CVE-2026-133661 (GCVE-0-2026-133661)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:57 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:37| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/112… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:51 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch
55e725f916cd… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
11263af5a84f
|
fix: [security] Connector credentials stay within their | 55e725f916cd… |
Fix summary
The patch enforces strict visibility and ownership checks on all connector instance access paths, including metadata retrieval, connectivity tests, and case listings. It ensures that case templates only expose and copy connector instances visible to the acting user. Additionally, it mandates API key re-entry when changing instance URLs or sharing scopes to prevent credential leakage or unauthorized reuse. Finally, it decouples outbound MISP keys from incoming alert authentication, requiring distinct credentials for alert ingestion.
Patch summary
Added `is_instance_visible_to_user` checks to connector API endpoints, tool helpers, and template serialization logic. Modified `normalize_instance_sharing_scope` and `edit_connector_instance_core` to detect URL/scope changes and enforce API key re-entry via `instance_edit_requires_api_key`. Updated `connector_from_key` in alerting to skip outbound MISP instances. Adjusted template JSON serialization to filter connector instances based on user visibility. Updated tests to use authorized global instances.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack target (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is limited to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the local system (VC:L, VI:L, VA:L) as it involves unauthorized access to data and potential credential misuse, but does not compromise the entire system or other systems (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The primary issue is the lack of authorization checks when accessing connector instances and template data, allowing users to access resources they do not own or have visibility to.
- CWE-287 The system incorrectly accepted outbound MISP keys for incoming alert authentication, failing to properly distinguish and validate the source of credentials.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access connector metadata and case data without proper authorization checks, fitting the pattern of accessing functionality without proper authentication/authorization.
- CAPEC-100 The credential scope confusion and lack of visibility checks allow users to leverage trusted context (e.g., shared keys or template attachments) to access resources in a multi-tenant or multi-user environment.
Assumptions to verify
- The CVSS vector assumes that the vulnerability requires low privileges (PR:L) as it affects authenticated users.
- The CAPEC mapping to CAPEC-100 is based on the multi-tenant nature of the credential scope confusion, but the exact attack pattern may vary.
- The affected version is assumed to be < 4.1.0 based on the fixed version provided in the metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
10 | 11 | high | 3 |
- 2026-10-30 16:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840): fix: [security] Connector credentials stay within their https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:50 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch
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"app/templating/templating_api.py",
"app/tools/tools.py",
"app/tools/tools_core.py",
"app/alerting/alerting_core.py"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
"vendor": "flowintel",
"versions": [
{
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"status": "affected",
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],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
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"credits": [
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"type": "reporter",
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{
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"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "David Cruciani"
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],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "FlowIntel contains multiple authorization and credential management vulnerabilities affecting connector instances, MISP helper tools, and case templates.\n\n- Connector instance metadata, connectivity checks, and case listings accepted instance IDs without verifying if the acting user had visibility or ownership rights, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive configuration and data.\n- Case template serialization and creation processes exposed connector instances attached to templates regardless of the user\u0027s permissions, potentially leaking credentials or instance details to users who should not have access.\n- Editing connector instances allowed changes to URLs or sharing scopes without requiring re-authentication of API keys, enabling the reuse of another user\u0027s credentials in a new context or the leakage of shared keys to unauthorized endpoints.\n- Outbound MISP connector keys were incorrectly accepted for authenticating incoming alerts, bypassing the intended separation between outbound integration credentials and inbound alert source authentication.\n\nThese issues allow authenticated users to access unauthorized connector data, manipulate credential scopes, and potentially exploit credential confusion between different security contexts.\n\nAffected versions: \u003c 4.1.0"
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{
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"descriptions": [
{
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"value": "CAPEC-100 Leveraging Trusted Context in a Multi-Tenant Environment"
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]
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"metrics": [
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
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"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
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},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
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],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:51:05Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
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"scenarios": [
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"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862 Missing Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
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"description": "CWE-287 Improper Authentication",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T10:57:13.587Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
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],
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}
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"solutions": [
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"lang": "en",
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}
],
"title": "FlowIntel: Missing Authorization and Credential Scope Enforcement in Connector and Template Features",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
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"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
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"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The CVSS vector assumes that the vulnerability requires low privileges (PR:L) as it affects authenticated users.",
"The CAPEC mapping to CAPEC-100 is based on the multi-tenant nature of the credential scope confusion, but the exact attack pattern may vary.",
"The affected version is assumed to be \u003c 4.1.0 based on the fixed version provided in the metadata."
],
"capecRationale": [
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"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"rationale": "The vulnerability allows users to access connector metadata and case data without proper authorization checks, fitting the pattern of accessing functionality without proper authentication/authorization."
},
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-100",
"rationale": "The credential scope confusion and lack of visibility checks allow users to leverage trusted context (e.g., shared keys or template attachments) to access resources in a multi-tenant or multi-user environment."
}
],
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"credits": [
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"type": "reporter",
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{
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"cvssRationale": "The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack target (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is limited to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the local system (VC:L, VI:L, VA:L) as it involves unauthorized access to data and potential credential misuse, but does not compromise the entire system or other systems (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).",
"fixSummary": "The patch enforces strict visibility and ownership checks on all connector instance access paths, including metadata retrieval, connectivity tests, and case listings. It ensures that case templates only expose and copy connector instances visible to the acting user. Additionally, it mandates API key re-entry when changing instance URLs or sharing scopes to prevent credential leakage or unauthorized reuse. Finally, it decouples outbound MISP keys from incoming alert authentication, requiring distinct credentials for alert ingestion.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-20T10:51:05.201510Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
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"rankings": [
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"assumptionCount": 3,
"confidence": "high",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 10
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "55e725f916cd920a7cf6427e24bba4d8caef31e494562ba742ea2200458dc6ba",
"patchSummary": "Added `is_instance_visible_to_user` checks to connector API endpoints, tool helpers, and template serialization logic. Modified `normalize_instance_sharing_scope` and `edit_connector_instance_core` to detect URL/scope changes and enforce API key re-entry via `instance_edit_requires_api_key`. Updated `connector_from_key` in alerting to skip outbound MISP instances. Adjusted template JSON serialization to filter connector instances based on user visibility. Updated tests to use authorized global instances.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
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"date": "Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:41:11 +0100",
"patchSha256": "55e725f916cd920a7cf6427e24bba4d8caef31e494562ba742ea2200458dc6ba",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-20T10:50:25.040561Z",
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch",
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}
],
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{
"Exploitation": "none"
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{
"Automatable": "yes"
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{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:51:05Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Connector credentials stay within their",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"rationale": "The primary issue is the lack of authorization checks when accessing connector instances and template data, allowing users to access resources they do not own or have visibility to."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"rationale": "The system incorrectly accepted outbound MISP keys for incoming alert authentication, failing to properly distinguish and validate the source of credentials."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840): fix: [security] Connector credentials stay within their",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
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"timestamp": "2026-10-30T16:41:11Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
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{
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"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
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}
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},
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"cveMetadata": {
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Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.