CVE-2026-133659 (GCVE-0-2026-133659)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:55 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:38| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:46 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b.patch
af2c034661f8… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a39038de93a4
|
fix: [security] SSO identities and organisations respect | af2c034661f8… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces strict identity and organisation trust boundaries across all SSO providers. Keycloak now requires a verified email claim and no longer falls back to preferred_username. A new shared identity-resolution function rejects any email that maps to an account registered under a different sign-in provider, preventing cross-provider account collision. Entra ID role mapping now requires configured group object IDs (UUIDs) instead of display names, eliminating the name-duplication escalation vector. Default organisation creation always allocates a new organisation rather than reusing one by name match. Case sharing via the API now rejects ambiguous organisation names and requires an explicit organisation ID.
Patch summary
Added app/account/sso_identity.py with a find_sso_user() helper that resolves an email only within its existing auth_provider and returns an error on cross-provider collision. Keycloak token validation now requires email_verified to be true and removes the preferred_username fallback. Entra group resolution switched from displayName to object ID (UUID) with regex validation; default group names removed from config. create_default_org() in admin_core.py now always creates a new Org instead of querying by name. get_org_by_name() in common_core.py changed from .first() to .one_or_none() to raise MultipleResultsFound on ambiguity. case_api.py catches MultipleResultsFound and returns a 400 error directing the caller to use oid. Configuration defaults, template.env, and installation documentation updated to reflect UUID-based group configuration and new SSO identity rules.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: SSO endpoints are network-accessible. AC:L: the attack requires only a valid SSO identity or tenant membership; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is needed. PR:L: the attacker needs a low-privilege SSO account or tenant membership. UI:N: no victim interaction is required; the collision occurs server-side during provisioning or login. VC:H: unauthorized access to private case data and account information. VI:H: privilege escalation via group name duplication and account takeover via cross-provider email collision. VA:N: no denial-of-service impact. SC:N: all impacts are confined to the Flowintel application. SI:N: no impact on other components. SA:N: no safety impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-287 Keycloak accepted unverified email claims and all SSO providers resolved emails to accounts regardless of the original sign-in method, allowing an attacker to authenticate as a different user's identity. This is a failure to properly validate the identity assertion during authentication.
- CWE-639 Entra ID role mapping used user-controllable group display names as the authorization key, and organisation provisioning used user-controlled profile names as the lookup key. An attacker could duplicate these names to gain unauthorized roles or organisation membership.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerabilities arise from the application incorrectly handling edge cases in identity resolution: unverified email claims, cross-provider email collisions, duplicate group display names, and duplicate organisation names. The application assumed these identifiers were unique and trustworthy when they were not. CAPEC-126 is the closest available pattern; a more specific CAPEC for identity-confusion or name-collision attacks does not exist in the CAPEC catalogue, making this the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context; the patch does not contain version-specific markers.
- PR:L assumes the attacker already possesses a valid SSO identity or Entra tenant membership; the patch does not specify whether SSO is enabled by default.
- CAPEC-126 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers identity-confusion or name-collision attacks, so this mapping is approximate.
- The CVSS vector assumes the SSO endpoints are reachable over the network without additional network segmentation; the patch does not specify deployment topology.
- The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerabilities were disclosed under a coordinated disclosure program or whether a CVE has been assigned.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 09:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b): fix: [security] SSO identities and organisations respect https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:45 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b.patch
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{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-287"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.