CVE-2026-133663 (GCVE-0-2026-133663)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:58 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:25
VLAI
Title
flowintel Insecure Direct Object Reference Allows Cross-Case Data Access and Modification
Summary
flowintel contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability affecting multiple endpoints that manage child records of cases and tasks. An authenticated user with access to one case or task could read or modify records belonging to other cases by supplying identifiers of those records directly in the request. Affected operations include: - Reading task notes, subtasks, and URL tools by referencing their IDs without verifying they belong to the authorized task - Retrieving task assignees for a task belonging to a different case - Editing or deleting timeline events and timeline event links belonging to another case - Editing or removing case connectors belonging to another case - Invoking connector module operations (MISP, generic connectors, worker calls) by combining an authorized case with a connector link from a different case The root cause is that the application authorized the parent resource (case or task) in the URL but then fetched or operated on the child record independently without verifying the child's ownership relationship to the authorized parent. Security impact: an authenticated user can exfiltrate sensitive threat intelligence data from cases they do not have access to, and can modify or delete timeline entries, connector configurations, and other records in unauthorized cases, leading to data integrity loss and potential disruption of incident response workflows. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 10:47 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 18:24 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 10:47
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae.patch 5d78368cb0dd…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
fecba79506de fix: [security] Child records stay bound to their authorised 5d78368cb0dd…
Fix summary

The fix enforces ownership validation by requiring the authorized parent case or task ID in every core method that reads or writes child records. Before returning data or performing writes, each child record's case_id or task_id is explicitly compared against the resolved parent. Mismatched records are rejected with a 404 or 403 response. Connector module context building now verifies connector-to-case ownership before preparing module data, resolving credentials, or executing sync operations. Instance visibility checks are applied consistently across both web and API routes.

Patch summary

Added case_id or task_id ownership checks in CaseCore.py methods (remove_connector, edit_connector, edit_timeline_event, edit_timeline_event_link, _build_case_connector_module_context) by passing the authorized parent ID and comparing it against the child record's foreign key. Updated case.py get_assigned_users to verify task.case_id matches the resolved case. Updated case_api.py EditConnectorsCase and RemoveConnectors to validate connector ownership and instance visibility before delegating. Updated case_misp.py timeline and connector endpoints to pass case.id to core methods. Updated task_api.py note, subtask, and URL-tool GET handlers to verify the child's task_id matches the authorized task.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - exploitable over the network via HTTP API. AC:L - the attacker only needs to know or enumerate valid child record IDs; no special race conditions or complex setup required. AT:N - no attack target manipulation needed. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with access to at least one case or task. UI:N - no user interaction required. VC:H - full read access to sensitive threat intelligence data in other cases. VI:H - ability to modify or delete timeline events, links, and connectors in other cases. VA:N - no denial-of-service impact. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the flowintel application's own data store; no external system impact is evidenced.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-639 The vulnerability is a classic IDOR: user-supplied identifiers for child records (notes, subtasks, connectors, timeline events) are used to fetch or modify objects without verifying the object belongs to the authorized parent case or task. The authorization check on the parent does not constrain the child lookup.
  • CWE-862 Several endpoints performed the operation on a child record without any ownership or authorization check tying the record to the user's authorized case, effectively missing the authorization step for the specific object being accessed.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-1 The attacker manipulates URL path parameters or query string identifiers (note_id, subtask_id, url_tool_id, connector instance ID, timeline event ID) to reference objects belonging to other cases or tasks. The application did not validate that the referenced object belonged to the authorized parent, allowing cross-tenant data access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern; the attack does not involve protocol-level tampering but rather parameter substitution in REST-style URLs, which falls under the broader 'tamper with URLs' category.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); no earlier version boundary is confirmed.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid case or task membership; the patch does not clarify whether anonymous access is possible.
  • CAPEC-1 (Tamper with URLs) is the closest available pattern; the actual attack is parameter substitution in REST endpoints rather than classic URL tampering, but no more specific CAPEC exists for IDOR via REST identifiers.
  • VC:H and VI:H assume the data in other cases is sensitive and that modification/deletion constitutes full integrity loss; the patch does not specify data classification.
  • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was disclosed publicly or under embargo; exploitation status is assumed to be 'none' based on absence of evidence.
  • Instance visibility enforcement (can_interact_with_case_connector) was added to the API route in case_api.py but was already present in case_misp.py; the patch ensures consistency rather than introducing a new check in all locations.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 high 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-10-30 13:58 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae): fix: [security] Child records stay bound to their authorised https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae.patch
  2. 2026-11-20 10:46 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae.patch
Show details on NVD website

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                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ],
          "ssvcV203": [
            {
              "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
              "ssvcData": {
                "options": [
                  {
                    "exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "technicalImpact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "Supplier",
                "timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:47:07Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              }
            },
            {
              "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "ssvcData": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-133663",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "technicalImpact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-11-20T18:24:45.904432Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-11-20T11:18:34.710",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
            "url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-639"
              },
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-862"
              }
            ],
            "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}


Solutions

CNA · CIRCL
The fix enforces ownership validation by requiring the authorized parent case or task ID in every core method that reads or writes child records. Before returning data or performing writes, each child record's case_id or task_id is explicitly compared against the resolved parent. Mismatched records are rejected with a 404 or 403 response. Connector module context building now verifies connector-to-case ownership before preparing module data, resolving credentials, or executing sync operations. Instance visibility checks are applied consistently across both web and API routes.

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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.