CVE-2026-132644 (GCVE-0-2026-132644)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:13 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:24| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:10 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd.patch
7d89e603fc49… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
4ac836afde4a
|
fix: [security] Galaxy cluster imports no longer take over | 7d89e603fc49… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an authorization check (__mayUpdateCapturedCluster) before any update to an existing Galaxy Cluster, permitting the operation only for the cluster's owner organization, a sync user with visibility to the cluster, or a site administrator. It also introduces a CAPTURE_FIELDS allow-list applied via CakePHP's fieldList option on save(), which restricts writable fields and explicitly excludes org_id and orgc_id from the update path, preventing ownership transfer. The captureOrganisationAndSG() call is moved after the authorization check so that a rejected request cannot alter ownership.
Patch summary
In app/Model/GalaxyCluster.php: (1) Added a private const CAPTURE_FIELDS array listing the only fields captureCluster() may write, excluding the 'default' field. (2) Moved the existingGalaxyCluster lookup and the locked-cluster check before the captureOrganisationAndSG() call. (3) Added a call to the new __mayUpdateCapturedCluster() method that enforces owner-org, sync-user-visibility, or site-admin authorization. (4) Changed both save() calls to use ['fieldList' => self::CAPTURE_FIELDS]; the update path further removes org_id and orgc_id from the field list. (5) Added the __mayUpdateCapturedCluster() private method implementing the three-way authorization check. In tests/testregressions.py: added a GalaxyClusterCaptureUpdateGate test class with six test cases covering cross-org refusal, owner acceptance, sync-user visibility gating, and ownership preservation.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; the import endpoint is reachable over HTTP. AC:L: The attacker needs only a valid galaxy-editor account and a target cluster UUID (discoverable via API enumeration or prior knowledge); no race condition or special timing is required. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is needed. PR:L: The attacker requires an authenticated account with the perm_galaxy_editor role, which is a non-trivial but not administrative privilege. UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the import is a server-side API call. VC:N: The primary impact is on integrity of cluster data and ownership; while an attacker could read cluster fields in error responses, the vulnerability is not a confidentiality bypass. VI:H: The attacker can overwrite cluster content (value, description, distribution, etc.) and transfer ownership (org_id, orgc_id) of clusters belonging to other organizations, severely compromising data integrity. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact is evident. SC:N: No impact on connected or downstream systems is demonstrated. SI:H: The integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance is compromised, affecting all consumers of the affected clusters. SA:N: No impact on the security posture of other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The captureCluster() update path performed no check that the requesting user was authorized to modify the specific cluster identified by UUID. Any user with the galaxy editor role could update and take ownership of clusters belonging to other organizations. The authorization logic was entirely absent for the cross-organization case.
- CWE-639 The cluster UUID, supplied by the attacker in the import payload, was used as the sole key to identify the target row for update without verifying that the caller had a legitimate relationship (ownership, sharing-group visibility, or admin role) to that specific resource.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker manipulates the UUID parameter in the galaxies/import request to target a specific Galaxy Cluster belonging to another organization. The system uses this user-supplied identifier to locate and overwrite the target row without validating the caller's authorization over that resource. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: a legitimate API parameter (UUID) is used to redirect the operation to an unauthorized target. Uncertainty: CAPEC-114 typically describes tampering with multiple parameters or injecting unexpected values; here the parameter value is a valid UUID, and the core flaw is the missing authorization check rather than the parameter itself. However, no CAPEC more precisely captures 'using a valid resource identifier to perform an unauthorized operation on that resource,' making CAPEC-114 the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the vulnerability is assumed to affect all versions containing the pre-fix captureCluster() implementation.
- The galaxy editor role (perm_galaxy_editor) is assumed to be a non-administrative, non-trivial permission that can be granted to multiple organizations on a shared MISP instance.
- CVSS VC is rated None because the primary demonstrated impact is integrity (modification and ownership transfer); any incidental confidentiality exposure via error messages is not the core vulnerability.
- CAPEC-114 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available mapping; the core flaw is missing authorization rather than parameter manipulation per se, but no CAPEC more precisely describes 'using a valid resource identifier to perform an unauthorized operation.'
- The 'default' field exclusion from CAPTURE_FIELDS is noted in the commit message but its specific security significance is not further detailed in the patch; it is assumed to prevent modification of a cluster's default/flag status.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
- No specific MISP release version is identified as the first fixed version; the commit date (2026-11-10) is the only temporal anchor available.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 11 | medium | 7 |
- 2026-11-10 16:49 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (4ac836afde4a29a90cd19322f6fb75a6940fb731): fix: [security] Galaxy cluster imports no longer take over https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:09 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd.patch
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"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"ssvcData": {
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T21:10:16Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-132644",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T21:24:15.022183Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-18T22:17:21.600",
"references": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.