CVE-2026-133662 (GCVE-0-2026-133662)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:57 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:37| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:49 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e.patch
5d485ef0a573… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
90e2845cf623
|
fix: [security] Analyser saves and results respect case and | 5d485ef0a573… |
Fix summary
The patch enforces authorization on both read and write paths for analyzer results. A new ownership/admin check gates result retrieval in both the web view and the API. Before any write operation, the target case is resolved and the caller's membership (or admin role) is verified; restricted-task permissions are additionally enforced. Input validation rejects malformed or conflicting destination selections, and task-note errors now abort the save. The front-end template was updated to surface 403 permission errors instead of silently treating them as generic failures.
Patch summary
Added can_read_result() in misp_modules_core.py to verify result ownership or admin role; called from both analyzer_api.py Result.get() and misp_modules.py misp_module_result_data(). Rewrote manage_notes_selected() to validate request structure, resolve the target case before any mutation, check case membership and restricted-task permissions, reject conflicting destinations, and propagate task-note errors. Updated the HTML template to check !res.ok instead of res.status==400 so 403 responses are displayed to the user.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L – exploitation requires only a valid session and a known or guessable UUID/ID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N – no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L – any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit. UI:N – no victim interaction required. VC:N – the application's own configuration/secrets are not exposed. VI:H – unauthorized writes corrupt another organization's case data (notes, tasks, MISP objects). VA:N – no denial-of-service impact. SC:H – another user's analyzer results are fully readable. SI:H – another organization's case integrity is compromised by injected data. SA:N – no security-authority impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-639 Both the read path (result UUID) and the write path (case_id, task_id) accepted user-supplied identifiers without verifying that the caller was authorized to access the referenced resource. This is a textbook IDOR / user-controlled key authorization bypass.
- CWE-862 The save handler performed writes to cases and tasks without any membership or role check, and the result-read endpoints returned data without any ownership check. The authorization logic was simply absent rather than bypassed via a crafted key, making CWE-862 a complementary mapping.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-129 The attacker manipulates the case_id, task_id, or result UUID parameters supplied in API or form requests to reference resources belonging to other users or organizations. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed IDOR behavior. The mapping is a best-fit; CAPEC does not have a dedicated 'IDOR' pattern, and parameter tampering is the standard classification for user-controlled identifier abuse.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
- PR:L assumes that any authenticated non-admin user can exploit the IDOR; the patch does not indicate additional role gates beyond authentication.
- AC:L assumes UUIDs are guessable or discoverable (e.g., via logs, other endpoints, or sequential enumeration); if UUIDs are truly random 128-bit, AC could be H, but the case/task ID path uses integer IDs which are trivially enumerable.
- CAPEC-129 is the closest available pattern; CAPEC lacks a dedicated IDOR entry, so parameter tampering is used as the best-fit mapping.
- The SSVC 'automatable: yes' assessment assumes integer-based case/task IDs are enumerable; UUID-based result reads may be harder to automate without prior knowledge of the UUID.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-10-30 15:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e): fix: [security] Analyser saves and results respect case and https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:49 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e.patch
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}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.