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GHSA-RH53-XVX2-J327

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:41 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:41
VLAI
Summary
OpenChoreo: cluster-gateway internal proxy performs no caller authentication and is not read-only — data-plane Secret disclosure and arbitrary Kubernetes mutation
Details

Summary

The OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (/api/proxy/, /api/exec/, /api/wirelogs/) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as "read-only," the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.

Impact

An attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:

  • Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside kube-system in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.
  • Workload tampering or destruction — creating, modifying, or deleting Deployments, Services, and other resources.
  • Pod command execution inside workload pods via /api/exec/.

This is also the missing second authorization layer behind GHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmx (the openchoreo-api exec/wirelogs cross-project authorization bypass): because the gateway provides no compensating authorization, that bypass — and any other authz gap or SSRF that reaches the internal API — reaches the data-plane Kubernetes API unchecked.

Direct exploitability depends on the network isolation of the internal listener, which is not fixed in source. Where the internal port is reachable by untrusted workloads with no restrictive NetworkPolicy — and with impact landing in a separate data-plane cluster — this is Critical; it is scored conservatively as High otherwise.

Patches

Fixed in 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0. Upgrade path: 1.1.x → 1.1.2, 1.0.x and earlier → 1.0.2, 1.2.0-rc1 line → 1.2.0.

Severity
9.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 1.2.0-rc.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.0-rc.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73842"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:41:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T22:17:29Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes\u0027 Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can \u2014 with no client certificate or token \u2014 read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane\u0027s Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure \u2014 reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destruction \u2014 creating, modifying, or deleting Deployments, Services, and other resources.\n- Pod command execution inside workload pods via `/api/exec/`.\n\nThis is also the missing second authorization layer behind GHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmx (the openchoreo-api exec/wirelogs cross-project authorization bypass): because the gateway provides no compensating authorization, that bypass \u2014 and any other authz gap or SSRF that reaches the internal API \u2014 reaches the data-plane Kubernetes API unchecked.\n\nDirect exploitability depends on the network isolation of the internal listener, which is not fixed in source. Where the internal port is reachable by untrusted workloads with no restrictive NetworkPolicy \u2014 and with impact landing in a separate data-plane cluster \u2014 this is Critical; it is scored conservatively as High otherwise.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0. Upgrade path: 1.1.x \u2192 1.1.2, 1.0.x and earlier \u2192 1.0.2, 1.2.0-rc1 line \u2192 1.2.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T21:41:39Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T21:41:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/security/advisories/GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73842"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4256"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4258"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4259"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/50fcae3f1753fd0ac3ae655a3fc080a761c49c04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/93e6f10953cfc249af2222ddb6730d4b0a729129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/e3da3c63dcf0895c693cb17ce142ef95e959b62a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.1.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.2.0-rc.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenChoreo: cluster-gateway internal proxy performs no caller authentication and is not read-only \u2014 data-plane Secret disclosure and arbitrary Kubernetes mutation"
}



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