PYSEC-2026-2734
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:15 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05Summary
The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.
This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.
Impact
As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:
-
Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04): An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.
-
Model Theft (OWASP LLM10): If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.
-
Access Policy Bypass: Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.
The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resolve workspace model configurations (system prompts, knowledge bases, RAG pipelines). Therefore, workspace-specific confidential data is not directly exposed through this vector.
PR: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481
| Name | purl | open-webui | pkg:pypi/open-webui |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.1.124",
"0.1.125",
"0.2.0",
"0.2.1",
"0.2.2",
"0.2.3",
"0.2.4",
"0.2.5",
"0.3.0",
"0.3.1",
"0.3.10",
"0.3.12",
"0.3.13",
"0.3.14",
"0.3.15",
"0.3.16",
"0.3.17",
"0.3.17.dev2",
"0.3.17.dev3",
"0.3.17.dev4",
"0.3.17.dev5",
"0.3.18",
"0.3.19",
"0.3.2",
"0.3.20",
"0.3.21",
"0.3.22",
"0.3.23",
"0.3.24",
"0.3.25",
"0.3.26",
"0.3.27",
"0.3.27.dev1",
"0.3.27.dev2",
"0.3.27.dev3",
"0.3.28",
"0.3.29",
"0.3.3",
"0.3.30",
"0.3.30.dev1",
"0.3.30.dev2",
"0.3.31",
"0.3.31.dev1",
"0.3.32",
"0.3.33",
"0.3.33.dev1",
"0.3.34",
"0.3.35",
"0.3.4",
"0.3.5",
"0.3.6",
"0.3.7",
"0.3.8",
"0.3.9",
"0.4.0",
"0.4.0.dev1",
"0.4.0.dev2",
"0.4.1",
"0.4.2",
"0.4.3",
"0.4.4",
"0.4.5",
"0.4.6",
"0.4.6.dev1",
"0.4.7",
"0.4.8",
"0.5.0",
"0.5.0.dev1",
"0.5.0.dev2",
"0.5.1",
"0.5.10",
"0.5.11",
"0.5.12",
"0.5.13",
"0.5.14",
"0.5.15",
"0.5.16",
"0.5.17",
"0.5.18",
"0.5.19",
"0.5.2",
"0.5.20",
"0.5.3",
"0.5.3.dev1",
"0.5.4",
"0.5.5",
"0.5.6",
"0.5.7",
"0.5.8",
"0.5.9",
"0.6.0",
"0.6.1",
"0.6.10",
"0.6.11",
"0.6.12",
"0.6.13",
"0.6.14",
"0.6.15",
"0.6.16",
"0.6.18",
"0.6.19",
"0.6.2",
"0.6.20",
"0.6.21",
"0.6.22",
"0.6.23",
"0.6.24",
"0.6.25",
"0.6.26",
"0.6.26.dev1",
"0.6.27",
"0.6.28",
"0.6.29",
"0.6.3",
"0.6.30",
"0.6.31",
"0.6.32",
"0.6.33",
"0.6.34",
"0.6.35",
"0.6.36",
"0.6.37",
"0.6.38",
"0.6.39",
"0.6.4",
"0.6.40",
"0.6.41",
"0.6.42",
"0.6.43",
"0.6.5",
"0.6.6",
"0.6.6.dev1",
"0.6.7",
"0.6.8",
"0.6.9",
"0.7.0",
"0.7.1",
"0.7.2",
"0.8.0",
"0.8.1",
"0.8.10",
"0.8.11",
"0.8.12",
"0.8.2",
"0.8.3",
"0.8.4",
"0.8.5",
"0.8.6",
"0.8.7",
"0.8.8",
"0.8.9"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44556",
"GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q"
],
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.\n\nThis allows any authenticated user \u2014 regardless of role or group assignment \u2014 to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:\n\n- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.\n\n- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.\n\n- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.\n\nThe endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resolve workspace model configurations (system prompts, knowledge bases, RAG pipelines). Therefore, workspace-specific confidential data is not directly exposed through this vector.\n\nPR: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2734",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:13.179622Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T15:15:41.966847Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23481"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI\u0027s responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.