PYSEC-2026-2734

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:15 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05
VLAI
Details

Summary

The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.

This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.

Impact

As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:

  • Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04): An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.

  • Model Theft (OWASP LLM10): If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.

  • Access Policy Bypass: Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.

The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resolve workspace model configurations (system prompts, knowledge bases, RAG pipelines). Therefore, workspace-specific confidential data is not directly exposed through this vector.

PR: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481

Impacted products
Name purl
open-webui pkg:pypi/open-webui

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.124",
        "0.1.125",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.2.2",
        "0.2.3",
        "0.2.4",
        "0.2.5",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.3.1",
        "0.3.10",
        "0.3.12",
        "0.3.13",
        "0.3.14",
        "0.3.15",
        "0.3.16",
        "0.3.17",
        "0.3.17.dev2",
        "0.3.17.dev3",
        "0.3.17.dev4",
        "0.3.17.dev5",
        "0.3.18",
        "0.3.19",
        "0.3.2",
        "0.3.20",
        "0.3.21",
        "0.3.22",
        "0.3.23",
        "0.3.24",
        "0.3.25",
        "0.3.26",
        "0.3.27",
        "0.3.27.dev1",
        "0.3.27.dev2",
        "0.3.27.dev3",
        "0.3.28",
        "0.3.29",
        "0.3.3",
        "0.3.30",
        "0.3.30.dev1",
        "0.3.30.dev2",
        "0.3.31",
        "0.3.31.dev1",
        "0.3.32",
        "0.3.33",
        "0.3.33.dev1",
        "0.3.34",
        "0.3.35",
        "0.3.4",
        "0.3.5",
        "0.3.6",
        "0.3.7",
        "0.3.8",
        "0.3.9",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.4.0.dev1",
        "0.4.0.dev2",
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.4",
        "0.4.5",
        "0.4.6",
        "0.4.6.dev1",
        "0.4.7",
        "0.4.8",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.0.dev1",
        "0.5.0.dev2",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.5.10",
        "0.5.11",
        "0.5.12",
        "0.5.13",
        "0.5.14",
        "0.5.15",
        "0.5.16",
        "0.5.17",
        "0.5.18",
        "0.5.19",
        "0.5.2",
        "0.5.20",
        "0.5.3",
        "0.5.3.dev1",
        "0.5.4",
        "0.5.5",
        "0.5.6",
        "0.5.7",
        "0.5.8",
        "0.5.9",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.6.10",
        "0.6.11",
        "0.6.12",
        "0.6.13",
        "0.6.14",
        "0.6.15",
        "0.6.16",
        "0.6.18",
        "0.6.19",
        "0.6.2",
        "0.6.20",
        "0.6.21",
        "0.6.22",
        "0.6.23",
        "0.6.24",
        "0.6.25",
        "0.6.26",
        "0.6.26.dev1",
        "0.6.27",
        "0.6.28",
        "0.6.29",
        "0.6.3",
        "0.6.30",
        "0.6.31",
        "0.6.32",
        "0.6.33",
        "0.6.34",
        "0.6.35",
        "0.6.36",
        "0.6.37",
        "0.6.38",
        "0.6.39",
        "0.6.4",
        "0.6.40",
        "0.6.41",
        "0.6.42",
        "0.6.43",
        "0.6.5",
        "0.6.6",
        "0.6.6.dev1",
        "0.6.7",
        "0.6.8",
        "0.6.9",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.8.10",
        "0.8.11",
        "0.8.12",
        "0.8.2",
        "0.8.3",
        "0.8.4",
        "0.8.5",
        "0.8.6",
        "0.8.7",
        "0.8.8",
        "0.8.9"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44556",
    "GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.\n\nThis allows any authenticated user \u2014 regardless of role or group assignment \u2014 to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:\n\n- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.\n\n- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.\n\n- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.\n\nThe endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resolve workspace model configurations (system prompts, knowledge bases, RAG pipelines). Therefore, workspace-specific confidential data is not directly exposed through this vector.\n\nPR: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2734",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:13.179622Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:15:41.966847Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44556"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI\u0027s responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization"
}



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