields:
{
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
"createdDate": "1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z"
}
This confirms that client-controlled values are accepted and persisted by the server.
Impact
This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of tool resources.
Confirmed impacts include:
- Cross-workspace reassignment of tools (workspaceId)
- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)
In multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move tools between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T14:52:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the tool update endpoint of FlowiseAI.\n\nThe endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a tool resource.\n\nDue to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign tools to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint responsible for updating tools:\n\n**PUT /api/v1/tools/{toolId}**\n\naccepts a JSON request body containing tool metadata.\n\nHowever, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.\n\nServer-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:\n\n1. workspaceId\n2. createdDate\n3. updatedDate\n\nThe request body is directly merged into the underlying database entity without proper DTO validation or authorization checks.\n\n### PoC\nAuthenticate to the Flowise interface.\n\nCapture the request used to update a tool:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/tools/\u003cTOOL_ID\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\nModify the request body by injecting additional fields:\n\n{\n \"name\": \"aaa\",\n \"description\": \"bbb\",\n \"color\": \"linear-gradient(rgb(109,215,45), rgb(136,170,134))\",\n \"schema\": \"[]\",\n \"func\": \"\",\n \"iconSrc\": \"test\",\n \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\",\n \"createdDate\": \"1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z\",\n \"updatedDate\": \"1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z\"\n}\n\n```\nSend the request.\n\nObserve that the response includes the manipulated fields:\n\n```json\n{\n \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\",\n \"createdDate\": \"1995-03-06T14:17:50.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nThis confirms that client-controlled values are accepted and persisted by the server.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of tool resources.\n\nConfirmed impacts include:\n\n- Cross-workspace reassignment of tools (workspaceId)\n- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)\n\nIn multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move tools between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.",
"id": "GHSA-x5v6-pj28-cwwm",
"modified": "2026-05-14T14:52:40Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T14:52:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-x5v6-pj28-cwwm"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Tool Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace Resource Reassignment"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.