CVE-2026-45556 (GCVE-0-2026-45556)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-10 14:00 – Updated: 2026-06-10 14:42
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Roxy-WI: Authenticated arbitrary file write on every managed load balancer (and downstream RCE) via WAF rule save `config_file_name`
Summary
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save accepts a config_file_name form field that is passed straight through to config_mod.master_slave_upload_and_restart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain (_replace_config_path_to_correct → check_is_conf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginx_cfg_evil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root — full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Severity
9.9 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-10 14:42 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advis… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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