PYSEC-2026-339
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-06-29 11:50 - Updated: 2026-07-01 20:22Impact
The POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint (CreateJiraBotView) is
reachable without authentication (permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]).
Its attachments payload is fetched server-side via httpx.get() with no URL
validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created.
An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into
fetching arbitrary URLs — including the cloud metadata endpoint at
http://169.254.169.254/ — and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment.
On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod's IAM role. The docstring on the view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it.
Affected code paths:
- src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py — CreateJiraBotView
- src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py — LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachments
- src/firefighter/raid/client.py — RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue
### Patches
Fixed in firefighter-incident 0.0.54:
- CreateJiraBotView now enforces BearerTokenAuthentication + IsAuthenticated.
- attachments URLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection
of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast
or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6).
- Fixes an unrelated KeyError('attachments') surfaced during regression testing.
Users should upgrade to 0.0.54 or later.
### Workarounds
Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation:
- Restrict ingress access to /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot to trusted
networks only (VPN, internal load balancer).
- Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as RAID_JIRA_API_PASSWORD;
this breaks jira.create_issue() before the vulnerable attachment fetch is
reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked — emergency mitigation only).
- Enforce IMDSv2 with HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1 on EC2/EKS nodes. This does
not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path.
### Resources - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery - CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
| Name | purl | firefighter-incident | pkg:pypi/firefighter-incident |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "firefighter-incident",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/firefighter-incident"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.54"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.1",
"0.0.10",
"0.0.11",
"0.0.12",
"0.0.13",
"0.0.14",
"0.0.15",
"0.0.16",
"0.0.17",
"0.0.18",
"0.0.19",
"0.0.1rc1",
"0.0.1rc2",
"0.0.2",
"0.0.20",
"0.0.21",
"0.0.22",
"0.0.23",
"0.0.24",
"0.0.25",
"0.0.26",
"0.0.27",
"0.0.28",
"0.0.29",
"0.0.3",
"0.0.30",
"0.0.31",
"0.0.32",
"0.0.33",
"0.0.34",
"0.0.35",
"0.0.36",
"0.0.37",
"0.0.38",
"0.0.39",
"0.0.4",
"0.0.40",
"0.0.41",
"0.0.42",
"0.0.43",
"0.0.44",
"0.0.45",
"0.0.46",
"0.0.47",
"0.0.48",
"0.0.49",
"0.0.5",
"0.0.50",
"0.0.51",
"0.0.52",
"0.0.53",
"0.0.6",
"0.0.7",
"0.0.8",
"0.0.9"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42864",
"GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc"
],
"details": "### Impact\n The `POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot` endpoint (`CreateJiraBotView`) is\n reachable without authentication (`permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]`).\n Its `attachments` payload is fetched server-side via `httpx.get()` with no URL\n validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created.\n\n An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into\n fetching arbitrary URLs \u2014 including the cloud metadata endpoint at\n `http://169.254.169.254/` \u2014 and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment.\n\n On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the\n temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod\u0027s IAM role. The docstring on the\n view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it.\n\n Affected code paths:\n - `src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py` \u2014 `CreateJiraBotView`\n - `src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py` \u2014 `LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachments`\n - `src/firefighter/raid/client.py` \u2014 `RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue`\n\n ### Patches\n Fixed in `firefighter-incident` `0.0.54`:\n - `CreateJiraBotView` now enforces `BearerTokenAuthentication` + `IsAuthenticated`.\n - `attachments` URLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection\n of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast\n or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6).\n - Fixes an unrelated `KeyError(\u0027attachments\u0027)` surfaced during regression testing.\n\n Users should upgrade to `0.0.54` or later.\n\n ### Workarounds\n Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation:\n - Restrict ingress access to `/api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot` to trusted\n networks only (VPN, internal load balancer).\n - Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as `RAID_JIRA_API_PASSWORD`;\n this breaks `jira.create_issue()` before the vulnerable attachment fetch is\n reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked \u2014 emergency mitigation only).\n - Enforce IMDSv2 with `HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1` on EC2/EKS nodes. This does\n not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path.\n\n ### Resources\n - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery\n - CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-339",
"modified": "2026-07-01T20:22:52.903088Z",
"published": "2026-06-29T11:50:50.634046Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident/security/advisories/GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident/commit/2586679e6f32c12d223668b73e98f4c4de7b771f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/firefighter-incident"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "FireFighter has unauthenticated SSRF in its Raid jira_bot endpoint that allows IAM credential theft"
}
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